Abe's empire

For new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe the challenges are many as Japan seeks to reposition itself in the new world order.

P.S. SURYANARAYANA in Singapore

IS the Empire striking back in Japan? Alternatively, is Japan delicately poised for a take-off towards the status of a "post-modern state", a developed-economy-plus model? Serious political questions, which implicitly portray these possibilities without being so stark in conceptual exactitude, are being asked in the context of Shinzo Abe's assumption of office as Japan's new Prime Minister on September 26.

Abe's critics, especially those outside Japan, are scanning the country's political horizon for any sign of resurgent nationalism. Such a phenomenon, the critics believe, could signal a revival of Japan's imperial-era attitudes and behaviour that ended, historically, with the end of the Second World War more than 60 years ago.

The grand alternative view, among other Japanese and Japan-watchers inclined to see Abe as a normal political leader with personal ambitions and national goals, is that he could perhaps guide his country to a new domain of excellence. This domain, known to political scientists as the "post-modern state", is that of a developed economy in material terms plus a qualitatively better life for citizens.

As Japan's first leader born after the Second World War, that ended in its comprehensive military defeat, why should Abe evoke such compelling emotions among his supporters and opponents at home and abroad? The reasons are simple yet profound.

Abe is a post-imperial child of Japan, but he belongs to a political dynasty or its Japanese equivalent. His grandfather Nobusuke Kishi was a Minister in the Cabinet that waged imperial Japan's battles during the Second World War. After that Kishi was for some time regarded as a Class A war crime suspect for trial. Kishi was not, of course, indicted by the international war crimes tribunal. He went on to become Prime Minister and play a part in shaping the political story of Tokyo's military alliance with Washington, which continues to this day. Equally important, Abe's father served Japan as its Foreign Minister. Poor health apparently cut short his quest for the Prime Minister's post.

Aside from such a political pedigree, Abe's own political style, evident during his meteoric rise to power, is perhaps a pointer that he may, if unchecked, recast Japan as a fiercely nationalist and assertive power. Another factor that his critics cite as a vital clue to his political personality is his tendency to cast doubts on the legitimacy of the international war crimes tribunal that convicted several imperial-era Japanese as Class A criminals in the mid-20th century. In all, Abe's alleged "revisionist view" about imperial-era Japan's historical culpability and his own brand of "neo-nationalism" have led to the apprehension that the Japanese Empire might now have a chance to strike back on the international stage.

Dismissing this scenario as alarmist, Abe's supporters at home and well-wishers abroad tend to see him differently. To them, he is the youngest Prime Minister since the end of the Second World War. At 52 years, he has had exposure to a near-revolutionary political experiment that his mentor Junichiro Koizumi initiated during his five-and-a-half years as Prime Minister: the structural economic reforms, which were aimed at putting Japan's ailing economy, the world's second largest after the United States, back on course.

For Abe, the prospect of a long political career at the helm, besides his pledge to stay the course of economic reforms, should be two positive factors as he begins his tenure. The expectations about a possibly long tenure are based on two factors - Abe's young age and, more significantly, the big victory margin in his election, on September 20, as president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the main constituent in Japan's ruling coalition.

As for Abe's commitment to Koizumi's near-iconoclastic economic reforms, there are two theories. One relates to his genuine "conversion" to Koizumi's ideology of structural reforms in regard to Japan's post-imperial era status as "a developmental state" - a perspective that Chalmers Johnson popularised in a major study of "the Japanese economic miracle". The fact cannot be ignored that Abe was for long schooled in the ways of his political dynasty. His family had indeed played a part in moulding and sustaining the model of a "developmental state", the salient feature of which is the government's direct participation in the market. Koizumi's persuasive powers may have helped "convert" Abe to the cause of structural economic reforms that would, over time, reshape the "developmental state" into a free-enterprise state or a system resembling the archetypal Western model.

The other theory is that Abe may have simply decided to carry forward Koizumi's plan. Any such view implies that Abe's "conversion" to structural economic reforms may be a matter of political convenience. As such, the future of Koizumi's economic reforms, of which privatisation is the centrepiece, will depend on the political dividends they yield for Abe. It is in this complex web of political calculations about the centrality of structural reforms to Japan's economic future that the idea of "a post-modern state" figures.

As the first Asian country to have been industrialised, Japan can, if its economic reforms succeed, look forward to becoming a developed-state-plus model. In this model, its standing as a developed country at the macro-economic level has to be reinforced by a high quality of life for all or a vast majority of the citizens.

The protagonists of this "post-modern" model tend to assume that Japan's oriental social ethos will necessitate efforts for some form of an egalitarian spread of any macro-economic gains.

For Abe to act as an agent of change for the creation of a "post-modern state", or for the emergence of a fiercely nationalist and re-militarised Japan as a continuing ally of the U.S., the stakes will be very high. And, there are no firm bets now on Abe's long-term prospects as Japan's man of destiny.

A priority that Abe cannot wish away is the improvement of Japan's low-ebb relationship with key neighbours - China and South Korea. Authoritative Chinese sources emphasise how post-imperial Japan too has come to be seen across East Asia as a practitioner of Bonaparte's model of "expansionism". A relevant question, therefore, is whether Abe will come up with a Japanese formula that could match China's policy of "peaceful rise".

Japan's current challenges are best summed up in a recent treatise by political scientist Takashi Inoguchi. The salient aspects, as relevant to the international community, are as follows: "Japan's politics [after the Second World War] were premised on one-party dominance [by the LDP], economic developmentalism, the military protection [by] the United States, and the renunciation of the use of force [under Japan's U.S.-imposed pacifist Constitution]. Each of these premises is [now] undergoing fundamental review and adjustment as a new period of international relations begins to take shape. ... It is likely [therefore] that Japan will become an `ordinary global power' in the years to come. ... Japan will reassert its right to use force in the settlement of international disputes, as other states do. This would, of course be a seismic development in the international relations of Japan. ... We are [also] witnessing the gradual emergence of a genuine two-party system in Japanese domestic politics."

Every step by Abe, who has pledged to revise the present Constitution, will be watched by the international community.