In reform mode

The mood in Vietnam, as it finds itself poised to enter the WTO, is one of hope and introspection.

P. S. SURYANARAYANA in Singapore

AS a country eager to make up for lost opportunities and develop fast, Vietnam has few equals. And the desire to make a quantum leap on the economic front is becoming increasingly evident.

For the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the loss of economic opportunities was, in a very large measure, inflicted by the United States during the period of the Vietnam War. In more recent years, though, and especially after the reunification of the northern and southern parts of Vietnam, the challenges of economic development have been compounded by social ills such as corruption, which, in particular, attracts much political attention and popular disapproval.

However, the overall mood in Vietnam, as it finds itself poised to enter the World Trade Organisation (WTO), is one of hope and introspection.

It is against this background that the latest changes at the helm of state affairs in Hanoi have acquired importance. A ranking Vietnamese official told Frontline that the national agenda would remain the priority of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) as the latest changes do not mark a shift from the present political system.

Vietnam's new Prime Minister is Nguyen Tan Dung, who was a key Deputy Prime Minister until his elevation by the National Assembly (N.A.) in Hanoi on June 27. Born on November 17, 1949, Dung is Vietnam's youngest Prime Minister in about two decades. The N.A. approved this change, by far the most far-reaching move made by the CPV as part of the leadership renewal, by over 92 per cent of the votes.

The outgoing Prime Minister, 73-year-old Phan Van Khai, stepped down over a year before the completion of his second term. Khai had decided to quit the centre stage during the CPV's deliberations held several months earlier. Then, as now, he cited advancing age as the reason.

For the CPV, headed by Secretary-General Nong Duc Manh, the prime objective at present is to effect a smooth transfer of power to a younger team at the state level and to do so as quickly as possible. A time line for this political exercise has been determined, to some extent, by Hanoi's prospective accession to the WTO later this year. Another factor is that Vietnam will host a crucial summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in a few months' time. The highest-ranking leaders of the U.S. and China are expected to be among the participants.

In fact, Khai, while asking for the N.A.'s permission to give up the post of Prime Minister, suggested that Dung be chosen so that he could have plenipotentiary powers in time to host the APEC summit.

Another key appointment made by the N.A. is that of President Nguyen Minh Triet, who prior to this elevation was secretary of the CPV's Ho Chi Minh City unit. The new political choices include that of Nguyen Phu Trong as the N.A. Chairman. Prior to this, he was secretary of the CPV's Hanoi Committee. These preferences re-emphasise the party-state links.

Within the framework of the CPV's enduring political primacy, the new government in Hanoi is now being mandated to tone up the quality of administration at home and integrate Vietnam with the international community. This is a view shared by the Vietnamese establishment and Vietnam-watchers in the East Asian diplomatic community.

Indicative of this "reality check" (a non-Vietnamese view in East Asia) was a politically significant move by some members of the N.A. during its session in Hanoi in June. As the N.A. began the proceedings to effect the changes in the government, in line with the overall preferences of the CPV high command, some parliamentarians sought to unify the decision-making structures across the party-state frontiers. This move by a minority of N.A. members, representing the delegation from one province out of a total of 64, was not reflective, though, of any political dissent at that high level. The episode, if any, demonstrated the growing activism of N.A. members.

While the party had nominated Triet for the presidency, these N.A. members wanted CPV Secretary General Manh himself to assume office as President as well. The proposal, not acceptable to Manh from the beginning of the current political exercise, was designed to harmonise government policies and party preferences much more effectively and conspicuously than under a system of only one post for each office-holder.

While Vietnam has thus chosen not to follow the present Chinese political model, under which the ruling party's prime leader Hu Jintao is also the state President, the issues facing the CPV are also qualitatively different. This is so even in respect of the question of corruption in public life.

A significant comment that the new Vietnamese leadership made relates to corruption. The new Deputy Prime Minister, Truong Vinh Trong, said: "Whether we have the anti-corruption steering board or not, the recent scandals will be thoroughly resolved." He maintained, in the same breath, that the government would "need more evidence". However, the people as also the N.A., as an increasingly inquisitive and questioning player on the political scene, have pushed the anti-corruption agenda to the forefront of national priorities.

Vietnam's conspicuous efforts to modernise itself through "Doi Moi" (economic renovation) and other updated reforms and to become a regional player have caught the eye of the U.S. Forever on the look-out for potential friends or players with interests that could in some ways match those of the U.S., the Bush administration has been increasingly befriending Vietnam. Of particular interest to Washington is Vietnam's perceived inclination and potential ability to act autonomously of an ascendant China in East Asia.

Hanoi's new leaders face the foreign policy challenge of seeking an independent regional role in ways that could enhance their autonomy in regard to the U.S. as well and not just China. The current U.S. moves towards military-to-military confidence-building measures in its ties with Vietnam and its latest agreement with Hanoi to pave the way for Vietnam's entry into the WTO are strong signals of relevance to the CPV in this regard.

What has not been lost on Hanoi is that its WTO accession, originally targeted for end-2004, has already taken a longer time to negotiate. Vietnam is also aware of the U.S. factor that is looming behind the scenes in this domain as well.

For the new leaders, with Dung an acknowledged political-level expert on national security and economic affairs, the immediate priority is to energise the Vietnamese state as a people friendly dispensation. If that is accomplished, an autonomous international role, consistent with Vietnam's heroic status as a country that prevailed over the U.S. in the recent past, may be within their grasp. The current signals from Hanoi indicate such aims, although Vietnam is certainly engaging the U.S. with much self-confidence and some mutual understanding. Hanoi does not want to be a prisoner of its heroic past as well.