Something is rotten in the state of Maharashtra

The State’s once-moderate politics is dominated by power grabs, parochial appeals and noisy conflicts, eroding its reputation for balanced governance.

Shiv Sena party workers take a special train to Ayodhya from Thane in 2018. | Photo Credit: VIBHAV BIRWATKAR

If one were looking for just one example of what is wrong with politics in the State of Maharashtra, a statement by the BJP leader and Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis might serve the purpose well. In his capacity as Home Minister, referring to a youth who supposedly posted some text glorifying Aurangzeb on social media, Fadnavis said on June 7, 2023: “I know where these progeny of Aurangzeb [‘aulad’, a pejorative colloquial term] come from....” (Speaking in Hindi, Fadnavis said: “Somewhat suddenly, in some places in Maharashtra, aulads of Aurangzeb are being bred… we shall find out who their real owners are....”) In a sense, that statement represents the verbal and substantive rot that has set in in the politics of Maharashtra.

Sandwiched between the “north” and the “south”, Maharashtra has often displayed a tendency to vacillate between the sociopolitical features of both regions. However, it used to always display a marked trend towards moderation. Thus, if in the early 20th century, Maharashtra, like the province of Madras, had a Brahmanetar (non-Brahman) movement, it still did not produce a more pronounced anti-Brahminism sentiment while bringing about a reconstruction of power relations in the Marathi-speaking region.

Similarly, when by the late 20th century, the north was upholding a strong and vocal Hindutva among the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), Maharashtra too witnessed the rise of “vernacular” (a term used by Thomas Blom Hansen in the mid-1990s) Hindutva in the early 1990s, but unlike in the north, that did not produce a full-fledged dominance of the BJP at that time.

More contemporarily, this distinction for moderation appears to be declining. While politics has become extremely competitive—something that may seem to be a welcome feature in a democracy—current developments are robbing the State of its historical roots, giving way to crass power struggles, parochial identities, and sociopolitical conflicts that are of a verbose and voluble nature but leave the competitiveness empty of content. Fadnavis’ statement mentioned above is part of this process. It also represents the urgency with which the BJP is trying to polarise the public sphere along religious lines.

Members of Sakal Hindu Samaj protest against love jehad at Shivaji Park, Dadar, in January 2023. | Photo Credit: EMMANUAL YOGINI

So, the story of Maharashtra in the past decade is one of a State losing its sociopolitical identity, giving up its progressive pretensions, and falling into the all-India trap of degeneration into sub-democratic politics.

At a superficial level, political fragmentation and a collapse of governance mark the rot in the State. Since 2014, a large number of Congress and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) leaders have moved over to the BJP. This steady stream of defections not only weakened the two Congress parties but also ensured a broader acceptability for the politics of the BJP. For a long time, Maharashtra had two major State-level players: the Shiv Sena and the NCP. Between 2019 and 2024, both the parties were split in two. One faction of each entered into an alliance with the BJP.

At the same time, the State has been witnessing a steady rise in the number of smaller parties. These often lack any ideology and organisation. They are mostly confined to one or two districts and are willing to do business with any of the major players. Even the Vanchit Bahujan Aaghadi (Front of the Deprived Bahujans) led by Prakash Ambedkar only remained a spoiler without consolidating its own strength between 2019 and 2024. All these developments have resulted in a chaotic fragmentation of the political arena, making the social bases of all the parties uncertain and shaky.

But this summary of competitive politics would be simplistic if we were to ignore the long-term trends and the deeper rot.

Mass appeal of Hindutva

Two features that have their roots in the 1980s characterise the State’s politics today. In the early 1980s, the political elite (mostly from the Maratha caste cluster) lost their connection with the economy and an ability to minimally regulate the dominant material forces. This made their political clout rather vacuous, leading to frustration among the community at large. Then, around the late 1980s, the spread of Hindutva in the rural areas and small towns took place through small-time organisations, resulting in the popularity of the ideology across regions and castes. Both Marathas and the OBCs were attracted to a Hindutva that gave them a sense of vicarious militancy and aggression.

Congress workers join the election campaign of Vikas Thakre, who fought against BJP’s Nitin Gadkari, in Jaitala Chowk in Nagpur in April 2023. | Photo Credit: EMMANUAL YOGINI

In the past decade, these two features have become the dominant characteristics. Not only have the Marathas become more frustrated and distrustful of their own leadership, but the political elite have become even more accommodative of dominant material interests. The suspicion of industrial interests in neighbouring Gujarat is a political fallout of this. Another fallout is the increasing rivalry between the Marathas and the OBCs.

Highlights

• Maharashtra, once a bastion of political moderation, is now struggling with a surge in Hindutva ideology and fragmented party politics.
• The BJP’s ascendance has shaken up traditional power structures, while localized Hindutva groups stoke religious tensions with impunity.
• As governance falters and administrative machinery becomes politicised, Maharashtra faces a crucial test: whether it can reclaim its pluralist heritage or succumb to divisive politics.

At the same time, more viciously than in the late 1980s, localised Hindutva organisations are active today, enjoying impunity and often the acquiescence of the state machinery. They are busy vitiating the social atmosphere in the name of “love jehad” and other agenda items of Hindutva politics. Thus, a lack of control by the political elite over the economy and the collusion of sections of the political elite with crass vigilante elements of Hindutva overshadow the politics of Maharashtra today.

RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat with Maharashtra Deputy Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis in Mumbai on June 29, 2024. Localised Hindutva organisations are active today, enjoying impunity and often the acquiescence of the state machinery. | Photo Credit: PTI

For quite some time, the State has practically given up on systematic planning. All decisions are in the form of knee-jerk responses and all pretence of planning is sacrificed at the altar of ad hoc packages that Ministers announce to placate immediate distress. More seriously, governance has become nominal with the increasing politicisation of the administrative machinery. Civil and police administrations are becoming extensions of the ruling parties, working in their service. The State government has been systematically weaponising the government machinery to discourage dissent. Above all, the political class has cynically allowed the Maratha issue to keep boiling with false promises.

BJP, the main driver of electoral politics

The competitive politics in the State unfolds in this complex context. With nine seats in 2024, the BJP may not appear to have improved its condition from its 2009 tally of exactly the same austere number, but politics in the State has changed almost dramatically in the intervening time. For the BJP, despite its seat tally going back to its strength in 2009, there are three major differences. One, in place of just a little over 18 per cent in 2009, its 2024 vote share is 26 per cent. This is only about two percentage points less than its vote share in the last two Lok Sabha elections (2014 and 2019).

Second, in the last two Lok Sabha elections, the BJP won a large number of seats (23) from the State, making it the dominant party there. Third, in the Assembly elections that followed the Lok Sabha elections in 2014 and 2019, the performance of the BJP was quite handsome: with a vote share similar to that in the general election, the party won 122 and 105 seats respectively in the 288-member Assembly. In other words, the BJP, the somewhat weak player in State politics two decades ago, has now become the main driver of electoral politics in Maharashtra.

Civil and police administration are becoming extensions of the ruling parties, working in their service. In this image from 2014, police lathicharge Youth Congress workers who were trying to enter the municipal headquarters in south Mumbai to protest against the poor condition of roads in the city. | Photo Credit: VIVEK BENDRE

This electoral ascendance has naturally enthused the party, which believes it is on the verge of becoming the State’s dominant force and aims to steer social and political processes in tune with its all-India ambitions. The gap between capacity and ambition produces tensions in the arena of competitive politics and, more generally, in the social sphere. Much of the cynical politics and excited mobilisations that the State has seen in recent times is because of the urgency with which the BJP is trying to match its limited capacity to its far-reaching ambition.

That larger ambition is twofold: first, to transform Maharashtra into a “party State”, as in Gujarat or as is happening in Madhya Pradesh, where the party controls the entire public space; and second, to make Hindutva the lingua franca of social-cultural exchange. The recent Lok Sabha election showed that, unlike in 2014 and 2019, there is space for an opposition in the State now. But the Assembly elections in 2014 and 2019 underscored the BJP’s ability to emerge as the single largest party. So, even if its ambitions are not immediately fulfilled, a handsome performance in the Assembly election would enable it to keep both the above aspirations alive. On the other hand, buoyed by its success in the Lok Sabha election, the Maha Vikas Aghadi could hope to restrict the BJP’s electoral march.

For a democratic Maharashtra

But the real challenge is beyond electoral calculations. It is about how the non-BJP parties understand the current moment and their responsibility at this juncture. Do the non-BJP parties really want to strengthen the Maharashtra dharma and enter into a deeper confrontation with the BJP? Do the non-BJP parties intend to build on the inheritance of Yashwantrao Chavan’s pluralist accommodation?

Achieving these will require reimagining social relations and reworking the political terrain. Keeping the BJP out of power might be easier than reimagining a democratic Maharashtra that will not be lured by exclusionary politics. One can only wish that the non-BJP parties will take up the challenge seriously. One fears that they are ill-equipped to pitch the battle at this level. And therein lies the present tragedy of Maharashtra.

Suhas Palshikar, based in Pune, taught political science and is co-author (with Rajeshwari Deshpande) of The Last Fortress of Congress Dominance: Maharashtra since the 1990s (2021).