'We must sustain the ceasefire'

Former naval chief Admiral L. Ramdas, chairperson of the Indian chapter of the Pakistan-India Peoples Forum for Peace and Democracy, has outlined some significant proposals for concerted initiatives by Islamabad and New Delhi as a follow-up to the extension by the Government of India of the unilateral ceasefire it announced in Jammu and Kashmir. In an interview to Asha Krishnakumar in Chennai, Admiral Ramdas spoke about the impact of the ceasefire, the follow-up actions that should be take n by India and Pakistan, and the need for talks with all Kashmiri groups, and shared his concerns over the implementation of the peace process. Excerpts:

Despite setbacks in terms of the recent killings in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian government has extended the ceasefire. It seems that the government is trying to achieve a breakthrough by isolating the extremists. Is this a right strategy? What is th e likely outcome of the ceasefire?

I am totally in favour of the unilateral ceasefire and, therefore, its extension. This is the only way of starting dialogue at various levels with various extremist groups.

As for the strategy, militants, except those of the Hizbul Mujahideen and the Lashkar-e-Toiba, have stopped their activities. The Hizb has called the ceasefire a drama and the Lashkar-e-Toiba says this is a fraud and that the only way is to liberate Kash mir through jehad. These two groups are directly under Pakistan's influence, and such a reaction is perfectly understandable.

But as we have put some kind of a moral pressure on Pakistan by declaring a unilateral ceasefire (a sequel to this is international pressure), it has reciprocated by a complete restraint on the Line of Control (LoC) and by pulling back some forces from t he LoC. So, I think you can call the ceasefire efforts a two-thirds success.

If anybody expected the entire militancy to end the moment we declared a ceasefire, it would have been very unrealistic. But, equally, it is only a matter of time before both Pakistan and these two groups (the Lashkar and the Hizb) conform because the pr essure is building on them. And we should not recede from this very sensible, courageous stand of extending the ceasefire.

Also, it is only a matter of time before these militants are hounded out by the people of Kashmir. For, notwithstanding what anybody might say, it is a fact that the people of Kashmir are tremendously relieved after this (ceasefire).

How do you see Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah's stand on the ceasefire? "To hell with this ceasefire," he said.

Farooq Abdullah welcomed it in the beginning. I met him twice on this. He has been quite favourable to and supportive of the government's stand in private. But I think he has a domestic political problem. He does not want the Hurriyat to get a lead over him as being the sole representative of the people. I am in total agreement with (him on) this. For there are others who belong to Jammu and Kashmir - people from Jammu, from Ladakh and other political formations in the Valley and elsewhere. And that is where, I believe, the government should not waste any more time. It should quickly start dialogue with any group - Kashmiri Pandits, Ladakhis, the National Conference or other political forces - that is ready to come to the table. The moment this happens , the other groups, including the Hurriyat, would not want to be left out.

I think this is one of the follow-up steps we must take quickly. Otherwise, the mileage gained by the ceasefire would get hazy.

I also believe that when the talks start, the government must be assisted by people who have been in peace movements and understand various issues.

The ceasefire is seen as a preliminary, although crucial, step in the peace process. But given the complex and multi-dimensional problems, what follow-up or supplementary actions should the government take to build confidence between the two countries ? What should be India's 'goodwill package' to Pakistan?

As I said, we must start the dialogue with groups within Jammu and Kashmir, no matter which one. And now that both nations have nuclear weapons, it is crucial to agree on some kind of a nuclear protocol. That is, measures that will ensure that there will be no use of nuclear weapons - accidental or deliberate. Should something go wrong with the negotiations, it is very easy to go back to the escalation mode.

The other thing is that we are naturally, and understandably, worried about tripartite talks. Tripartite only means a three-party meeting. It does not mean they must all meet at the same time, and under one roof. That can happen later. India is now start ing dialogue with the various groups, and also with Pakistan as soon as there are signals. We can also feel that the Lashkar and the Hizb have been restrained. Pakistan may claim to have nothing to do with their training, arming and so on. But it cannot deny that they are coming through its territory. Therefore, Pakistan must do its utmost to stop these groups. In fact, Pakistan should stop all personnel from crossing the LoC.

These two can be started simultaneouly. And whenever we feel the time is right we must have the Kashmiris joining, for whatever agreement we arrive at must have the consent of the people of Kashmir.

What is your assessment of Pakistan's reaction to the ceasefire? What is the impact of the ceasefire?

The most important impact is that the LoC has become virtually peaceful. Second, Pakistan has also indicated at various levels that it is ready for a dialogue and has also not insisted on tripartite negotiations. Only the militant groups are asking for a tripartite meeting. This may be a reflection of the power centres in Pakistan - one is Gen. (Pervez) Musharraf and, possibly, the ISI (Inter-Sevices Intelligence). We do not know who really are behind these groups - setting targets, training them, provi ding them equipment and so on.

But we have to attach some credibility to the statements made by Musharraf, (Abdus) Sattar (Pakistan's Foreign Minister) and others. They are ready for talks.

I think Pakistan has come three-fourths of the way in confidence-building. But the last lap - of restraining the militant groups - may be the most difficult one for them. That is the challenge they face.

Do Pokhran-II and the test-firing of Agni-II have any impact on the peace efforts?

Clearly, one watershed in Indo-Pakistan relations was Pokhran-II. India did it first, and Pakistan, predictably, followed. Now we are at a stage where both nations have declared from the rooftops that they are weaponised. Both also have their own doctrin es - though not formally announced. Pakistan says that if it fears losing a conventional war or an important city like Lahore it will use the nuclear weapon. India has said that it will not use it first, but retaliate if Pakistan hits it.

That is why I said that a nuclear protocol and some kind of safeguards can be discussed in some detail with some form of international supervision and control.

We also seem to have some threat perception, as seen by strategists, from China. So, if we are striking a nuclear protocol, it is only fair that we do so with China also. This is important in the South Asian context.

What are your comments on Pakistan's reaction to the ceasefire? It is said that it was telecast on Doordarshan's Hindi news bulletin on the afternoon of January 22?

Some of us also heard that the Pakistan government had banned activities of the Taliban, as also of Osama bin Laden. And that it has requested Taliban forces all over the world to take necessary actions to restrain their men. Or, words to that extent. Un fortunately, this was blanked out from the English bulletin, which followed. Subsequently, none of the bulletins carried it and neither did the television channels. We have to find out what exactly was announced.

The Hurriyat, in a recent statement, said some hardliners in the government were sabotaging the peace negotiations. Do you agree with this view?

Some hardliners, within and outside the government, have articulated this stand. Everywhere there are people who are for and against anything. It is reasonable to expect people to say that we have tried this for two months, it has not worked and so let u s go back. But go back to what? Is it going to be better or worse? Costlier in terms of men, material and money? I agree, we are losing lives even during the ceasefire. But it is a downward curve.

On the LoC we were losing a number of jawans every day. That has stopped. Two, it has stopped a fair amount of militant activity in the Valley. And, three, it has enabled the people, for a change, to feel more free than at any time in the last 12 or 13 y ears.

I think India should stick to its policy, even if it means two more extensions of the ceasefire. That is the only way. One, the people will identify who their real enemies are, or they would provide enough information to the security forces to take care of them. And two, this is the only way we can move forward for a dialogue process.

You spoke about follow-up actions to be taken by India.

First, sustain the ceasefire. Two, open a dialogue immediately with any group that is ready to come to the table. Three, send suitable messages to Pakistan to get them across the table for talks. I sense this is going to happen. It is only a matter of ti me.

In the medium term, we need to concentrate on developmental activities in Jammu and Kashmir, which have been neglected for long.

Finally, the ridiculous restrictions on travel, trade and commerce between the two neighbouring countries need to be done away with. That in itself would remove many of the myths and much of the wrong propaganda.