Altering history

A thoroughly researched account of Nixon's masterly venture to seek rapprochement with China.

LEADERS are those who alter the course of events for the better; functionaries follow the beaten path. Small men trim their sails to the passing breeze. Richard Nixon was a profoundly amoral man; petty and mean. But on foreign affairs, he could see afar. He led. Henry Kissinger was a subordinate who acted on the President's instructions; skilfully, most of the time, but not always. The opening to China was Nixon's idea.

Margaret Macmillan is an insightful historian who writes with verve and naughty wit. Her work Peacemakers on the Congress of Versailles (1919) was a classic of its kind. Her book Women of the Raj won high praise. This is a thoroughly researched work on Nixon's masterly venture to seek a rapprochement with China, braving public opinion at home, attacks by conservatives within his party, and shock to allies. Secrecy was indispensable to the enterprise; but secrecy always breeds suspicion. The author has drawn on the archives and on the enormous range of interviews she had. The book will rank as a definitive work on the subject. It covers the background as well as the aftermath of Nixon's meeting with Mao Zedong in Beijing on February 21, 1979. "It was an earthquake in the Cold War landscape and meant that the Eastern Bloc no longer stood firm against the West."

The subtle nuances of rival diplomacies in the United States-China-Soviet Union triangle are carefully analysed. Significantly, "one of the things Mao and Nixon talked about was the past; particularly the events and the issues that had kept their two countries apart since the Communists took power in 1949". This is a neglected aspect in Indian studies on relations with neighbours. In the West, archival disclosures concentrate on misunderstandings at crucial times and missed opportunities.

Nixon was very much the leader. The author records that when he first told Kissinger in February 1969 that he wanted to open up relations with China, Kissinger, according to Alexander Haig, who was then his aide, was dumbfounded. "Our leader has taken leave of reality," he told Haig. "He has just ordered me to make this flight of fantasy come true." Later, at the National Security Council, he wondered about the consequences of bringing China out of its isolation: "Whether we really want China to be a world power like the Soviet Union, competing with us, rather than their present role which is limited to aiding certain insurgencies".

In the late summer of 1969, when Nixon had already sent word indirectly to the Chinese that the Americans would like to establish contact, Kissinger remained sceptical. "As the President and his party were flying back home from a world tour, Haldeman sat down beside Kissinger on Air Force One and remarked that Nixon intended to visit China before the end of his presidency. Kissinger smiled: `Fat chance'."

Mao was impressed by Nixon. He called the ever ingratiating Kissinger "just a funny little man. He is shuddering all over with nerves every time he comes to see me". Mao had written "you seize the hour and seize the day". During the meeting with Nixon, he gestured at Kissinger and repeated enigmatically: "Seize the hour and seize the day." Both countries did so and tackled the divisive issue of Taiwan with finesse.

Both the U.S. and China had reflected hard and prepared for the opening. Pakistan's President Yahya Khan provided a reliable channel for the exchanges. It was the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 that set alarm bells in China ringing.

In February 1969, Mao set up a four-man study group of old marshals of the Army led by Chen Yi, former Foreign Minister. Leaders must lead. But they must also reflect and read studies by those who reflect. Mao listened to the marshals and broke from the past. Nixon and Mao altered the course of history decisively.