The Supreme Court is determined to insulate the police force from political influence. But will the State governments fall in line?
THE Supreme Court has put its foot down vis-a-vis State governments on the issue of implementing the National Police Commission (NPC) recommendations. Readers may recall that in its order of September 22, 2006, the Court had directed States to file an affidavit by January 3 this year confirming whether the reforms cited in its order had been brought into force. Even many of us who understand that the Court has the last word in such matters were cynical about the States going the full length to bow down to the directive. This is because governments in our country have an enormous capacity to circumvent law and hoodwink constitutional authorities without actually appearing to do so. This is exactly what happened recently when they filed their affidavits before the apex court. The silver lining was the stand of the Central government in what seemed to be at least a partially positive response.
The Ministry of Home Affairs, which oversees matters of policing in the country and directly controls the police in the Union Territories, submitted an affidavit that it had already set up a Committee on National Security and Welfare of Central Police Personnel with the Home Minister as chairman. It further said that a new Police Act (to replace the 1861 Act), which would embody most of the reforms mentioned in the Supreme Court order, was being finalised (on the basis of the draft prepared by the Soli Sorabjee Committee) so that it could come into effect, after parliamentary approval, at least in respect of the Union Territories. It is an entirely different matter that the Court was not fully satisfied with what the Home Ministry had done. It was of the view that the Ministry's action did not conform to its direction for a full-fledged National Security Commission that was free from political interference and could choose chiefs of Central Police Organisations (CPOs) on its own judgment. The Court gave time to the Ministry until March 31 to rectify this shortfall.
While the Government of India (GOI) thus emerges reasonably well in the whole transaction, the real difficulty is only with regard to State police forces, which, readers will know, have unabashedly been converted into handmaidens of State governments (read the ruling party). While a few governments told the apex court that they had initiated the required measures, the majority were not all that forthcoming. Some sought a little more time to act. The others pointed out difficulties in ushering in the prescribed reforms.
It is interesting to analyse the States' responses. I have always said that on two issues in the country there is near unanimity that cuts across party lines. These are in respect of control over the police and action to root out corruption. All parties want a near stranglehold over the police force to facilitate its misuse for narrow political ends. In the same way, no party has exhibited any strong desire to steer clear of corruption and provide a clean government. To put the record straight, some States actually nurse corruption and compete with one another in scaling new heights of dishonesty. This is why I am not surprised that the governments in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and West Bengal, run by different parties, responded to the Court's order in an identical fashion. The stand, generally, of these and other States was that appointment of a Director-General of Police (DGP) from a panel prepared by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) of officers fit for promotion to that rank was not acceptable, as such a prescription encroached on a State's right to appoint an officer of its choice. We now have the odd situation of some State DGPs who are not in the government panel (prepared by the Home Ministry and approved by the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, ACC,) for filling in positions in CPOs. No doubt not every Indian Police Service (IPS) officer can get into that panel as standards of eligibility are high.
The Supreme Court rightly believed that the position of a State DGP was vital and that it had to be filled by an officer who had a good record of service and had fulfilled the yardstick prescribed by the GOI. Some States object to picking a DGP from that kind of an elite panel only because they cannot choose their own favourites. I know that, sometimes, in a few States, no officer is available from that panel. I am of the view that in such circumstances a State can always seek a special dispensation from the government. To reject wholesale a sensible proposal for choice of a DGP from a select panel of officers with proven ability and integrity is nothing but specious and tendentious. Equally questionable is the States' rejection of a fixed tenure of two years for a DGP that the NPC had suggested and the Supreme Court has now mandated. One of the States has taken the position that a fixed tenure would prevent States from removing a DGP if he is guilty of negligence or misconduct. This is far from correct. A fixed tenure is no licence to incompetence or dishonesty.
A State can always justify an action to remove an incumbent provided such a move is honest and transparent and under circumstances that speak for themselves. The Supreme Court order of September prescribes a similar two-year tenure for other operational executives such as Zonal Inspectors-General, Range Deputy Inspectors-General, District Superintendents of Police (DSPs) and Station House Officers (SHOs). It is an open secret that some of these jobs, especially at the SHO level, are sold in some States for a price that is extracted by departmental superiors or street-level politicians who have a clout with the top leadership of the ruling party. A minimum tenure is the first step towards ending corruption in transfers and postings that have become an industry by themselves. Readers can, therefore, understand why there is such resistance to the apex court's directive.
The most crucial of the NPC recommendations now endorsed by the Court is the creation of a State Security Council (SSC) that would lay down policy guidelines for the State police. The SSC would be headed by the Chief Minister and comprise among others the Leader of the Opposition and a few eminent men from the judiciary, academia, and other fields. The State DGP will be its ex-officio Secretary.
To explain the rationale behind such a council better, I thought I should quote the Court's order:
"The State governments are directed to constitute a State Security Commission in every State to ensure that the State government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the State police and for laying down the broad policy guidelines so that the State police always acts according to the laws of the land and the Constitution of the country. The recommendations of this Commission shall be binding on the State government."
Can there be anything more salutary to the cause of professional policing than the concept of a State Security Commission? But many State governments have opposed this tooth and nail. The Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh govenments have taken a categorical stand that the SSC would not work for a variety of reasons. The former apprehends that the Council would undermine the jurisdiction and powers of a constitutionally elected State government and could become a parallel body without accountability. The Andhra Pradesh affidavit was even more carping and devastating to the cause of an objective police force. It stated: "...inclusion of Leader of Opposition in the Commission would lead to disastrous results as the government and Opposition cannot sail together on various aspects and framing the policies in enforcement of law and order would be adversely affected."
The affidavit went on to allege that the Leader of the Opposition and other independent members of the SSC could push their own agenda and politicise the proceedings of the body with a view to embarrassing the State government. My response to the apprehensions is that the SSC is not meant to discuss day-to-day operational matters that would still be the prerogative of the field officer. In my view, the Council could concentrate on policies with regard to expansion of a police force, recruitment criteria, strengthening legal backing for police operations and fair treatment of the weaker sections of society.
I concede there could be attempts to politicise policing by some members of the SSC. This is why the early days of the experiment are crucial. A mature Chief Minister and an equally sagacious Leader of the Opposition can set up precedents in favour of a healthy approach to matters of policing that could influence the future functioning of the Council. A forum for discussing how policing should focus on the problems of crime and citizen safety can only enhance police performance and not dilute it. Ultimately, the success of such a bold innovation as the SSC would depend on the quality of men authorised by law to work on it. I am sure the Indian polity has still a few stable and well-intentioned men and women who are interested in policing as a tool to promote community safety rather than one to be unscrupulously exploited for political aggrandisement.
If all that I have written in support of the reforms prescribed by the Supreme Court do not make any sense, at least what happened in Punjab a few days ago, as a prelude to setting the election machinery in motion, should highlight the ills of the system. The Election Commission of India has ordered the removal of the State DGP following allegations raised against him by the Akali Dal-led Opposition. The gravamen of the charge against the DGP was that his brother had received an undue favour from the State government and that he could, therefore, not be expected to be neutral during the conduct of the election.
Since I do not have dependable information on the allegation against the officer, I shall not comment on the decision. But when a responsible body such as the Election Commission acts against a serving DGP, it cannot be ignored either. This significant happening should further validate the point that the DGP is an important functionary in a State and that there can be no compromise on merit on his choice. He should not only be chosen through a transparent process, but should be given a security of tenure that would help him function without fear or favour. This is what the apex court is aiming at.
If some State governments do not buy this, it is a sad reflection on our polity. The Court is determined to pursue its laudable agenda of establishing professionalism in the most vital organ of government and insulating it from political caprice.
I am almost certain that if the obdurate States do not fall in line by March 31, they will have a torrid time at the hands of the Court. It is now left to opinion leaders to attempt counselling those in State governments who do not see reason.
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