Profiling terrorists

THE SHIA SHRINE at Samarra after an explosion masterminded by Zarqawi. The attack is thought to have enraged Sunnis as well. - HAMEED RASHEED/AP

The life of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, who was killed in a U.S. attack in early June, is an index of the stuff of which terrorists are made.

I am amazed by the sheer number of columns written on Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in the days following his killing. On June 7, a United States fighter-bomber attacked a safe house at Baquba, about 50 kilometres north of Baghdad. Seven other leaders of "Al Qaeda in Iraq" were in conference with him at that time and were also reportedly killed in this daring and well-orchestrated action. One theory holds that Zarqawi was still alive after the bombing, and that U.S. troops picked him up in a serious condition. This is, however, just one of those irrelevant facts dished out to dramatise an event. Whatever be the truth, this was undoubtedly a major victory for U.S.-led forces and a shocking reverse for those who had propped up this Jordanian exile as a symbol of resistance in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. Widespread violence was expected as a reprisal to Zarqawi's liquidation. A few days ago, one web forum hosted by an anti-Shia insurgent group, Ansar al-Sunna, displayed the beheading of three Iraqis, as if to tell the rest of the world that the spirit of Zarqawi was intact and the latter's murder would not go unpunished. Apart from this, there has been no major incident in Iraq (as I write this column) that portends an escalation of the offensive against the government or U.S.-led forces. This is good as far as it goes, and runs contrary to earlier speculation that Zarqawi's followers would be able to unleash enormous violence in protest against the killing of their leader.

The successful elimination of Zarqawi may rightly be traced to the prowess of traditional HUMINT (human intelligence). Technology can help an intelligence agency only up to a point. The tip-off from a human individual - motivated either by money (Zarqawi carried a reward of $ 25m on his head), or by plain undiluted vengeance - always provides the critical edge to an operation that is otherwise predominantly technology-oriented. Satellite phones and other eavesdropping devices no doubt give the much-needed teeth to the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) or I.B. (Information Bureau). It is ultimately the informant, cultivated over years and owing loyalty to his handler, who gives pinpointed facts leading to the hide out of a fugitive from justice. I am sure this has been the case in respect of Zarqawi.

The U.S. was substantially assisted by Jordanian intelligence. The latter had actually formed a task force to hunt for Zarqawi. His hand in the bombings of three Amman hotels on November 9, 2005, in which 60 were killed, gave the impetus to Jordanian authorities. It is highly doubtful whether the U.S. would ever have achieved success without Jordanian support. If not for anything else, the Zarqawi operation will be cited for years to come at training institutions across the globe to prove that without international cooperation terrorism cannot be tackled. Jordan and the U.S. owe it to law enforcement outside their two countries to share, at an appropriate time, crucial facts that will sharpen future anti-terrorist mechanics.

This brings me to the question: How are terrorists made? They are definitely not born as such. Does the Zarqawi story tell us anything at all in our eternal quest to build a social fabric that will prevent terrorists from mushrooming as they do in disparate parts of the world? Zarqawi's biography is a thread of events that is fascinating. The Times (London) online report of June 7 is a goldmine of information on the subject. I have chosen to draw heavily from it.

Belonging to a large and poor Bedouin family that traced its origin to the Jordanian desert, Ahmad Faadhil Al Khalailah, as he was known at birth (1966), dropped out of school at 16. Combative and most modestly educated, his entry into a criminal career, at the end of a few menial jobs, was natural. He was given to liquor, and he possibly even served a prison term for sexual offences. In 1989, the jehadi in him drew him towards Afghanistan to fight the Soviet occupation that came to an end almost simultaneously with his arrival there. He did not have anything meaningful to keep himself occupied. Interestingly, he had a short stint with an Islamist newspaper in that country, before returning to his native town of Zarqa in Jordan around 1992, as a disappointed man. Within a year, he was on the wrong side of law again, and was sentenced to seven years for possessing rifles and bomb-making equipment at his home. In jail, apart from memorising the Holy Koran, he showed some leadership traits by organising fellow prisoners living in his block. Released in 1999 after a general amnesty, he crossed over to Afghanistan once more, obviously to evade Jordanian efforts to nab him on charges of plotting an attack on Christian pilgrims during the millennium celebrations. It was during this second spell in Afghanistan that Al Khalailah renamed himself Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, which stood for "the imposer from Zarqa" where he was born. After the fall of the Taliban, Zarqawi sought refuge in the Kurdish region of Iraq under the control of another insurgent group, Ansar al-Islam. There is information suggesting that despite a request from King Hussein of Jordan, Saddam refused to extradite Zarqawi back to his home country. It is this report that strengthens the belief that Saddam was not unfriendly to Al Qaeda, although he may not have been its greatest admirer. Nevertheless, it gave enough ammunition to the U.S. to justify its invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Following the Ansar's ousting from their enclave in the Kurdish Iraq in 2003, Zarqawi moved over to the Sunni triangle in northwestern Iraq. Here, the group led by Zarqawi, renamed as Tawhid wal Jehad (Monotheism and Holy War), received material support from what remained of Saddam's army after he was deposed. With its base in Fallujah, an essentially Sunni town, Zarqawi's men indulged in unremitting violence through suicide attacks on American troops and whoever assisted them. First came the twin bombings of August 2003 against the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad, which left 22 dead. This was followed by the attack against the famous Shia shrine in Najaf, resulting in more than 80 casualties. The two atrocities aroused civilian passions, especially in the Shia community, like never before, and the Iraqi administration's principal preoccupation became one of neutralising Zarqawi and his followers. Interestingly, in mid-2004, Zarqawi changed the name of his group to "Al Qaeda in Iraq". The objective was possibly to give it a status in the international terrorist community that it had lacked until then. Osama bin Laden's relative inactivity was also an opportunity to fill what was reckoned as a vacuum. There was the added prospect of the new label attracting funds from different parts of the world.

Zarqawi fled Fallujah following the November 2004 take over of the city by U.S. and Iraqi troops. Surprisingly, his capacity to cause havoc against his chosen targets seemed infinite even after this. His ruthlessness was evident from the videotaped beheadings that he so effectively portrayed over the web. (The one terrorist leader who, more than others, used the Internet for propaganda was Zarqawi, and not surprisingly, the search of his hideout on the fateful evening of June 7, yielded computer hard drives, digital cameras, etc, in addition to AK-47 rifles and grenades.) One horrible image that haunts many of us is the killing of American contractor Nicholas Berg. Here, Zarqawi was himself believed to be the person actually committing the monstrous act. The bombing of Amman hotels in November 2005, and the February 2006 bombing of the holy Shia shrine of Samarra in Iraq clearly pointed to substantial resources in Zarqawi's hands. His deliberate attempt to escalate animosity between Shias and Sunnis was equally obvious, although this alienated some Sunni leaders themselves. Naturally, the U.S. offensive against him was stepped up at this point of time, leading to his elimination earlier this month.

Zarqawi's life is an index of the stuff of which terrorists are made. I concede that there is just a thin line of distinction between basic impulses that drive major crime and terrorism. Nevertheless, it is not mere criminal passion that propels many of them, especially those who assume leadership positions. It is the ability to extract loyalty under the most trying circumstances that counts. There was something about Zarqawi, which has not emerged from the sketches available up to now - a factor that might have ignited passions in the direction he chose. We have possibly to wait until an adventurous journalist interviews those who knew him intimately and comes out with objective and authentic accounts of how the brute of a man exacted loyalty and succeeded in escalating terror to heights hitherto unknown to most of us. According to Hussain Haqqani, a Boston University professor who studies Muslim extremism, Zarqawi set "a new standard of ruthlessness". What was most intriguing was his fondness for recording his operations in minute visual detail. In this respect, I can see that he had something in common with Liberations Tigers of Tamil Eelam supremo V. Prabakaran. Recall how the initial moments of Rajiv Gandhi's arrival at Sriperumpudur on the fateful evening of May 21,1991 were captured on video and how they came in handy for subsequent police investigations of the assassination. There is one view that it was this weakness for the visual depiction of his activities that was Zarqawi's undoing.

First, on video someone resembling him was seen personally slaying Nick Berg in May 2004. Next, in April this year, a web site with Al Qaeda links showed him clearly delivering a message. This was uncharacteristic of a man who was generally known to be finicky about his own security. Identifying him even in a crowd was, therefore, not a problem to those who ultimately got him.

The question that baffles those who are struck by the awesome personality that Zarqawi was is one of unravelling the kind of relationship that existed between him and Osama bin Laden. There is a lot of guesswork in what has been written on this subject. The hazy feeling is that the two were not exactly fond of each other. One recorded meeting between them is traced back to the late 1990s somewhere in Afghanistan. It is known that Bin Laden had refused to accommodate him in Al Qaeda's apex organ. For his part, although Zarqawi accepted Al Qaeda money to meet his expenses, he maintained a certain reserve that pointed to a determination to maintain his identity and not to take orders from Bin Laden. Further, differences between the two also arose about Zarqawi's obsession with hitting Shia groups and not paying enough attention to tackling the U.S. troops. In the post-Saddam dispensation, however, it suited both to acknowledge each other's importance. While the Al Qaeda stamp gave authenticity and ideological respectability to Zarqawi, the latter's adventures in Iraq helped Bin Laden to circulate the highly questionable impression that he was in command in that country.

One thought agitates many who have been following terrorism with great interest, academic and otherwise. What does Zarqawi's liquidation mean to Bin Laden? Will he be frightened more than before at the U.S. might to eventually get at targets set by them? Will somebody in his group, attracted by the phenomenal reward available, tip off the U.S. forces in search of him? There are two factors here for our consideration. It is obvious that Zarqawi was betrayed by someone in his own group. This does not come as a surprise because of his highhandedness in his attacks against the Shia population and their holy shrines. It is believed that Sunni opinion was also outraged by this mindless violence and desecration. I do not think Bin Laden has such an image problem within his group. The loyal villagers who surround him always offer the best possible physical protection. Also, dissent, if at all it is there, possibly exists in a muted form that is of hardly any consequence. The prospect of enemy infiltration into Al Qaeda therefore seems remote. Secondly, the terrain in which Bin Laden has sought refuge - the inhospitable heights of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border - hardly yields itself to the kind of operation that was launched against Zarqawi. Viewed in this light, Zarqawi was more daring of the two. A study in contrast perhaps? Interesting days in Iraq are certainly ahead.