President George Bush, in East Asia mainly to attend the summit of the APEC Forum, focusses on issues of strategic importance rather than economics.
in SingaporeSTRATEGIC priorities, rather than economic diplomacy, conspicuously defined the latest tour of East Asia and Australia by United States President George W. Bush, notwithstanding the fact that his primary purpose was to attend a summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum in Bangkok on October 20 and 21.
Bush dropped sufficient hints about exploring the feasibility of evolving an informal Asiatic version of the increasingly marginal North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). But neither Bush nor the official interpreters of his diplomatic endeavours uttered a word about an Asian NATO during the former's whirlwind tour of Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Australia between October 17 and 23. However, he announced the setting up of strategic security links with several of these countries, leaving little or no room for doubt about his `world view' in relation to the Asiatic Rim of the Pacific Ocean. The controversial concept of an Asian NATO has been talked about in Washington and elsewhere for quite some time now.
Apart from a few country-specific security tie-ups, Bush concentrated on two other significant issues - the North Korean nuclear weapons "programme" and the U.S.' worries about the quagmire that Iraq is fast becoming. Inevitably, anti-terror declamations were issued in concert with Thailand, Singapore and in particular, Indonesia. But the issues that figured prominently were Washington's new security linkages with some Asia Pacific countries and the North Korean nuclear question.
On the nuclear issue, President Bush spoke at length to the leaders of two countries he did not visit on this occasion - President Hu Jintao of China and President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea. At these meetings, which took place on the sidelines of the APEC summit, Bush announced his willingness to consider the formulation of a security-related "assurance" that "there is no intention [on the part of the U.S.] to invade North Korea" in order to prevent it from crossing the so-called `red line' in its quest to obtain nuclear weapons.
The possibility of an "assurance", as distinct from a firm "security guarantee" that might have the implicit sanction of international law, was outlined on the basis of Bush's comment about "addressing the security concerns of North Korea within the context of the six-party talks". His talks with Hu Jintao on October 19, Bush said, was "about how to advance the Beijing talks... " to achieve "a mutual goal, which is a (nuclear) weapons-free (Korean) peninsula". In the context of the Beijing talks, which were held in the Chinese capital in late August this year, and included the U.S., the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, South Korea, Russia and Japan, Bush had praised Hu Jintao for "leading". By October 27, following an official indication from Pyongyang that it might be willing to consider Bush's offer if it was indeed "based on [the U.S.] intention to coexist with the DPRK", efforts were intensified to convene another round of the Beijing talks.
On October 25, the DPRK reciprocated Bush's new initiative, though in a limited sense, by suggesting a "package solution" on the basis of the "principle of simultaneous actions". Obviously Pyongyang's concern was to ensure that any move by Bush towards a "written assurance of non-aggression" [as might be evident in DPRK's perception] should take place at the same time as any effort by North Korea towards the "de-nuclearisation" of the peninsula.
While Bush did not speak in categorical terms about the possibility of a specific "written assurance" by the U.S. renouncing the `option' of pre-emptive military strikes against the DPRK, Pyongyang too left the details of the "package solution" to diplomatic imagination. Pyongyang seems to consider the latest offer from Bush as a step towards a feasible bilateral deal with the U.S. on the hypersensitive issue. However, Bush had placed his new offer explicitly within the framework of the six-party talks. Further, Bush clarified that there was no question of a formal no-war treaty.
While raising hopes of keeping the process of the Beijing talks alive, the Bush initiative has not defined the larger strategic purposes behind an Asia-Pacific `vision'.
Washington's escalating crisis of self-confidence in Iraq made its presence felt at the deliberations. Apprehensive of Iraq's potential to turn into America's `West Asian Vietnam', Bush was pleased with the Japanese pledges of monetary assistance - a grant of $1.5 billion. He was pleased, too, with the indication that Tokyo was trying to send "non-combat" troops to the West Asian country to aid the U.S.-led `coalition' forces there. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi did not spell out when he might despatch the troops, on account of the field-level constraints of his country's pacifist Constitution. However, Bush praised Koizumi for his behind-the-scenes role in the passage of the U.S.-friendly Resolution 1511 on Iraq by the U.N. Security Council. Bush said he would "welcome" whatever help, by military means or otherwise, that Japan "can" render after its general elections on November 9.
For Bush, another matter of satisfaction was South Korea's decision "in principle" to send its "combat troops" to Iraq in due course, despite the current political uncertainties in Seoul caused by Roh Moo-hyun's move to seek a referendum on his continuance as President in the context of allegations of corruption against a close aide. Singapore's proactive action on October 27 of sending 192 military personnel to Iraq for logistical duties on the maritime and aerial fronts, under the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 was also welcomed by the U.S.
Anti-terror commitments were easy to obtain from all the countries that Bush visited, the most significant being the one from Indonesia, increasingly seen by the U.S. as a state to watch out for on the terrorism front. In a joint statement issued in Bali on October 22, Bush and President Megawati Sukarnoputri spoke of the "strong support of the U.S. for Indonesia's democratic transition and reforms". They agreed, that "military reform is an important element of Indonesia's transition to a mature and stable democracy". Bush went on to praise Indonesia for its "recent successes in [the] war on terror, including the arrest and prosecution of those responsible for the Bali bombings [of October 2002]".
However, Bush made no public offer to hand over to Indonesia, or at least allow it access to, Hambali, an Indonesian terrorist-suspect who was recently caught by the U.S. in concert with Thailand. Although Hambali is wanted for interrogation over the Bali bombings, that Indonesia did not make an issue of it at this time has to do with Megawati's politeness or patience and Bush's own U.S.-centric politics in the context of the "global war on terror". Questions, therefore, remain about the utility of the anti-terror declaration that the U.S. had signed with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Indonesia, ahead of the Bali carnage last year.
Overarching Bush's perceived `successes' in gaining a commitment here or a pledge there on various fronts, ranging from North Korea to Iraq and the anti-terror "campaign", was his strategic agenda. He pursued it vigorously during his swing through East Asia and Australia and had quite some `gains' to show in the end. The new crisis of bombings in Baghdad in late October has overshadowed, but not obliterated, this security agenda, which brings into sharp focus questions about the U.S.' idea of an Asian version of NATO and the feasibility of such a proposition.
In Tokyo, Bush and Koizumi reaffirmed the continuing relevance of the U.S.-Japan military alliance in the context of the fast-changing dynamics of the evolving post-Cold War phase in global politics. Not adequately addressed during Bush's short stay in Tokyo on this occasion was the issue of reducing America's geo-strategic footprint in Okinawa. Bush's predecessor, Bill Clinton, had acknowledged the Okinawa issue as one that could not be brushed aside or downplayed for long. A `plus' for the U.S. now is the latest signal from Tokyo about its willingness and ability to cooperate with Washington in carrying out state-of-the-art research in missile defence. These plans relate to the Asia Pacific theatre, at the relative lower end of the spectrum, and the U.S.-specific global-scale defence against ballistic missiles.
Although Bush did not travel to South Korea during his latest diplomatic excursion, no discordant note was struck at his meeting with Roh Moo-hyun in Bangkok on the issue of a time-frame for the continuing U.S. military presence in the Korean peninsula.
In a joint statement issued after talks with Philippines President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in Manila on October 18, Bush termed the country a "major non-NATO ally". Treating this as an honour, Arroyo expressed "the hope that this move would facilitate the modernisation of the Philippine Armed Forces and the strengthening of our (U.S.-Filipino) defence partnership". While the very mention of NATO in the Asian context was either a Freudian slip or a deliberate exercise in image-building, the fact remains that Bush and Arroyo have their strategic work cut out, given the persistent political controversies and the people-level opposition to any U.S. military presence in the Philippines. The memories of the U.S. exit from Subic Bay in the early 1990s have not faded, and the political situation in the Philippines remains unsettled.
The Philippines was not alone in Bush's new strategic calculus for East Asia. While in Bangkok, he announced on October 19 that the U.S. "is willing to grant `major non-NATO ally' status to Thailand". He told Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand that the move "is a very important recognition" of Bangkok's "friendship and... strong support" for the U.S.
In Singapore, Bush and Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong declared, in a joint statement on October 21, that they "will enter into negotiations on a framework agreement to expand defence and security cooperation". The proposed pact, designed to give a new qualitative direction to U.S.-Singapore interactions, will be known as the "Framework Agreement for the Promotion of a Strategic Cooperation Partnership in Defence and Security". The nuance behind this nomenclature is meant to keep the bilateral relationship in a format other than that of a military alliance.
It was in Australia that Bush was most loquacious about his strategic `vision' for the Asia Pacific region. Addressing the Australian Parliament in Canberra on October 23, he said: "Our two countries [the U.S. and Australia] are joining together in the Proliferation Security Initiative. We are preparing to search planes and ships and trains and trucks carrying suspected cargo to seize weapons or missile shipments that raise proliferation concerns... Our nations have a special responsibility throughout the Pacific to help keep the peace... America will continue to maintain a forward [military] presence in Asia, continue to work closely with Australia".
While the "special responsibility" assigned to Canberra raised concerns in some East Asian capitals, given the perception of Australia as a `Western outpost' in Asia, Bush complicated the issue in his remarks to the press. He said: "I was asked the question: `Is Australia America's deputy sheriff?'... And, my answer was: `No, we are equal'. We are equal partners in the war on terror... working for a world that is more free."
The issues at stake in the U.S. world-view go well beyond Australia's role and relevance. Even once-conservative U.S. experts such as Andrew J. Bacevich have depicted "American Empire" as the reality against the "myth of the reluctant superpower" in the evolving post-Cold War era.
While the idea of an informal Asiatic NATO is implicit in Bush's latest utterances, the inevitable question is about the likely target of any such grouping, even if it be an unorganised caucus rather than a conglomerate of willing nations. Will an Asiatic NATO be designed to contain China? For the present, the U.S., which does not fight shy of talking about its strategic dependence on China to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, has not revealed or hinted at any particular plan to isolate Beijing in the near-term. China, too, has not chosen to rock the boat of its current diplomatic engagement with the U.S. China's vote in favour of the latest U.N. Security Council resolution on Iraq, essentially a U.S.-piloted basic document, is a case in point. China's own strategic experts such as Zhu Majie and others have pointed out that "the rise of China is a stabiliser for the security of the Asia Pacific region and the world at large". Authoritative Chinese sources do not wish to be drawn into a discussion on what might be on Bush's mind. Some other regional diplomats tend to believe that the cases for and against an Asian NATO have not yet been fully made. The political message is obvious that Official China is watching the situation just as the U.S. itself might still be assessing its realistic strategic options.
However, in July itself, a commentary carried by China's People's Daily, in its English online service, zeroed its focus on how the U.S. "dreams of Asian NATO". The illusory nature of the new American dream was seen in the following terms: "Without a definite enemy [in the present post-Cold War period], it will be very difficult for the idea of an Asian version of NATO to gain extensive support from the international community and even within the U.S. itself".
It was also noted that "the Pentagon's Asia Pacific military strategy has put India in a prominent position compared to other Asian countries". A Pentagon report, it was underlined, had "recommended that the U.S. should construct a long-term alliance with India to contain Washington's potential Asian adversaries". Well-placed diplomatic sources indicate that the India factor of this kind does not worry Official China, which engages the U.S. in a strategic sense with self-assurance.
It is a matter of continuing irony, though, that India still remains outside the APEC Forum. While the stated reason is that a moratorium on new membership of the APEC community is still in place, India's continued exclusion from this community became more conspicuous even as the leaders of the forum agreed, at the end of their latest summit in Bangkok on October 21, to "dedicate APEC not only to advancing the prosperity of our economies but also to [advancing] the complementary mission of ensuring the security of our people".
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