THE Washington Communique and work plan were issued after the first summit in April 2010. The communique
reaffirmed the fundamental responsibility of states to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials and prevent non-state actors from obtaining information or technology related to their use in nuclear weapons;
encouraged the conversion of reactors from using HEU to LEU as fuel and minimisation of use of HEU, where feasible;
supported the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), as amended in 2005, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture;
reaffirmed the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the international nuclear security framework and to work to ensure that the agency will continue to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise to carry out its activities (emphasis added);
endorsed the positive contributions of mechanisms like the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the G8-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction;
supported the implementation of strong nuclear security practices without infringing upon the rights of states to develop and utilise nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security.
A work plan was also issued at Washington as the basis for national and international action through cooperation, which essentially laid out the specific measures to realise the goals of the communique. These included ratification and implementation of international treaties, particularly CPPNM and ICSANT; universal implementation of UNSCR 1540; completion and implementation of the guidance provided by IAEA's Nuclear Security Series by working closely with the IAEA and to assist, upon request, other states in doing so; R&D collaboration to develop new technologies that require neither HEU fuels nor targets for reactor operation and for production of medical or other isotopes respectively and to encourage the use of LEU and other proliferation-resistant technologies and fuels in various applications such as isotope production; education and training and enhancing nuclear detection opportunities through joint exercises among law enforcement and customs officials.