A wake-up call

To cope with the threat from the LTTE, Sri Lanka needs to revamp its security and intelligence systems. This is the lesson from the July 24 attack at Katunayake, the worst in the history of aviation terrorism.

THE daring attack by a 14-member suicide squad of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on Colombo airport and the adjoining Air Force base on July 24 exposed the Achilles' heel of the country's national security structure. The attack, which made a mockery of Sri Lanka's security and intelligence community, questioned the government's capacity to develop intelligence, forecast threats, protect critical infrastructure and prepare appropriate force structures to disrupt LTTE operations. It was symbolic of the sharp decline in the capability of the Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII), which is responsible for anti-terrorist (protective) intelligence as well as counter-terrorist (offensive) intelligence.

The timing of the attack on Sri Lanka's most protected security complex outside the north and the east coincided with the anniversary of the anti-Tamil riots of July 24, 1983, triggered by the LTTE's killing of 13 Sinhala soldiers. It was usual for the LTTE to launch attacks to commemorate significant anniversaries. Furthermore, the LTTE has a history of carrying out attacks on civil and military aviation.

In two waves, LTTE strike teams penetrated the high-security complex at Katunayake at 3-30 a.m. and destroyed a total of 11 aircraft and damaged three. Three passenger aircraft - two A 330s and an A340 - of Sri Lankan Airlines and eight Air Force military aircraft - two Israeli built Kfirs, a Ukrainian MiG-27, two Mi-17 helicopter gunships and three-Chinese K8 advanced training aircraft - were destroyed. Two other passenger aircraft - an A320 and an A340 - were badly damaged.

After five hours of fierce fighting, the 14 LTTE suicide bombers who had entered the complex were either killed or blew themselves up after they ran out of ammunition. Six airmen and one commando were killed. Although there were no civilian fatalities, eight security forces personnel and 18 civilians were injured. The injured civilians included a TV journalist who was shot in his leg and a Russian engineer working for a private airline. The Sri Lankan Airlines, 40 per cent owned by Emirates, the airline, suffered an estimated loss of $350 million.

In the history of aviation terrorism, the LTTE attack is considered the worst. The second highest number of aircraft destroyed or damaged in any single terrorist attack is four. The attack staged by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in Dawson's Field, Jordan, in September 1970 destroyed four passenger aircraft. Although international pressure following the attack led to the expulsion of the group from Jordan, the PFLP also attacked the Lod airport, Israel (May 1972), attempted to blow up oil installations in Singapore (January 1974), and was responsible for the OPEC kidnapping, Austria (December 1975) and the Entebbe hijacking, Uganda (June 1976). The LTTE's attack against civil aviation is a clear act of terrorism. The injury to the Russian classifies it as an act of international terrorism.

The attack was intended to cripple Sri Lanka's economy by affecting tourism and foreign investment and to degrade and destroy the air capability of the Sri Lankan military. Although no tourists were injured, the attack could affect tourism at least by a quarter and set back both domestic and foreign investment. The attack destroyed a third of Sri Lanka's commercial fleet and a fourth of the Air Force's jet fleet. The latter fact is likely to affect the Air Force's capability to destroy LTTE targets, provide air support for forward troops, airlift troops and supplies, and evacuate the injured among the security forces.

Within a week of the attack, Sri Lankan Airlines grounded 300 members of the cabin crew. In effect, they are being pushed for retirement. On July 31, as many as 600 employees who had opted to leave under the voluntary retirement scheme were asked to stay at home. The next day the airline issued a circular providing the option of retirement to anyone except the Sri Lankan technical crew - the pilots. Although the employment of 120 Sri Lankan pilots is secured, the 90 foreign pilots are likely to be affected. Twenty-eight foreign pilots, mostly Filipinos and Bulgarians, are likely to be given three months' notice and three months' pay. Sri Lankan Airlines also closed down several of its offices overseas and drastically reduced the number of international flights.

Both the Sri Lankan Airlines and the Air Force will have to wait for a year to replenish the losses. The Air Force's losses are significant because the LTTE is now poised to attack Jaffna. As there is no secure land route to Jaffna, the government is dependent on the air bridge and the sea route. Furthermore, the Kfirs and MiG-27s have provided the much-needed fire support for forward troops.

While the Kfirs is a modern multi-role fighter with a weapons platform equipped with a computerised bombing system for accurate delivery, the MiG-27 is capable of conducting night operations. The Kfirs and the MiGs can be launched only from the Katunayake airbase and not from the other bases at Anuradhapura, Hingurakgoda, Trincomalee, Vavuniya or Ratmalana. The losses will leave Sri Lanka's No. 10 jet squadron with 10 Kfirs and the No. 5 squadron with five MiG 27s and a MiG trainer. The two Mi-24s destroyed were among the No. 9 attack squadron's 18 helicopter gunships equipped with electronic equipment to mount night operations.

In sum, the LTTE attack achieved its multiple objective of demonstrating the failures of the authorities concerned in terms of both force protection and strategic and tactical intelligence. Suicide attacks in the past in Sri Lanka have demonstrated that a suicide team can breach the best possible security. (In the past 10 months there has been 31 suicide attacks in Israel.)

Protective security - target hardening - against a suicide squad has been of limited value. Without tactical intelligence relating to the time, modus operandi and location of the attack it is almost impossible to prevent a suicide attack against a civilian or military target. To develop sound, timely and usable intelligence, the government needs full-time intelligence professionals dedicated and committed to penetrating the LTTE organisation in the Wanni and LTTE cells in the South.

The response of the Sri Lankan state to the LTTE attack was cosmetic. As the runway itself was not damaged, at 3 p.m. the same day Air Force jets took off on bombing missions. Two Kfirs and two MiG-27s bombed LTTE ground targets at Vishwamadhu, 17 km southeast of Kilinochchi and in Trincomalee, south in Koonativu area. Bombing for the sake of swift retaliation is an unprofessional response to a terrorist attack. Without precise target intelligence, aerial bombing has proved to be counter-productive.

The government appointed two committees of inquiry. In the past, such committees, appointed with a view to pacifying public opinion in the short term, have amounted to a massive waste of time and, more important, of resources. The reports of the committees, which are likely to recommend the dismissal of the base commander and a few airmen, will have no immediate, mid-term or long-term impact on improving Sri Lanka's security. President Chandrika Kumaratunga should have called for the resignation of Cyril Herath, the Director-General of the DII.

Cyril Herath, a retired and honest police officer, was brought back as head of the security and intelligence apparatus in 1998. Nearing 70, and out of government service for over a decade, he lacked an understanding of the LTTE. The LTTE that he knew in the 1970s and the early 1980s had transformed itself totally by the 1990s. While heading the security and intelligence community, Cyril Herath also held the post of Chairman of the National Development Bank. Intelligence being the most effective weapon against terrorism, his holding a second and non-intelligence post demonstrated the government's lack of understanding of the nature of the LTTE. To foreign security and intelligence agencies closely monitoring the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government did not appear serious and professional in fighting a ruthless enemy organisation.

In contrast, the LTTE assigned high priority to intelligence and counter-intelligence. It invested 40 per cent of its war budget in developing and managing both a civilian and a military intelligence organisation. All LTTE attacks were either intelligence driven or intelligence led. The organisation had one of the most successful agent-handling programmes. It had agents within the four armed services and in two of the three intelligence directorates. Although the LTTE meticulously studied the aspects of success and failure with regard to every operation, the Sri Lankan security forces and the intelligence community continued to repeat their mistakes. Accountability and transparency mean little to political appointees and to their masters. Being a political appointee, Cyril Herath is likely to continue to hold both posts.

In many ways, the Sri Lankan government is reaping the whirlwind of its actions. Since the People's Alliance (P.A.) came to office in 1995, the political appointments that were made to gain control of the security and intelligence community has emasculated the country's military, security and intelligence capabilities. Mediocre officials who wanted to curry favour with P.A. politicians branded some of the able personnel in government as supporters of the previous United National Party (UNP).

As a result, 60 per cent of the senior officers, 40 per cent of the middle-level officers, and 20 per cent of the junior officers of the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB), the forerunner of the DII, were either asked to retire or sent on uniformed postings. Consequently, the government lost its ablest intelligence minds trained by British, Israeli and other reputable agencies. Almost all the officers were non-political, experienced intelligence professionals who had risen through the ranks, committed to serving Sri Lanka's interests.

After replacing Zerny Wijesuriya, an internationally-respected career intelligence officer who headed the NIB, with an investigator, the government gradually dismantled the critical branches essential to fight terrorism. The most devastating was the removal of both the head and the deputy head of counter-terrorism. With the head of the training branch removed, neither the novices to intelligence posts nor the political appointees who were brought in could be trained properly.

The new Defence Secretary, Chandrananda de Silva, also a political appointee but with no training or understanding of security and intelligence matters, spearheaded the purge. Despite having been Defence Secretary for half a decade, de Silva has failed to learn the basic principles of defence management. By satisfying his political masters by implementing political decisions, he has survived but at the cost of gravely damaging Sri Lankan national security. By interfering in crucial matters, he has affected the performance of both the intelligence community and the military.

By compromising national security for political gain, the government has lost all the military gains except Jaffna. With the threat to Jaffna mounting, the government is likely to lose Jaffna before President Kumaratunga ends her term. Furthermore, the LTTE has grown rapidly between 1995 and 2001. It has also developed an artillery capability that can engage the security forces head-on.

The most devastating impact of politicising the security and intelligence community has been the government's failure to detect the formation of LTTE cells in Colombo. In Sri Lanka, the Police Department has primacy in the matter of both investigation and counter-terrorist operations in the South. But with the politicisation of the Defence Ministry and the Police Department police officers with a proven track record of fighting LTTE infiltration were shifted to administrative posts. For instance, Lionel Gunatillake, head of the Criminal Investigations Department, was transferred as Director, Welfare.

There was no reward or incentive for police officers who handled anti-terrorist operations successfully. Unless an officer knew a politician he or she was not rewarded and did not become eligible for a special promotion. At best one had to be politically correct, not operationally skilled. Those who silently marked time ended as heads of departments and divisions, while the best were labelled rebels and sidelined.

While Prabakaran rewarded his successful intelligence operatives, the police system failed to develop incentives and rewards to recognise and promote talent and intelligent hard work. A highly trained and skilled combat officer like Nimal Lewke, previously of the Special Task Force, continues to work as the Director of the Police Hospital. On political grounds several able officers, including Chandra Wakista of the Terrorism Investigations Department, were suspended for their previous efforts to combat the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).

With the anti-terrorist community becoming demoralised, the LTTE had a field day in the South, recruiting even a few services personnel. Gradually the threat to Colombo increased. Soon, politicians who played little games with security were going to pay a heavy price. The LTTE infiltrators built support cells, facilitating the entry of suicide squads to mount strikes at the very heart of the South, including Colombo.

The fact that the government has failed to detect the LTTE support cell that hosted the suicide team that attacked the Katunayake airport and airbase demonstrates the grave lack of high grade intelligence. Unless the support cell that provided the intelligence, housing, food, transportation and communications to the suicide team is detected, the LTTE may send another suicide team to conduct an equally devastating attack. The LTTE has over a hundred psychologically and physically war-trained suicide bombers. As long as a support infrastructure is allowed to function in Colombo, the LTTE will be able to mount operation after operation.

The act of reducing the period of training of soldiers has done the gravest damage to the national security of Sri Lanka. This writer argued in Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security that by reducing the training period of the average soldier the nation will produce a soldier who cannot fight.

The politicians were interested in numbers and the civilian bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry failed to understand that quality and not quantity was the key in the fight against terrorism.

Today, the LTTE cadres are better motivated than the average Sri Lankan soldier. The only way the Sri Lankan soldier can be made a superior fighter is by increasing his or her training period.

The LTTE attack at Katunayake demonstrated, in addition to the lack of a contingency plan, the grave lack of training/retraining and commitment of the average airman. Three of the aircraft were damaged by 'friendly fire'. One commando was killed by 'friendly fire'. Prabakaran emphasised on training to the point that he is quoted as saying: "During training, you can fire 1,000 rounds, but when launched into battle, one round should kill one enemy." In the LTTE, retraining, known as 'touch-up training', is a must.

The bureaucrats in the Defence Ministry do not understand the importance of professional training. This has prevented repeated attempts by both Sri Lankan and foreign specialists to professionalise the security forces and the intelligence community. Two of the world's leading experts in terrorism and guerilla warfare, Dr. Bruce Hoffman from the U.S., and Dr. Chaliand from France, flew into Sri Lanka in 1998 and 1999 respectively. Both visited both the north and the east. Against the advice of the Sri Lankan military, Dr. Chaliand risked his life and physically examined the forward defences south of Elephant Pass. He said it was only a question of time before the LTTE breached the defences south of Elephant Pass and in the Wanni.

Dr. Chaliand's recommendations were sent to President Chandrika Kumaratunga through French Ambassador Elizabeth Dahan. After 11 camps were overrun in the Wanni in late 1999 and the defences south of Elephant Pass were breached in early 2000, Dr. Chaliand was invited to return again. However, the Defence Ministry said it had no funds to pay for his passage.

Dr. Hoffman advised the government not to undertake Operation Jayasikuru, the over-ambitious project to open a land route from Vavuniya to Jaffna. As 90 per cent of the Sri Lankan troops are engaged in defensive operations, he also said that the Special Forces component should be increased to at least 30 per cent. He was surprised that the government had no working think tank to debate options and come up with the best workable solutions to address the military problems that plagued the country.

One of the leading defence organisations in the United States, MPRI, headed by General Harry Soyster, the former head of the Defence Intelligence Agency, offered to revamp and restructure the Sri Lankan national security apparatus. Once again, the Defence Ministry in Sri Lanka scuttled the plan by stating that it was not favourably disposed to the idea.

The LTTE threat is a severe military threat. There are only two military officers serving in the Defence Ministry, the apex organisation coordinating the security forces and the intelligence community. In the United Kingdom, 50 per cent of the officers in the Defence Ministry are services personnel. Sri Lanka cannot be an exception and cannot wait - without paying a price.

The first step towards developing an efficient organisation would be to retire the political appointees and obtain expertise in specialist training. Thereafter, in order to encourage the creation of innovative national security leaders, the government should build merit-based security forces and an intelligence organisation. In such a structure only the very best should be appointed to lead the national institutions.

It would also be necessary to develop a coherent national security policy and a military doctrine which Sri Lanka still does not have. Without bringing about personnel and structural alterations and laying a solid foundation, it will be impossible to get out of the current rut of defeat after defeat. Without such radical changes, Sri Lanka is unlikely to build robust military, security and intelligence capabilities to challenge the rapidly growing LTTE threat in the immediate, mid and foreseeable future.

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna is Fellow, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, Scotland, and author of Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis and National Security.