The long march ahead

China is now ready with a new leadership, new policies and a new political philosophy to achieve its developmental goals and to take on a more assertive and constructive role in international affairs.

KEEP up with the times, move forward or fall behind this is the urgent message conveyed to the new leaders of the Communist Party of China and to the people of the country in the marathon 68-page report presented by the outgoing party General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, at the 16th Congress that concluded in Beijing on November 15. It resembles the slogan yo ban fa! (there is a way!) that Mao Zedong gave the party and the people in the early days of the Chinese revolution when the cards seemed to be heavily stacked against them.

Like Mao Zedong, Jiang Zemin also called on the party not to be imitative but to explore new ideas, to find new ways of ruling and leading and new ways of acquiring and using power, in both domestic and international spheres. Indeed, he suggested that keeping up with the times, being creative and moving forward steadily had become even more necessary because China had just entered its most dangerous decades at a time when unexpected, profound and dangerous changes were taking place in the international system. In short, it is the coming decades that will determine whether China will be able to achieve the last and `fourth step' goal of catching up with `medium level ' developed countries like France, by the middle of the 21st century. It need not be said that the CPC is determined to succeed. Hence the 16th Congress is tasked with ensuring that the `third step' goal before it of quadrupling an already quadrupled gross domestic product (GDP) by 2020, when the per capita GDP will be around $1,800 will be met. Simultaneously, it will be expected to maintain domestic stability and policy and leadership continuity, while coping with international challenges and building up its defence capability. The totality adds up to what the Chinese call `overall' or `comprehensive' national power.

For the whole of the previous decade, China was preparing, as it were, to enter the new century with achievements that would give it greater confidence in dealing with its outer world. The party is now ready with a new leadership, new policies and, it may be said, with a new political philosophy to take on a more assertive and constructive role in world affairs. The 16th Congress, the first in the new century, reflects these concerns as well as the care with which the transition in all three areas has been effected. With more sobriety than drama, the Congress has placed a new leadership in power, adjusted policies across the board and presented a new philosophy in the shape of the `Three Represents'.

The process of preparing for the 21st century a phrase that China used ad nauseum in the 1990s began following the collapse of the Soviet Union. That event ushered in a period in which the Tiananmen Square incidents within the country, combined with the defeat of socialism and the emergence of a unipolar world, challenged China's social stability, territorial integrity and social system, and cast it as the outcast of the international system. The 1990s was China's dangerous decade. To meet the dangers and adjust to the profound changes taking place within and outside China, the party made major adjustments to its modernisation strategy. Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, it decided to do the socialistically unthinkable it put economics in command instead of class struggle and proceeded to develop the productive forces, to open wide to the capitalist world and to join the trend of economic globalisation while, however, continuing to resist absorbtion into the U.S.-led political globalisation. By mid-1990s, it began to join international multilateral organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). By the end of the decade, it had entered the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and accepted its rules. In short, during that 1990s, the party followed the same advice that Jiang Zemin is currently urging the new leaders to follow and, in doing so, had made tremendous achievements in China's social and economic development, and therefore in its foreign policy. The philosophy underlying this advice and these successes is really a simple one-liner Development is the fundamental principle.

Put crudely, this holds that the very survival of the party and of China depends almost entirely on economic growth which, in turn, depends on the country's ability to keep up with the times and on not failing to grasp the new developments of the age in science and technology. However, there are two important caveats to this formulation, both of which are reflected in the title of Jiang Zemin's Report `To Build a Well-Off Society in an All Round Way and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.' The first, `to Build a Well-Off Society' provides an important clue to understanding China's development strategy. It suggests that the party seeks not just wealth and power for the country, but also a degree of real economic benefit for the people. Hence economic growth should be assessed in social and human terms. Thus, by 2020, when China will have re-quadrupled its GDP, become the world's second largest economy, and overtaken Japan, the beneficiary is to be Chinese society as a whole. In short, society should then enjoy `a fair measure of leisure', to use Jiang Zemin's phrase, and should have the same standard of life as the French people have.

Now, for an Indian that statement is quite startling. It means that in a mere 50 years after it suffered four decades of internal chaos, revolution and war, as the direct consequences of what today would be called `regime change', the CPC has already been able to provide its 1.2 billion-strong population with roti, kapda aur makan, and is looking beyond to provide them with comforts, if not with luxuries.

Understandably, then, much of Jiang Zemin's report was devoted to recalling the achievements of the past 13 years during which, first as Deng's understudy and then on his own, he provided the leadership and the necessary continuity that enabled China to achieve these successes. The score-card is impressive. In 2001, China's GDP was thrice that in 1989 and touched 9.5933 trillion yuan with an average annual increase of 9.3 per cent, making China the fastest growing economy in the world. According to Nicholas Lardy, the well-known analyst of China's economy in the reform period, this pace is unprecedented, as is the growth in its foreign trade from $15 billion to $510 billion between 1997 and 2001, and the quantum of foreign direct investment (FDI) received, some $40 billion or 1/3 of the total FDI received by developing countries. In the past half a decade, China has also become the most important market for Japan, replacing the U.S.; has established `deep links' with neighbours such as South Korea and even Taiwan; and has begun to lead in economic growth as the world's pre-eminent low-cost manufacturer. The foreign exchange reserves are almost legendary as is its favourable trade balance with the U.S. At the same time, China claims to have put in place an incomplete social security system that has already lifted some 80 million out of poverty, and that the standard of living of the people has also improved considerably.

China can therefore claim that at the beginning of the new century, it has "entered a moderately affluent society in terms of average living standards" and is willing to shoulder greater responsibilities as a major power.

The second caveat in the title of the Report reads: `...and Create a New Situation in Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics'. With the passage of time and with the experience of the socialist countries, the question that needs to be discussed is not whether China has abandoned the socialist path, but whether or not socialism can be achieved by skipping stages of development. If the answer is in the negative, then perhaps what needs to be discussed is how the dark underside of a capitalist society can be moderated or not replicated at all in taking, however reluctantly, the capitalist path. If that experiment has nevertheless still to be tried, then the Soviet and Chinese experiences in trying to build socialism have to be examined deeply.

For the present, given the human and social conditions in most Third World countries and in the developed West, it seems to matter less what ideology drives development as long as there is development combined with social justice that brings relief in the form of roti, kapda aur makan to the masses. It may be recalled that in the face of the grinding poverty of the Indian peasant, Mahatma Gandhi observed that if God were to appear before the poor, it would have to be in the shape of a bowl of food.

As long as Chinese leaders are able to say as Jiang Zemin did "the people have received more tangible benefits than ever before, and China has enjoyed long-term stability and solidarity and had a good government and a united people" and as long as this can be verified objectively, China can be said to be more on the right than on the wrong path. But, given a large and growing middle class and its propensity towards consumerism, the new leadership will have to struggle hard to continue to build its own way and its internal autonomy. The new leaders are indeed faced with, among other issues, the gigantic task of dealing with unemployment, economic and political restructuring, expanding socialist democracy to encourage people's `political participation in an orderly way', constructing an adequate legal system and tackling corruption, which Jiang Zemin described as `a matter of life and death for the party'. Also, the rise of sub-state and non-state forces such as ethnic assertion and religious fundamentalism presents new challenges to both national integrity and the social system. The CPC proposes to meet this challenge in a variety of ways principally by transforming itself into the vanguard of all the ethnic groups, that is, of all the people; by admitting advanced patriotic elements into the party; and by adding a cultural and spiritual dimension to the material civilisation it has been building since its modernisation drive got under way in the 1980s. This is codified in the theory of the `Three Represents'. It refers to the CPC as representing the development of the most advanced productive forces, of having an orientation towards the most advanced culture, and of caring for the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people in China.

While wide interest has been generated by the decision to open party membership to entrepreneurs and capitalists, the dimension that is Jiang Zemin's original contribution to theory/creativity, which seems to be demanded of The Leader in China, has been generally ignored. This is the attempt to raise the cultural level of both society and politics; to advocate and laud cultural diversity, as of the several ethnic groups in China, or of the great civilisations of the world; to attempt cultural fusion; and to build a system that will bear "the imprint of the country's civilisational space". The "diversity and colourful" nature of "our world" has been Jiang Zemin's theme for several months now. Together with this he has called for the "creation of a powerful contingent of philosophy and social science workers to help raise public ideals and morals". In his report, Jiang Zemin, referring to Mao Zedong, observed that culture interacts with economics and politics and contributes in computing the overall strength of the nation. In his words, "culture is deeply rooted in the vitality, creativity and cohesion of a nation", and therefore has strategic significance. To build such a material and spiritual civilisation is one of the charges he has entrusted to the CPC under the new leadership. Another related charge is to maintain flesh and blood ties with the people as an inspirational source and to enhance the party's `purity, solidarity and unity'.

THE Party and the new leadership, therefore, comprise the most critical factor that will determine the success or otherwise of the goals of the third strategic step. According to Chinese reports, the selection of leaders of the right type began as early as 1982, with the decision to retire old leaders, to train younger ones and `to pilot orderly personnel changes' with greater transparency. Thus, it will be recalled that Jiang Zemin was brought to the centre from Shanghai in 1989 to be the core of the third generation leadership. In a similar fashion, Hu Jintao, the new CPC General Secretary, was selected as early as 1992 and made Vice-President of the country in 1998, though he is not yet identified as the core of the fourth generation. This means that he has had 10 years in training to step into Jiang Zemin's shoes and five years in which to emerge as the core. In the 356-member Central Committee, about 50 per cent are new faces. The average age of its members is 55.4 years, and a whopping 98.6 per cent are college-educated. All except one, who studied abroad, are home-grown technocrats.

The Polit Bureau has 24 members, of whom only seven are not newly elected; only two represent the armed forces. All except the sole alternative member, are in their 50s, including Hu, who is 58. This means that if no revolt or power struggle breaks out, these men can anticipate 10 years at the helm, if not more, while the solitary 66-year-old woman member will have at least one term of five years. Apparently, the decision to restrict tenure to two terms and/or 70 years of age was taken at the last Congress and Jiang Zemin has abided by this decision.

The men who count are the nine members of the Standing Committee of the Polit Bureau, who will be the most influential and powerful leaders. Four of them Hu Jintao, Zheng Qinghong, Wen Jiabao and Li Changchun are familiar names, for they were part of the fourth generation that was already in place waiting to be promoted. It comprised 49 per cent of the Central Committee, 11 per cent of the Polit Bureau, 48 per cent of the Ministers of the State Council, 52 per cent of party secretaries of the Provinces and 77 per cent of all Governors whose average age is said to be 40 to 45 years. This is the `contingent of high calibre leading cadres' who will guide the Party for the next five years and whose careers the Indian government and public will do well to follow carefully.

There is little doubt that Jiang Zemin will play the role of the Senior leader as did Deng Xiaoping to provide advice when needed especially given the critical nature of the coming decades. He will also continue as the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, probably even after next year. In his report, Jiang Zemin made it clear that in CPC-Army relations, the party has no intention of letting the Army share its power and that the party's `absolute leadership' over the Army has to be upheld without change.

The 16th Party Congress deliberations were in many ways a Festschrift to Jiang Zemin, delivered by Jiang Zemin himself. This is forgivable, for the successes and achievements of his 13 years in power are outstanding and numerous. Perhaps, Jiang Zemin leaves the strongest imprint on the country's foreign policy where, "in response to dizzying international changes and displaying great courage and skills, the third generation leadership of the CPC with Jiang Zemin at the core, has scored one victory after another in the diplomatic arena".

In retrospect, China's diplomacy during this decade was impressive. It includes the painless return of Hong Kong and Macao to the mainland; the check on the independence moves in Taiwan; the three summits with U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush; the effective stabilisation of China's periphery; and the series of partnerships, including with India, and the strategic partnership with Russia, now enshrined in the only treaty that China has concluded in recent years. The list is too long to be detailed here. However, mention must be made of China's increasing participation in multilateral organisations and the initiative it took to form the first ever multilateral security mechanism in Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, to which the U.S. is not a party, and the BoAo Forum, which is intended to become an Asian Davos.

In advocating new norms to govern and guide inter state relations and a new security concept based on mutuality and common security, in calling for greater responsibility of the major powers for both peace and sustainable development and in commending cultural and civilisational diversity and dialogue as alternatives to the U.S. vision of world order, Jiang Zemin has for many years been preparing the ground for China to advocate an alternative vision and to occupy the vacant moral high ground, that was only once occupied by Jawaharlal Nehru in the recent past, in international politics. Some of the initiatives that China took towards this end have been shaken or weakened by the U.S. `war against terror'. This has not only shrunk the space available for China for autonomous action, but injected U.S. military presence into its immediate neighbourhood, adding to its security concerns.

Nevertheless, even as he restated China's opposition to `terrorism in all forms', with its implied criticism of the U.S. stand as a long-term policy in his report, Jiang Zemin reiterated the country's idea of a fair and rational world order and its advocacy of multipolarity to counter the unipolar status of the U.S. In other words, there is likely to be a marked continuity in foreign policy. The only significant new thrust came in relation to Taiwan. If the `one China' principle was accepted, Jiang Zemin said, China would be willing to discuss "how to end cross-straits hostility formally". He added that the "international space in which the Taiwan region may conduct economic, cultural and social activities compatible with its status, or discuss the political status of the Taiwan authorities on other issues" can also be discussed. The careful choice of words seems to indicate a new flexibility in China's response to the Taiwanese need for a separate identity short of sovereignty. No new formulation to end the impasse across the straits has yet emerged, but the door for one such will be opened if the Taiwanese reaction is constructive.

INDIA needs to watch China more than it seems inclined to do, and to take it seriously as an increasingly important player in international affairs, one that could be persuaded to be more cooperative and hence less likely to be adversarial. In short, Indian diplomacy has to learn to be persuasive and to take initiatives to dispel rather than to confront and enlarge what it perceives as threats. Most threats can be viewed as challenges, a description which, unlike threat, can provide space for moderation, flexibility and change. Given China's major concerns, it is not logical to assume that its modernisation projects are driven by its determination to contain India, as has been suggested by some commentators.

China has global, not regional concerns, as should India, given its size, potential and genius, which will create sufficient strategic commonalities between the two states so as to encourage a measure of cooperation and help enlarge the space India can occupy in world affairs. India needs to find a way to get over both the 1962 syndrome and what can be called the George Fernandes syndrome. While the former has undoubtedly weakened considerably with the change of generations, the latter finds strong support within the strategic community and the general public. This is perhaps because China is not studied at universities or covered sufficiently by the media, and Chinese documents are not easy to procure. This is a situation just short of the tragic because India is not abiding by the first principle of both military and political strategy, namely the principle of knowing the other.

The need to know is enhanced by the grave complexities of the post-Soviet world, which require both countries to step lightly but surely towards their national goals. Moreover, there are two new and urgent areas of increasing concern to both as the major powers of the region, where a trustful exchange of views is called for. These are the insidious sub-state threats posed by ethnic assertion and religious fundamentalism that operate at the level of society; and the state concern with the growing U.S. presence in the region. For their own security and national standing and for the security of the region, both countries will need to cooperate to restrict or limit further advance of the U.S. in this part of the world. A first step would be to get to know the new CPC leaders and to exchange high-level meetings with them with increasing frequency, and not in the present desultory fashion that has seen only three prime ministerial visits in almost a decade.

Mira Sinha Bhattacharjea is Co-Chairperson, Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi.