National security cannot be made negotiable: Admiral Arun Prakash

Former Chief of the Naval Staff critiques the Agnipath scheme’s impact, its fiscal flaws, and offers recommendations.

Admiral Arun Prakash at his farewell given by the Eastern Naval Command at its headquarters in Visakhapatnam on September 28, 2006, as his successor, Vice Admiral Sureesh Mehta, looks on. | Photo Credit: K. R. DEEPAK

Admiral Arun Prakash retired as India’s 20th Chief of the Naval Staff and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 2006. After retirement, he served on the National Security Advisory Board and led the National Maritime Foundation. In an interview with Frontline, he pointed out possible ramifications of the Agnipath scheme as it exists today and recommended modifications in the short-service model that has changed the recruitment process for armed forces personnel below officer rank. Excerpts:

Do you think that the Agnipath scheme was introduced at the right time?

Given that recruitment had been suspended for two to three years because of COVID and that the Galwan incident [June 15, 2020] had demanded an urgent deployment of additional troops in Ladakh, the scheme was most ill-timed. In any case, such a radical scheme should, under no circumstances, have been introduced without a trial in the regular Army, Territorial Army, or Central Armed Police Forces. 

Is it suitable for the Navy?

In its present format, as learnt from the media, I consider the initial training period of 4.5 months, for an Agniveer, followed by 15 days of sea experience and 15 days’ branch training as grossly inadequate for meaningful employment in all but the most basic duties in a warship or shore naval unit. During the following 3.5 years, minus leave spells, the entrant would have attained bare levels of professional competence before he/she is discharged from service. .

According to the government, the scheme is aimed at making the forces younger and more agile. It is supposed to provide the civilian labour market with disciplined and skilled young individuals. 

Given that it requires a certain amount of maturity and experience to operate modern weapons systems and to lead small bodies of men in combat, there was nothing wrong with the average age profile of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen. This is our experience and has been proven in recent conflicts. There may have been an age problem in the context of Army officers commanding battalions and brigades, but the solution to that lay elsewhere. The role of the armed forces is to safeguard the nation’s security and integrity against external threats. Providing “the civilian labour market with disciplined and skilled young individuals” etc., etc., must not be made their charter or responsibility.

How do you assess the scheme when it comes to enhancing operational effectiveness of the armed forces compared with traditional recruitment methods?

This is best assessed by unit commanders who have to employ Agniveers on professional tasks in operational areas. However, truncated training and concern about bleak future prospects are likely to impact the combat effectiveness as well as the motivation levels.

Some experts believe that the temporary nature of military service under the Agnipath scheme might affect the morale and cohesion of new recruits.

It must be recognised that military service, followed by a lifetime pension, had become an important socio-economic factor that impacted the future of whole families in many parts of rural India as well as neighbouring Nepal. In comparison, four years of employment, with an uncertain future, is likely to impact the morale and motivation of recruits.

How do you view concerns about disability pensions and other benefits for Agniveers, who may need long-term medical care due to service-related injuries?

As far as disability pensions and other benefits are concerned, Agniveers should be treated on a par with all other combatants

There are apprehensions that the scheme will result in the militarisation of society resulting in an increase in conflict and crimes. 

It could happen, if bona fide and legal post-demobilisation employment is not ensured.

How would you respond to the argument that the defence forces need to be downsized to ensure more funds for better equipment and modern technology?

The Prime Minister emphatically declared in this year’s Kargil Divas speech that fiscal savings were not a factor underpinning the Agnipath scheme. Therefore, it is clear that the sole criterion for assessing it should be its impact on combat effectiveness. National security cannot be made a negotiable entity, where manpower can be traded for equipment/technology. Given the nature of security threats facing India and the extended land/maritime boundaries required to be safeguarded, the armed forces need modern weapons and equipment as well as adequate trained manpower to deploy them. However, given advances in military technology, “right-sizing” of the armed forces needs serious consideration so that the “teeth to tail” ratio is not distorted.

What key modifications would you recommend for the Agnipath scheme?

Restore the original recruitment scheme and make Agnipath a parallel entry, in judicious proportion. Ensure an adequate training period so that the entrant can become a safe and useful member of a combat unit within a reasonable time. Eliminate discrimination in designation/badges and eligibility for death/disability benefits.

Enhance colour-service to 7-10 years to ensure experience and utility.

Legislate, by an Act of Parliament, absorption of demobilised Agniveers in Central Armed Police Forces, public sector undertakings, and State government jobs, besides providing for reservation in colleges.