It is five years since the Pulwama-Balakot crisis plunged India-Pakistan relations into a downward spiral, but 2024 also marks three years of the 2021 ceasefire. And, contrary to all expectations, it has held. In fact, after the 2003 ceasefire that lasted nearly a decade, this is the second longest. Press Information Bureau data show that firing incidents along the LoC and IB dropped from 380 in January 2021 to 0 in March, followed by just 1 incident in 2022. Official figures for 2023 are not readily available, but news reports suggest that violations might be in the single digits.
The upside of a lasting ceasefire such as this cannot be overstressed. There are reports of much relief in the daily lives of villagers in the border areas, of increased trade and uninterrupted agricultural activity. The military on both sides has had some breathing space. Most importantly, of course, a lasting ceasefire offers the hope that it can blossom into something bigger.
When the ceasefire was announced in 2021, former ambassador T.C.A. Raghavan had said, “We have to wait and see… whether it is a tactical arrangement or the beginning of a major political initiative. We don’t know as yet.”
And we still don’t know. There are no signs that it has led to anything more substantial and, if anything, the rhetoric on both sides has been aggressive with a marked increase in Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in the Jammu region. Unfortunately, it has become a domestic compulsion on either side to maintain a certain high pitch in mutual dealings. On the Indian side, it arises from cynical electoral calculations while on the Pakistani side there is self-destructive arm-twisting from the military. Added to this is the fact that, given the nature of the digital space, even small skirmishes tend now to be blown up in popular discourse, often seeming to drive diplomatic initiatives awry.
The uneasy calm now sees a new intrusion. India has formally asked for a modification of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), which until now was invoked in diplomatic circles as the acme of water-sharing agreements worldwide, one that defied wars and political tantrums. Amendments to the IWT are indeed overdue and could have been carried out at an intergovernment level, but that possibility appears to have become untenable after the breakdown of diplomatic ties in 2019 and the continuing infractions in Jammu.
In the grandstanding between India and Pakistan, what gets overlooked is South Asia, an already poor region further threatened by acute water and foodgrains crises as the climate situation worsens. Solutions for these can only come from a concerted regional effort. Unfortunately, South Asian regional cooperation is among the lowest in the world. As per reports, calculated as a proportion of potential trade possibility, South Asian trade stands at 5 per cent compared with 26 per cent in ASEAN, 50 per cent in East Asia, or 67 per cent in the EU region. Talks of a South Asian Economic Union have not made much progress.
As the Big Brother in South Asia, India can surely do more than merely flex. Its unarguable regional dominance could also translate into an ability to shrug off provocations and avoid tit-for-tat responses while allowing regional agreements on trade, climate, and energy to flourish. Ironically enough, it would actually benefit India the most. Not to mention, a more prosperous South Asia will inevitability see terror and religious extremism being dialled down.
To discuss these concerns, we invited former ambassadors Vivek Katju and T.C.A. Raghavan as well as Stimson Center’s South Asia Visiting Fellow Bashir Ali Abbas to write for us this time. Their future-looking pieces are essential for today’s vitiated times.
