“Men don’t stumble over mountains but over molehills.”
The veteran journalist Shastri Ramachandaran begins Beyond Binaries: The World of India and China, his highly readable book on the complex bilateral relations between India and China, with this aphorism by Confucius. The book, a compilation of Ramachandaran’s published writings from 2008 to 2022, is divided into four sections: “India-China relations”, “The World of India and China”, “Manufacturing Mindsets”, and “Reading the Tea Leaves”. Rather than summarise each section, I would like to touch upon facets from each that were of interest to me, and I hope, the general reader.
Beyond Binaries: The World of India and China
Institute of Objective Studies, 2024
Pages: 309
Price: Rs.750
Ramachandaran describes China’s one-child policy, implemented from 1978 to 2015, as a coercive programme of immense political and economic significance. If the Communist Party of China (CPC) could decide the size of an individual’s family for the economic betterment of the nation, was that not evidence enough of an overwhelming political temperament of absoluteness? However, since January 1, 2016, Chinese citizens have been allowed to have two children, marking the end of the one-child policy and in order to assuage the concerns of the country becoming old before becoming rich in economic terms.
1978 was also the year that witnessed the first rumblings of upheaval within the CPC in the direction of economic transformation, after decades of overall privation stemming from Mao Zedong’s idyllic visions of what Chinese communism ought to be. The deaths of both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1976 paved the way for a brief interregnum, first with Hua Guofeng (also known as “Two Whatever’s Hu”) and then Deng Xiaoping.
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When there is transformation in the systemic working of a country, social and administrative mannerisms are bound to change. In a chapter titled “Behind the Great Wall”, Ramachandaran examines the phenomenon of corruption in China’s reform era. While being understated and deferential had been the norm earlier, “materialism” was now the buzzword, with newly rich political entrepreneurs within the CPC and large-scale corruption gaining tacit approval as the price to pay for better lives and greater opportunities.
A history of cooperation and conflict
As neighbours, China and India have, in their own ways, come a long way. Beyond statistics, if two words could characterise the India-China bilateral ties, they would be “cooperation” and “conflict”. Bilateral trade in 2023 clearly revealed that China enjoys a trade surplus of over $100 billion with India. It is an unusual composition of trade, with India being China’s client for manufactured products and refined chemicals that are valuable to pharmaceutical companies, followed by industrial machinery, electronics and electrical goods. There is a stasis, with domestic economic and political lobbies wary of Chinese imports requiring higher slabs of import duties, since they are manufactured way below the production costs here. Cooperation in trade issues requires administrative and institutional finesse on both sides, adhering to WTO norms and cases regarding competition and dumping. India requires its political parties to discuss Chinese imports and its impact, both positive and negative, on our large manufacturing workforce.
Conflict is a persistent feature in bilateral relations, and memories of the 1962 conflict continue to reverberate in India, with boundary disputes being paramount during bilateral discussions. Can we go beyond the debacle of 1962 to look at a constructive engagement with China in many spheres? Ramachandaran mentions a “package deal” proposed by former Chinese President Deng Xiaoping in the late 1980s to a visiting delegation from India.
After this came the Joint Working Group (JWG), the first official bilateral administrative mechanism formed post-1962 by India and China, followed by the Special Representative (SR) mechanism on the boundary question which was constituted in 2003. Since 2005, the JWG has not met. The SRs have met many times to discuss the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) with military commanders actively participating in the deliberations. China’s violations on the India-China border in the Himalaya are a recurrent event, stifling any sincere solutions and the playing of who will blink first.
Ramachandaran has also dwelt on political personalities and their centrality to the bilateral ties, especially the boundary dispute. Prime Ministers Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Narendra Modi have all attempted to steer towards a solution, without any success. The lack of a domestic political consensus on an eventual (even hypothetical) settlement of dispute stymies both nations. From India’s perspective, the official mechanism has to be complemented by non-official Track-2 mechanisms, and Parliament needs to be informed about talks conducted with anticipated outcomes.
Tensions in high mountain areas find mention more in the Indian media. The absence of the voices of the residents in the areas of dispute, who largely belong to Tibetan ethnicity, is conspicuous. The lack of consideration in listening to the views of Tibetans makes the issue of settlement even more fraught with uncertainty, since they are considered “refugees” in India and a minority in China.
Balanced perspective
Is land the issue here? As the world’s highest plateau, Tibet is a rich repository of minerals and resources, especially rare earths, so coveted by a technology-dependent world. China leads the world in the rare earth industry, adding one more determinant to a possible conflictual template in India-China bilateral ties. A lackadaisical participation in mutual multilateral forums adds to bilateral discomfiture, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation being a prime example.
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Other irritants in the bilateral relations include China’s stonewalling of India’s bids to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and gain entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group. In his conclusion titled “One mountain, two tigers”, Ramachandaran mentions the current stalemate following the Doklam incident of 2017 as reinforcing India’s view of China as a belligerent state that frequently violates norms of international relations. This is where the role of academic institutions and think tanks will be valuable as anodes in bilateral relations that require more ballast.
All in all, Ramachandaran’s book is much needed for its balanced perspective. This reviewer feels that maritime bilateral ties, a matter of mutual discomfort, needed some explication. Also, a detailed index and a list of interviews conducted would have enhanced this book, which will be greatly appreciated by scholars and teachers of area studies alike.
Raviprasad Narayanan is faculty with School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
