Arambai Tenggol: How a Meitei ‘sociocultural organisation’ became an armed-to-the-teeth militia

The Manipur conflict has many moving parts, but Arambai Tenggol has emerged as a key driving force that continues to shape and fuel it.

Members of Arambai Tenggol wave the “Salai Taret” flag as they gather to take oath in front of Ibudhou Pakhangba temple at Kangla Fort in Imphal on September 30, 2023. | Photo Credit: AFP

On March 30, weeks before Manipur went to the polls, an unusual press release surfaced in local media circles. Directing all party candidates to refrain from extravagant public campaigning, it imposed a moratorium on feasts, loudspeakers, flag-raising, and door-to-door visits.

The letterhead had the words “Arambai Tenggol” printed alongside the logo of a charging cavalry trooper set against the Salai Taret, the ancient Meitei kingdom’s flag. The statement—or diktat, some would say—was signed by one Laishram Robason, who was identified as the outfit’s “Control Room Operator”.

LISTEN: Arambai Tenggol’s rise in Manipur’s conflict highlights the complex interplay of politics, culture, and violence in the region.

To a lay observer, the statement would probably read like a routine pre-election directive issued by a competent government authority. But, neither is the document routine, nor is the issuing authority competent. The extralegal directive captures everything that has gone horribly wrong in Manipur since May 3, 2023, when the north-eastern State slipped into an ethnic conflagration that has taken more than 221 lives, injured thousands, and displaced many more.

Among the many entities at the centre of this tragic convulsion is Arambai Tenggol. The conflict has many moving parts, but Arambai has emerged as a key driving force that continues to shape and fuel it. More than that, the Meitei militia has become an apt metaphor for India’s deep-seated pathologies of governance that have, time and again, allowed civil conflicts to fester for longer than they should.

It is, therefore, crucial to understanding Arambai as an organisation as well as what the state’s response to it means in the dual context of the Manipur conflict and ethnonationalist majoritarianism in India today.

A social creature

At the outset, Arambai Tenggol looks like a political force. But, it is, first and foremost, a social phenomenon. The name itself—Arambai Tenggol, the much-feted and feared cavalry force of the ancient Meitei kingdom, Kangleipak, whose weapon of choice was a unique poison-dart called “Arambai”—evokes a sense of Meitei cultural pride and historical nostalgia. By leaning on the crutch of an imperialist past, the outfit, which was a non-entity until the conflict began in May 2023, was able to appropriate the legacy of Meitei nationalism and gain wide acceptance in Meitei society.

In fact, Arambai Tenggol was born from the modern vestiges of Meitei royalty. Reportedly, it was floated by “Maharaja” Leishemba Sanajaoba, the titular king of Manipur and current Rajya Sabha member from the State. In September 2022, the outfit organised an “oath-taking ceremony” at his Imphal residence. In attendance was Sanajouba himself, alongside Korounganba Khuman (pseudonym for Tyson Ngangbam), the outfit’s chief. Dozens of cadres wearing their signature black tees with the cavalry-cum-Salai Taret logo emblazoned on the breast pockets were also present.

Simultaneously, Arambai scaled up its social media presence, especially on Facebook. This was a strategic move made at a time when smartphones and the Internet had penetrated Manipur, especially among the younger generation. Using social media, the outfit began to comment on a number of social and political issues. It had a particular obsession with history, reaffirming, sometimes reimagining, Meitei history while denying Kuki-Zo history. For instance, on December 24, 2022, it re-shared a news article in Meitei on Manipur Chief Minister N. Biren Singh dismissing the Anglo-Kuki War of 1917-19.

Beyond these commentaries, Arambai members have used the online space to project a more “edgy” and “cool” image of the outfit, by uploading their pictures in advanced military gear and using AI to post funny morphed images of themselves. This was meant to appeal to the young Meitei, particularly men. The outfit gave them an acceptable and modern platform to perform their masochism and channel their social angst towards what they perceived to be a righteous armed revolution in defence of their community.

Notably, Arambai has undertaken social service among displaced Meitei people, such as distribution of relief material. By doing so, it has attempted to project itself as a constructive social force and first responder in and around the strife-torn Imphal Valley. Along with its military action in defence of the Meitei community in the ongoing conflict, this has created, among ordinary Meiteis, an image of the outfit being a viable alternative to an ineffective and inaccessible state.

Cultural repertoires

Arambai has also engaged in cultural policing as part of its social outreach programme. This includes urging the Meitei to shun foreign brands and embrace traditional attire. By doing so, it has tried to project itself as a vanguardist social force that is here to fix the ills of modernisation and globalisation. But its revivalism goes beyond material culture. Arambai has also used religion to push a new imagination of Meitei indigeneity.

One of Arambai’s key social pivots is Sanamahism, the traditional Meitei religion that was gradually replaced by Vaishnavite Hinduism by the 18th century. The outfit has used the Sanamahi revivalist movement, which has gained traction in recent decades, as an instrument for Meitei mobilisation. A month before the conflict began in May 2023, Arambai members demonstrated their fealty to Sanamahism by storming the house of Takhellambam Ramananda, a Meitei Christian pastor, in Imphal for his allegedly blasphemous remarks against the Meitei religion.

Meitei women at a rally organised by the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), in Imphal on July 29, 2023. | Photo Credit: RITU RAJ KONWAR

The outfit often invokes the names of Sanamahi deities in its social media rhetoric. For instance, in a Facebook post on February 18, 2023, it allegorically places the top Sanamahi pantheon into the outfit’s senior leadership, projecting Lainingthou Sanamahi, the Supreme God, as the president. Given the centrality of Sanamahism in early Meitei kingdom repertoires, Arambai’s adoption of Sanamahi revivalism dovetails comfortably with its nationalist-imperialist reimagination of Meitei society. In fact, the September 2022 oath-taking ceremony at Sanajaoba’s residence was done in the name of Sanamahism. Iterations in praise of Lainingthou Sanamahi are often accompanied with praise for Sanajaoba.

However, Arambai’s social and cultural agendas do not define it as an organisation. They are mere pathways to political power and military dominance for an organisation that relies on brute force and elite connections for survival. No outfit, after all, can transform itself from a social collective into a popular militia by merely ranting about Meitei history and culture on Facebook. There is more to it.

Highlights

• Arambai Tenggol was reportedly floated by “Maharaja” Leishemba Sanajaoba, the titular king of Manipur and current Rajya Sabha member. In September 2022, the group held an “oath-taking ceremony” at his Imphal residence.
• It has a particular obsession with history, reaffirming, sometimes reimagining, Meitei history while denying Kuki-Zo history. Arambai has engaged in cultural policing, urging the Meitei to shun foreign brands and embrace traditional attire.
• Manipur today has become a militia state, with Arambai at the centre of it all. No other non-state armed entity in Manipur today enjoys the kind of political protection, firepower, and strategic legroom that Arambai does. Imphal and New Delhi need to show political will to contain it.

A political force?

It is hardly a secret that Arambai has been close to the Imphal-based Meitei political elite since its inception. In addition to Sanajaoba, the outfit enjoys, as recent reportage by Greeshma Kuthar in The Caravan suggests, the “personal patronage” of Biren Singh. In June 2022, Khuman had shared an all-smiles photograph on Facebook of himself and his cadres meeting Singh at his official residence. Since then, the outfit has routinely endorsed the Chief Minister on social media. A former paramilitary officer told The Telegraph in July 2023 that the outfit “had been raised with the blessings of the Chief Minister”.

At a joint UNAU Delhi Tribal Student’s Forum protest where the Kuki people demanded a separate administration in Manipur, at New Delhi on September 21, 2023. | Photo Credit: SHASHI SHEKHAR KASHYAP

When the conflict broke out, the State government looked away as Arambai armed itself by looting police armouries and attacked Kuki-Zo villages. This gave the outfit a sense of impunity and invincibility that it has since used to impose its writ in the Valley and along the foothills. Meanwhile, Arambai has been aggressively pushing the same political rhetoric as the Singh government through its online channels. This includes creating a National Register of Citizens for Manipur to identify “illegal immigrants” and fencing the India-Myanmar border to stop “narco-terrorists”, both of which are not-so-veiled pejorative references to the Kuki-Zo community.

While Arambai continues to bank on the Singh government’s patronage for survival and expansion, it has also taken on a life of its own, representing popular Meitei aspirations and projecting them onto a fiercely contested political-military public space. It is precisely for this reason that the outfit is today able to issue pre-election orders that violate the Manipur government’s law enforcement mandate, order re-polling at booths, and administer “oaths” to lawmakers at Imphal’s Kangla Fort, almost like a state-in-waiting or a quasi-statutory authority.

According to reports from the ground, Singh appears to be using the outfit to assert his political influence and ability to dominate the battlefield. In turn, Arambai is able to position itself as a local kingmaker. According to an intelligence officer interviewed by a magazine, Singh “orchestrated” the Arambai-led Kangla Fort event on January 24 to “show the Centre that he can’t be rendered inconsequential” and that, if need be, he can “run his own parallel government in Manipur”. In a recent interview to Karan Thapar, Paolienlal Haokip, the BJP MLA from Manipur, made a similar assertion, claiming that Arambai was created to “preserve the Chief Minister’s position for Biren Singh”.

The Centre has done little to fix this, for reasons best known to the BJP-led political dispensations in New Delhi and Imphal. Recently, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) filed a charge sheet against Meitei insurgents belonging to the Valley Based Insurgent Groups (VBIGs), such as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), for fomenting violence in Manipur. But there was no mention of Arambai.

This shows that the Centre does not want to project the outfit as a major terrorist group with international linkages. The Central forces also find themselves unable to restrain the Arambai because of lack of directions from New Delhi and the absence of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) in the Valley.

Any government move against Arambai runs the risk of alienating Singh and large sections of Meitei society who back the outfit. The BJP cannot afford that, especially in light of the general election. Moreover, exogenous sectarian interests might also be shaping the Modi government’s inaction to the outfit.

Last year, Kim Gangte, former Member of Parliament from the Outer Manipur constituency, told NewsClick that “people believe” the Arambai is an “RSS creation”. Thanks to these elite networks of patronage, Arambai has been able to dig its feet deeper into the Valley’s mainstream political space. It has even dislodged another radical Meitei vigilante organisation, Meitei Leepun, which rose to prominence during the conflict. Arambai displayed greater organisational finesse and social appeal than Leepun, while also securing privileged support from the Meitei political elite.

Emerging cleavages

But, Singh’s ostensible support for the outfit is a double-edged sword. By patronising a militia that only does his bidding, the Chief Minister risks alienating other Meitei leaders, the BJP high command, and even sections of the Meitei public who might be growing weary of Arambai’s partisan vigilantism. During the recent election in Imphal, several Meitei voters expressed frustration at the outfit’s alleged disruption of the voting process and indulging in proxy voting. One exasperated Meitei voter told a digital news platform that people who looked like Arambai cadres cast votes on behalf of her entire family.

Yumnam Shanta, a Congress polling agent, claimed that Arambai members had attacked his house on April 19. Shanta’s sister told the media that she had asked her son, who is apparently associated with Arambai, to leave the organisation. According to her, the outfit only wants to “safeguard the electoral interests of the BJP”, and not “defend Manipur” as it often claims. These simmering discontents in the Valley could soon boil over until a point where Arambai faces widespread rejection from the very community that it claims to defend and represent, as has happened with many ethnic insurgent groups in the north-eastern region in the past.

A split has also emerged between the Singh government and the Manipur Police over Arambai. In February, police commandos staged an “arms down” protest after a large group of Arambai members stormed the residence of an Additional Superintendent of Police (ASP) in Imphal and abducted him. The protesting policemen alleged that their seniors had asked them to stand down even as the mob raided the ASP’s house. The police even released an official statement claiming that Arambai was involved in various “anti-social activities”. Then, on May 12, the police arrested two Arambai cadres after the outfit allegedly assaulted and abducted four police personnel in Kangpokpi district a day before.

Interestingly, Manipur police often refer to Arambai cadres as just “miscreants” in social media posts and public statements, while reserving the term “militants” for the older Meitei insurgent groups and Kuki armed groups. Yet, Arambai’s military dominance has dislodged the older, more established Meitei armed groups—officially called VBIGs—that are either confined to their strategic bases in Myanmar’s strife-torn Sagaing Region or are partially disarmed under ceasefire pacts with the government.

Riot police officers fire tear gas shells to disperse demonstrators protesting against the arrest of five people who police said were carrying weapons while wearing camouflage uniforms, in Imphal, on September 18, 2023. | Photo Credit: Reuters

While cadres from some of them, such as the PLA and KYKL, do operate in Manipur today, they have seen their influence wane as Arambai’s clout rises. This could trigger turf wars between both sides. Arambai, however, is reported to have drawn recruits from the Pambei faction of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), which recently signed a ceasefire agreement with the government but has reportedly continued to engage in violence. On May 2, both groups even signed an “MoU” to work together.

Notably, a joint force of the Manipur Police, the NIA and the Central Reserve Police Force recently arrested two “important” members of the UNLF(Pambei). No such action has so far been taken against Arambai’s top leadership. On May 1, according to news reports, the army arrested 11 Arambai members but had to free them when a large crowd of Meitei women blocked and heckled the convoy transporting them. This shows how the outfit enjoys a high degree of social protection in the Valley, where it is seen by many as the rightful defenders of the Meitei against Kuki-Zo aggression.

Two paths

Arambai has been able to reinvent the wheel of Meitei nationalism in a way that departs from the socialist-nationalist strand of political self-determination represented by legacy Meitei armed groups. Set against a deeply fractured and turbulent landscape of inter-ethnic sparring, this is a potent formula for a group that has both the political connections and the firepower to convert thought into action.

But, from here, the Arambai story could go two ways.

One, if the State government allows the outfit to prosper, it could become a separate political entity capable of usurping the state apparatus. In fact, the Kangla Fort “oath-taking ceremony”, which saw Arambai administer a pointwise political pledge to elected lawmakers, was the outfit’s attempt to position itself as a serious political force whose mandate goes far beyond military action. The fact that it draws recruits from the lay folk, lacks a storied past, and is not led by gentrified elites makes it particularly appealing to the average Meitei individual. Such a profile also helps the group rise above legacy politics, even while maintaining direct ties with the Meitei political establishment.

Two, once the violence abates, Arambai could quickly fade into oblivion like a shooting star. The militia in its current form, after all, is a product of the ethnic conflict. So, despite all its sociopolitical clout and military prowess, it would struggle to survive outside the active Meitei-versus-Kuki-Zo fault line. Not only would it then quickly lose social appeal, the Meitei political elite might no longer deem it useful. There is also the possibility of New Delhi losing patience and cracking down on the outfit using the AFSPA, paramilitary forces, and the Indian Army.

It is a fact that Manipur today has become a militia state, with Arambai at the centre of it all. Many have tried to dismiss it as just one of the many armed groups wreaking havoc across the State, but no other non-state armed entity in Manipur today enjoys the kind of political protection, firepower, and strategic legroom that Arambai does. The logical conclusion of this story looks dystopian, but it can be changed if both Imphal and New Delhi show political will and moral integrity.

In Manipur today, the search for the “end game” is mired in the Rashomon effect—it really depends on whom you ask. But the growth of entities like Arambai shows one thing: that there is an organised endeavour to subvert the Kuki-Zo tribal claim over their ancestral land and affirmative rights using a lingering threat of force.

Angshuman Choudhury is Associate Fellow, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.