Changing tack in Myanmar

The exit of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt perhaps confirms the status of Myanmar's road map to democracy as a document with no clear destination.

in Singapore

THE self-assurance that Myanmar's State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) Chairman Senior General Than Shwe displayed in New Delhi on October 25 during his visit to India is a pointer to his firm grip on power in Yangon, especially in the context of his dismissal of Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt on October 19.

For a military dictator like Than Shwe, the removal of a close lieutenant should have been a calculated move, if not an agonising step. The timing, a few days prior to launching a major foreign policy initiative of seeking to raise the level of Myanmar's relationship with a democratic country like India, is reflective of the fact that Than Shwe had done sufficient homework before striking against a fellow general. However, there is no word as yet on how the junta plans to address the pro-democracy agenda of the celebrated campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi.

The official version on Khin Nyunt's exit is that he had been permitted to retire on health grounds. As a result, he ceased to be the head of the country's Military Intelligence as well. His successor, Lieutenant-General Soe Win, was Secretary I in the hierarchy prior to his promotion.

Diplomatic sources in Yangon, when contacted by this correspondent, indicated that there were no outward signs of a coup attempt within the military government on that day or of an armed action to quell any such bid. At the same time, traditional Myanmar-watchers in Bangkok did not rule out the possibility that Khin Nyunt might have agreed to bow out, only after he was confronted with a show of force (if not also action) by or, more likely, on behalf of Than Shwe.

WHILE what really happened behind the bamboo curtain in Yangon is still not very clear, the fact remains that Khin Nyunt, despite his upbringing as a functionary of an Orwellian SPDC, had gradually come to be regarded, even in the West, as a relative liberal, who could have engineered a gradual transition to democracy in Myanmar. This perception has much to do with his enunciation of a "road map for democracy" on August 30, 2003, five days after he was named Prime Minister in a reshuffle of the military government.

The seven-step road map, is as follows: a National Convention will be called [it was convened this year]; the convention will lay down principles for a new state constitution; a new basic statute may then be drafted; a referendum is to be held on such a draft; a general election on a "free and fair" basis is also considered a possibility in such a situation; a new parliament can be convened by the people's representatives so elected; and finally, a fresh government can emerge from a parliament so elected (albeit, at some unspecified point in the future).

The road map was announced three months after Suu Kyi was taken into "protective custody" on May 30 following roadside clashes between SPDC activists and members of her own entourage belonging to the National League for Democracy (NLD) at Dipaiyin (not far from Mandalay). Significantly, NLD activists and their sympathisers in Bangkok tend to suspect that Myanmar's new Prime Minister was, in some ways, behind those disturbances, at perhaps the behest of Than Shwe.

While it is hard to verify such accounts, the taking of Suu Kyi into "protective custody" caused international outrage. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), of which Myanmar is a member, was constrained to caution Yangon, albeit behind the scenes. Moreover, Suu Kyi, for whom incarceration at the hands of the junta was nothing new, had been released from "house arrest" in 2002 as part of an image-building exercise.

Given the association of Khin Nyunt with the "road map for democracy" and the suspicion that Soe Win was behind the Dipaiyin incident, the SPDC sought to set the record straight on October 22. The Chairman of the Convening Commission of the ongoing National Convention, Lieutenant General Thein Sein, said that the change of Prime Minister would not alter the SPDC's adherence to the "road map for democracy". It was underlined that the SPDC, and not Khin Nyunt, was the brain behind the plan. The National Intelligence Bureau has also been dissolved. However, the importance of this action is far from clear at this stage.

Diplomatic sources indicate that Khin Nyunt's exit in these circumstances could be seen as a signal from Than Shwe that the "road map for democracy" is not meant to pave the way for an easy transition to a pluralist political system. His exit is also reckoned to have something to do with the recent Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM-5) in Hanoi, where, at the European Union's insistence, Myanmar's credentials for participation as a full-fledged ASEAN member was not recognised.

At the substantive level, though, two factors have influenced Than Shwe's thinking. First, the manner in which the U.S., a long-time foe of the SPDC, befriended General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan in the "war against terrorism" without any reference to his military power base has emboldened the junta in Yangon. Secondly, the U.S., with its dismal record of prisoner treatment and other war-related activities in Iraq, has lost the moral authority to pressure the junta on the treatment of Suu Kyi or, indeed, on the larger issues of democracy.

Over a year ago, David I. Steinberg, an influential Asia expert in Washington, had drawn attention to "a largely unheralded and subtle shift in U.S. policy" towards Myanmar. While this reflected no real change in policies related to its sanctions on new investments in Myanmar, Washington had, as far back as February 2002, dropped its earlier insistence that the SPDC should honour the results of the May 1990 elections and hand over power to the NLD.

This may, in part, explain the rationale of the SPDC's "road map for democracy", which virtually nullifies the results of the 1990 elections and devalues the relevance of Suu Kyi to the democratic process. Another reason cited by diplomats and experts for the SPDC's politics of "road map" is the death, in virtual house arrest, of Ne Win, in December 2002. Regarded, prior to his disgrace, as the Louis XIV of Myanmar, Ne Win was long seen as another stumbling block to any moves towards democracy. Ne Win's three grandsons and a son-in-law were charged with a coup attempt against the SPDC in 2002.

The moot question is: Why has the SPDC now taken some action, which has the appearance of slowing down the "road map" process, despite its pledge to adhere to it in the wake of the latest political shuffle? The answer is obviously related to Than Shwe's assessment that no one should be allowed to rock the SPDC boat, whatever his status.

While this explains Khin Nyunt's "retirement" for "health" reasons - something that he himself did not announce - the SPDC's "road map" has, as noted by long-time observers like Robert H. Taylor, "encouraged many, including the ethnic minority leaders and some exile groups, to believe that Myanmar's long constitutional stasis was about to be broken". However, the "road map" is still a document with no clear destination.