Hamstrung by politics

The efforts to resolve the border dispute between India and Bangladesh are hampered by competitive electoral politics in the latter.

WHILE summing up the proceedings of the two-day meeting between Indian and Bangladeshi officials in mid-June, a spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) described the talks as "an overall positive development". Most of the participants at the meeting tended to agree with this view. However, they suggested that any progress in the efforts relating to the demarcation of the boundary between the two countries, which was the purpose of the talks, would be possible only after the general elections in Bangladesh. The elections will not take place before October 2001.

Although the talks set the demarcation process in motion, the mood on the Indian side was not exuberant; most Indian officials were left in no doubt that only a government in Dhaka free from electoral compulsions would be able to take a decision on the complex issue of exchanging territories. Agreeing with this perception, a senior MEA official said: "The forthcoming elections in Bangladesh have been instrumental in causing the border skirmishes, especially the Pyrdwah incident in April. The mischief was created on the Bangladesh side of the border by some pro-Pakistan and anti-Sheikh Hasina (the Bangladesh Prime Minister) groups, which wanted to embarrass her government. The present government does not want to take any more chances."

Khaleda Zia has already made the border issue a campaign point, though Sheikh Hasina had expressed herself against doing so. The Opposition's anti-India rhetoric is usually marked by charges that New Delhi has not ratified the India-Bangladesh Land Agreement, 1974. Indian officials say that on the issue of ratification they are in a Catch-22 situation. Under the Indian Constitution, they can ratify the agreement only after finalising the demarcation. That can be done only after discussions between the officials of the two countries. An MEA official said that Bangladesh would first have to decide on the demarcation before blaming India for not having ratified the agreement.

The first step in the direction of an early ratification of the agreement was in fact taken with the start of the talks. The Indian team for the talks, led by Joint Secretary in the MEA Meera Shankar, included representatives of, besides the MEA, the Ministries of Home Affairs, Water Resources and Law. Also present were representatives of the Survey of India, the Census of India, the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Directorates of Land Records and Survey of the States involved. The 11-member Bangladesh delegation was led by Mohammed Janibul Haq, Joint Secretary (Political), Ministry of Home Affairs. It included representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Land, and Water Resources, besides those of the Directorate of Land Records and Survey, the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi.

At the diplomatic level the meeting was a big step towards restoring trust between the two sides, which received a severe blow in April 2001. In contrast to the dismal record of past efforts at resolving the border issue, this time the meeting was convened within a record time. As early as December 1999 India had suggested a meeting at the Foreign Secretaries' level to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) of officials to discuss the border issue. It was, however, only after a year, in December 2000, that Bangladesh Foreign Secretary Safi Sami came to Delhi and endorsed the suggestion. Two JWGs were then formed, one to demarcate a 6.5-km stretch of the border, which remains undemarcated (demarcation of 4,096 km of the border has already been done) and the other to oversee the exchange of enclaves and adversely possessed territories. The June meeting decided to operationalise the two JWGs and fixed a time-frame for resolving the issue. The officials have agreed to meet again in the first week of July.

THE situation on the border is, however, far from peaceful. Trouble arose just a day after the June meeting ended. On June 15, three Bangladeshi nationals were killed when the BSF opened fire in self-defence at Santoshpur village in Chapainawabganj district, bordering Malda district of West Bengal. The local BSF unit alleged that when its officers challenged some people who were smuggling cattle into Bangladesh, Bangladeshi nationals who were working in the nearby fields entered Indian territory and attacked the troops. On information, BSF jawans from the Sirsi-Kalaibari camp rushed to the spot.

The BDR had a different version. It charged the BSF with opening fire on "harmless farmers who were grazing cattle". Like the Pyrdwah incident, in which 16 BSF officers were killed, the Santhoshpur incident also has created bad blood between the two countries.

Talking to Frontline in New Delhi, BSF Director-General Gurbachan Jagat said: "Such incidents keep on occurring at the border and cattle-smuggling has been a persistent problem on the India-Bangladesh border." However, Colonel Ahmedullah Imam of the BDR was quoted as having said: "The incident has shocked us as it occurred only a day after officials of both countries agreed to resolve the outstanding border issue."

Such incidents do not help the functioning of the JWGs, whose tasks have already been made complex. The first JWG, which has been entrusted with the task of marking the remaining 6.5 km of the border, has run into rough weather. One of the problems concerns the Muhurirchar area - the Muhuri river, mid-stream of which the boundary has to be demarcated, has changed its course since 1974, when the India-Bangladesh Land Agreement was signed.

The agreement, which was signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Bangladesh counterpart Sheikh Mujibur Rehman on May 16, 1974, states: "The boundary in the area should be demarcated along the mid-stream of the course of the Muhuri river at the time of demarcation. This boundary will be a fixed one. The two governments should raise embankments on their respective sides with a view to stabilising the river in its present course." However, the Bangladesh government has been insisting on following the Chakla Roshanabad map of 1893, which gives it 44 more acres of land than its due. The Indian side maintains that this is against the letter and spirit of the agreement.

The coming elections in Bangladesh have only made an early solution impossible. The Muhurirchar area forms part of the constituency of Khaleda Zia, the Leader of the Opposition and also the head of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, who has been attacking India at the slightest provocation and projecting Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina as being pro-India and hence anti-Bangladesh. In fact, she has been so captious that Sheikh Hasina has become guarded in her response to India. For instance, when the Pyrdwah incident in April was reported, Khaleda Zia accused Sheikh Hasina of being "a stooge of India" and her Awami Party of being "subservient to India". Sheikh Hasina had to take a defensive stand on the entire issue. She did not apologise for the incident but merely expressed regret over the death of the BSF personnel. She also cancelled her proposed visit to India as she did not want the visit to be construed as an act of surrender to New Delhi (Frontline, May 25, 2001).

Worse, in the run-up to the elections Khaleda Zia has shown a soft-corner for the fundamentalist forces, which are reportedly backed by Pakistan. Some of these forces have declared war against the Awami League. Hasina is aware that any softening of attitude towards India would affect the electoral prospects of her party and its allies.

In such circumstances, it is unlikely that the JWG will make any significant progress at its July meeting on the question of the 6.5-km stretch. "One can, understandably, expect no change in Dhaka's stand before the elections," said a high-ranking MEA official.

The second JWG is also facing hurdles. These relate to the non-availability of maps, traverse data and population census data. The JWG would particularly have to look into the Dumabari sector, which is now under Bangladesh's adverse possession. The problem relates to the 42 Manipuri families who live in this area. India has been asking for the traverse data of this area and Bangladesh has been repeatedly saying that it has none.

The problem regarding the areas under adverse possession lies in evaluating their demographic realities. Geographically, the adverse possession of territories by India and Bangladesh relates, on the Indian side, to the States of West Bengal, Meghalaya and Assam. The total area adversely possessed by Bangladesh is 2,749.16 acres whereas India holds 2,922.25 acres in a similar manner. The 1974 agreement states: "The governments of India and Bangladesh agree that when areas are transferred, the people in these areas shall be given the right to stay on where they are as nationals of the state to which the areas are transferred. Pending demarcation of the boundary and exchange of territory by mutual agreement there should be no disturbance of the status quo and peaceful conditions shall be maintained in the border regions."

However, for this to be done it is necessary to conduct a census of the Indian and Bangladeshi populations residing in these areas. Bangladesh has not been able to conduct such a census in the last 27 years. This has been the principal reason why the issue of adverse possession has not been resolved. The second JWG would have to see that the census operation is expedited in these possessions.

At the end of the June talks, the MEA spokesperson said that the long delay in demarcating the border and resolving the issue of adverse possession and enclaves had been the result of the "complex" nature of the issue. The two JWGs have promised to complete their work and submit their reports to the two Foreign Secretaries by April 2002. However, it is clear that even as the official-level negotiations go on, India will have to "wait and watch" until the results of the general elections in Bangladesh come.