A Sino-European Union policy towards North Korea is crucial to debunk the arguments of the United States for a National Missile Defence plan.
THE argument in favour of the National Missile Defence (NMD) system is based on a series of misunderstandings and exaggerations. The claimed threat is neither real nor credible. Yet President George Bush is using it to underpin the United States' deployment of the NMD, which is in the interests of the arms industry and to the detriment of world peace. There is therefore a need to invalidate these arguments and remove any vestiges of threat. The latter may be possible through a joint Sino-European effort.
The Bush administration came to office with a steely determination to push ahead with its 'Son of Star Wars' programme, the NMD, in the face of opposition from around the world. The idea is to erect over the U.S. an impenetrable umbrella of anti-ballistic missiles, giving it immunity from Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) tipped with nuclear warheads from any of the "rogue" states - Syria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and North Korea. While for the minority in the administration it is pay-back time for the $3 billion that the military-industrial complex chipped in to the presidential election campaign pot, others have bought the technical and political arguments for the NMD.
Yet, on close inspection, these arguments crumble. First, the claim that there is uncontrolled proliferation either of weapons of mass destruction or of the vehicles for their delivery is exaggerated. In fact, the bulk of the proliferation comes from the activities of one country, North Korea. It is the only 'rogue' state that will have the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction by an ICBM in the foreseeable future. However, North Korea's own capabilities and intentions are over-stated, misreported and constantly rounded up to transform possibilities into inevitabilities. North Korea has the Nodong 2 rocket with a claimed range of 1,500 km, the Taepodong series of missiles and space launch vehicles with a range of up to 10,000 km and the capability to hit Washington with a 100 kg warhead, as estimated by the U.S. No other "rogue" state has such an indigenous capacity. Iran's Shehab missiles are based on incremental innovations to Nodong. Pakistan's Ghauri, and its proposed Ghaznavi, a clone of Taepodong-1, are both almost entirely dependent on North Korea for technology and expertise. Syria is standing pat on an earlier North Korean missile - the Hwasong 6 - with a range of 500 km which fulfils the deterrence needed in its stand-off with Israel. Libya has its own Al-Fatah missile, but the fact that it is buying elements of Nodong technology clearly indicates how badly it is trailing in the missile race.
And these very missiles are untested and unreliable. Both Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) were distressed by the unreliability of even Hwasong 5. During the Iran-Iraq war and the second phase of the 'War of the Cities', Iran used 77 Hwasong 5 missiles, and over 10 per cent of them exploded on launch. As for Nodong its only launch by North Korea in May 1993, achieved a mere 500 km. A Syrian test proved no better, while an Iranian test in 1998 saw the missile self-destruct after 1,000 km. The only Taepodong launch was an attempt to put the Kwangmyongsong satellite into orbit on a three-stage Taepodong platform on August 31, 1998. The third stage failed and the debris was scattered across the Pacific.
It is not certain if North Korea plans to use ICBMs for delivery. The 1994 Framework Agreement signed by the U.S. and North Korea involved Pyongyang closing its Russian-built graphite-moderated nuclear reactor and stopping work on the construction of a second reactor in exchange for the U.S. putting together a consortium to construct two 1,000 MW Light Water Reactors. The reason for the U.S. enthusiasm was the suspicion that the original reactor had been tapped for weapons-grade plutonium. Both the KGB (state security police of the former Soviet Union) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the U.S. believed that North Korea had diverted enough plutonium to produce up to five crude first generation nuclear weapons. It is invariably claimed by the U.S. that these would provide the nuclear warheads for the missiles. Yet, it is evident from North Korea's previous nuclear work that its priority was the development of free-fall airdrop weapons - those delivered by plane or by "unconventional" means, that is, cargo ships. North Korea has never tested a nuclear weapon.
So what do we have? At worst there is the possibility of the North Koreans firing a couple of ICBMs at the U.S. using a missile that has neither proved reliable nor carried the required distance, tipped with an untested warhead, before being wiped off the face of the earth by the U.S. response. At best it is an unusable deterrent rather than a pre-emptive threat. Bush believes the best way to neutralise this threat is to spend at least $40 billion on the NMD! North Korea has between one and 10 Taepodong 1 missiles and two Taepodong 2 prototypes. These are currently available on the semi-open market at $6 million each. Thus, for $72 million, less than 0.2 per cent of the initial budget for the NMD, the U.S. could buy the entire lot. At the end of Bill Clinton's term, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright came very close to a deal with North Korea to buy out their missiles. Now Bush will neither play nor pay.
There is a way out. Since the visit to Pyongyang in May by Swedish Prime Minister Gran Persson, the European Union (E.U.) has developed unprecedented good relations with North Korea. Primarily because the E.U. is not the U.S., Japan or South Korea. Simultaneously, Bush has changed the Sino-U.S. relationship from "strategic partnership" to "competitive relationship". China now judges that the security environment is deteriorating with the U.S. aim, post-South Korean elections, of creating a U.S.-Japan-South Korea axis and at the same time strengthening the U.S.-Japan Defence Guidelines. China is concerned that North Korea is being used as an excuse to start the end run of a new arms race, one designed to force it to shift funding from civil to military research and development (R&D) - in the race with the U.S., China is currently winning in at least in some sectors - spending tens of billions of dollars in the development and deployment of hundreds of ICBMs to give itself a capacity to swamp the NMD and restore the status quo ante at the expense of recommencing nuclear testing.
China, therefore, sees a nuclear North Korea with intermediate- and long-range missiles as a threat to its security interests by providing an excuse for the U.S.' anti-Beijing policies. This was illustrated by China's pressure on North Korea to halt missile testing. China would like to see North Korea's export of medium- and long-range missiles negotiated away.
Thus Europe and China share a common interest. A joint Sino-European approach to North Korea might just work. It would also suit Russia, as with its intellectual or political underpinning stripped away the U.S. administration might not implement the NMD programme. It would suit Japan as it would prevent the need for its own backdoor NMD, the Theatre Missile Defence - for East Asia. It would suit South Korea as it tries to disentangle the NMD from the U.S. policy for the Korean Peninsula, that is, creating an enormous barrier towards rapprochement between the Koreas. It might even suit North Korea. While the Propaganda Department may be in the hands of the hardline fundamentalists, the Army has a much more moderate approach. In fact, it could suit everyone but the U.S. arms industry. Perhaps this is indeed the moment for a joint Sino-European demarche.
Glyn Ford is a Member of the European Parliament from the United Kingdom.
