Reluctant acquiescence

THE military establishment in Pakistan is not impressed with the Indian government's decision to extend the Kashmir ceasefire for the third month. This was evident from the terse and matter-of-fact statement issued by the Pakistan Foreign Office hours af ter the January 23 announcement from New Delhi.

This is in total contrast to the response when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee unveiled the Ramzan initiative on November 19 and then extended it by a month on December 20. Obviously the Musharraf government is not prepared to yield any further groun d, as in its perception the extension is just a ploy to buy time and marginalise Pakistan.

The military government was taken by surprise by the Ramzan initiative. It recovered quickly; it had little choice, in view of the pressure from within and without, particularly from the United States, to respond favourably. So, 12 days after Vajpayee's announcement, Islamabad came out with a calculated response, on December 2.

The formulation had two major components. The first was the unilateral decision to observe 'maximum restraint' along the Line of Control (LoC). The second was an invitation to the executive of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to Islamabad for c onsultations, to pave the way for tripartite talks in order to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

Through the December 2 declaration, Pakistan conceded for the first time that it no longer insisted on its involvement from the initial stage of the dialogue process. The two components of the formulation were meant to demonstrate to the international co mmunity the 'flexibility' of Pakistan.

Pakistan was convinced that it had stolen the thunder from Vajpayee by putting the ball back into the court of New Delhi. It saw 'a heads I win, tails you lose' situation for India. If New Delhi refused to allow an APHC delegation to visit Islamabad, its Ramzan initiative would collapse. On the other hand, if it allowed the visit, Islamabad could win the APHC over to its side.

But things did not turn out that way. As APHC leaders squabbled among themselves on the composition of the delegation and the line they should take in Pakistan, the Indian government gained time to play out its own strategy. Much to Pakistan's disappoint ment, the APHC leaders did not close ranks.

It was not India alone that had reasons to be concerned about the composition of the delegation. There was an equal level of anxiety in the Pakistani establishment. The bitter experience of the recent visit of senior APHC leader Abdul Ghani Lone still fr esh in mind, Islamabad was keen that the team should include pro-Pakistan members like Syed Ali Shah Geelani. But it could not openly talk about it. So Pakistan-based militant organisations and religious outfits came in handy. The Jamaat-e-Islami, the la rgest religious organisation in the country, declared that a visit by an APHC delegation minus Geelani would be a futile exercise.

A remarkable coincidence was that after the December 2 formulation was announced, all Pakistan-based organisations barring the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Harkat-ul Ansar toned down their anti-India rhetoric. Of course, there were stray voices questioning the locus standi of the APHC to negotiate on behalf of the Kashmiri people. One of the commanders of the militant organisations even said that the militant outfits should be a party to the talks as it was they who were engaged in the 'struggle against t he repressive' rule of India. However, these were considered more a reflection of jealousy among the militant groups at the growing importance of the APHC.

Then came the first extension of the ceasefire, on December 20. So prepared was the military government for the development that within two hours of it came the dramatic announcement from Pakistan military headquarters about the partial withdrawal of tro ops from the LoC. The statement appealed to India to reciprocate and pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

But within two days came the attack at the Red Fort in Delhi, allegedly by a suicide squad of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. That was perhaps the first indication that the military establishment was having second thoughts about the peace moves. Lashkar followed up the attack with a threat to target the office of the Prime Minister.

When New Delhi pointed accusing fingers at Islamabad as the force behind the periodic attacks, Pakistan hit back by accusing India of making baseless allegations. More significantly, the Pakistani statement gave the benefit of doubt to Lashkar, by using the expression "alleged threat". It did not condemn the Red Fort incident.

As if taking their cue from the Lashkar, other Pakistan-based militant organisations began questioning New Delhi's sincerity and also stepped up attacks in the Valley. Organisations such as the Hizbul Mujahideen and the Jaish-e-Mohammadi, which maintaine d a relatively low profile during the first month of the ceasefire, came out in the open. There was no attempt whatsoever from Islamabad to silence these outfits. It merely kept harping on the need for the early clearance of travel documents for the Hurr iyat leaders.

The thinking of the military establishment became clear when the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, Vijay K. Nambiar, had his first-ever formal meeting with Chief Executive Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The meeting itself came through under peculiar circumst ances.

Nambiar had taken charge of the mission in Islamabad in the second week of August and had had no occasion to meet Musharraf until January 15. The idea of the meeting came when Pakistan Foreign Secretary Inamul Haq called Nambiar to his office to hand ove r formally a copy of the December 2 statement.

It is believed that Haq asked Nambiar if he had met the Chief Executive. When he replied in the negative, the Foreign Secretary wanted to know if he desired to meet him. The High Commissioner said he would like to do so though he had nothing concrete to convey. That very day the office of Nambiar sent a letter requesting a courtesy call on the military ruler.

The Pakistan press, particularly the Urdu newspapers, went to town with the request. It was made out that the High Commissioner was to meet Musharraf and deliver an important message on behalf of the Prime Minister of India. One English newspaper even wr ote that Nambiar was to deliver an invitation from Vajpayee to Musharraf for a summit meeting in New Delhi.

Musharraf had expressed several times his eagerness for a meeting with Vajpayee at any time and place and had been cross with India for not responding to his overtures. Was the build-up in the press on the possibility of an invitation a signal to India?

The meeting on January 15 was a bit of an anti-climax. No doubt it was significant in the sense that it was for the first time since the Kargil hostilities in the middle of 1999 that India formally conveyed to Pakistan its desire for a 'composite dialogu e' provided the latter was prepared to address some key concerns of New Delhi.

Reining in the militant outfits was one of the main concerns articulated by the High Commissioner. The General on his part made it clear that resumption of the dialogue process should not be linked to the activities of militant outfits. He argued that th e absence of dialogue encouraged militancy. Indirectly, Musharraf wanted to know what Pakistan had to gain by checking the militant outfits. In other words, though the so-called peace process had been in operation for over 45 days, there was no meeting point between New Delhi and Islamabad on the basics.

Although neither point of view can be ignored, the recent initiatives have not helped much to bridge the gap. Pakistan believes that while it has taken some concrete steps to create the right atmosphere for the revival of the talks, India has got away wi th mere rhetoric. This is evident from the statement of the Pakistan Foreign Office on January 23 (in response to the second ceasefire extension), which states that the ceasefire in the previous two months meant nothing.

The issue apparently figured at the Core Commanders' meeting presided over by Musharraf just a day before India extended the ceasefire. The consensus at the meeting was that Pakistan should not yield any further ground on Kashmir.

No doubt, Pakistan is under pressure from the world community to mend fences with India. But it is also a fact that no ruler of Pakistan can afford to ignore the voice of the religious parties and militant outfits, particularly on the subject of Kashmir. In a sense, former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif paid the price for his alleged softness towards India on the issue of Kashmir. Musharraf would not like to repeat the mistake.

As things stand, there is hardly any difference in the viewpoint of the military government and the Pakistan-based militant organisations on the Indian initiatives. Both sides would have to demonstrate the spirit of give and take. However, both sides hav e to go a long way before they can be expected to sit across the table to resolve their differences.