Out of Iraq

The Junichiro Koizumi government's decision to withdraw troops from Iraq is consistent with the mood of the Japanese people.

P. S. SURYANARAYANA in Singapore

JAPAN'S decision to withdraw its troops from Iraq has attracted worldwide attention as an independent move by a key member of the United States-led "coalition of the unwilling".

The decision is consistent with the anti-U.S. mood of the Japanese people. However, the government led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has ensured that the reversal of policy will not be construed as a slap on Washington's face. On June 20, while ordering the complete withdrawal of soldiers from Iraq, Koizumi pledged to carry out a "new" operation, even if it is only a sop. However, two other factors also soften, and even negate, the impression that the Koizumi government may have now decided to act autonomous of the U.S. At a strategic level, the Bush administration sees the proposed Japanese pullout from Iraq as "a transfer of activity rather than a withdrawal of activity". This surely is no subtle semantics. Yet, the real substance of Koizumi's new move, expected to be completed by early August, is mainly to remove the soldiers out of harm's way in Iraq. But Koizumi promised to commit Japan's Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) to a new and relatively safe operation, which is also designed to please U.S. President George W. Bush.

In any case, Tokyo's active military commitment to the U.S.-led multinational forces in occupied Iraq during the past two and a half years has remained ab initio in the realm of "non-combat" duties. The restriction is in line with Japan's pacifist Constitution, which, for the Japanese people, is a vestigial American "gift" of MacArthur-era vintage.

The "non-combat" mandate has so far, and also invariably, applied to the soldiers of Japan's Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), numbering in all over 5,500 and deployed all the time in the Samawah area of southern Iraq.

The GSDF's duties have simply meant the provision of humanitarian relief and help for reconstruction activities. And, these jobs have been carried out by the GSDF personnel under Japan's own special laws that were got enacted by Koizumi for this purpose.

The mandate is of a similar kind for the ASDF personnel who, under Koizumi's new promise, will extend non-lethal logistical support to the multinational forces. The ASDF will do this by participating in airlift sorties to the Baghdad and Erbil areas of Iraq from out of Kuwait, the base. These sorties will involve the transportation of military personnel and equipment from the combat-prepared countries among the multinational forces. The ASDF personnel may now participate in the air-lift of people and equipment on behalf of the United Nations and in relation to Iraq.

Another attribute of Japan's presence in Iraq is that the GSDF troops there, numbering 600 at any given time during the entire period of mandate under Tokyo's own "military command", have always been protected by units of the combat-ready countries among the multinational forces. While the Dutch were the first to protect Japan's ground soldiers, Australia came to be recognised as the most active protector. Significantly, in contrast to Tokyo's current moves, Canberra has pledged to re-deploy, within Iraq itself, those who were detailed to protect GSDF personnel until now.

An important political aspect of the pullout is that the anti-U.S. sentiment among the Japanese people has not so far translated into any substantive or sustained hostility towards Washington over its military-related dealings with Tokyo. From the Pentagon's standpoint, in particular, the anti-U.S. feelings of the "common man" in Japan have also not translated into any kind of pro-China attitude on the many issues of direct concern to Washington.

Closely related to this is the absence of a people's history of post-imperial Japan, on the lines of a similar account of the U.S. So, it is not easy to predict how far Koizumi or his successor, widely expected to be chosen by September, will feel compelled to rein in the military from participation in external operations under mandates of the U.N. or the U.S.

The only certainty in this regard, as seen by Japan's foreign policy insiders themselves, Yutaka Kawashima in particular, is the "sense of ambivalence" that the Japanese people exude towards the U.S. Even without reference to these experts, the attitude can be partly traced to the trend of rising nationalism in today's Japan. Another factor at work in this situation is the growing perception among the Japanese people about a U.S. unconcern for their desire for autonomy.

Now, Japanese leaders have to navigate through the cross-currents of the U.S.' expectations regarding Tokyo and the people's outright scepticism or even ambivalence towards Washington. What then is Japan's balance sheet as the troops are pulled out of Iraq? And, will Koizumi's exit-Iraq order make any difference to the security environment in East Asia, where Japan is a pivotal player, not to mention Iraq?

As for the likely impact on Iraq, Japan's "non-combat" role has not, in any event, added "value" to U.S. perceptions of "security" in occupied Iraq. And, the Iraqi people served by the GSDF troops have been appreciative of their efforts. In fact, as Koizumi has proudly emphasised, not a shot was fired, as at the end of the penultimate week in June, by the GSDF's protectors or by the Japanese troops during their entire humanitarian operation in Samawah. The challenges and the tragedy that Japanese diplomats faced in occupied Iraq were not related to the GSDF's activities.

On the humanitarian front, Japan has made a positive difference to the situation in Samawah, regardless of the root causes of the crisis there that the GSDF had to deal with. Regional diplomats and analysts tend to believe that Japan cannot, in any case, be blamed for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Washington's subsequent blunders.

Koizumi's June 20 statement on the GSDF's pullout is replete with data on how Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) has already raised the quality of life in Samawah under the overall guidance of Japanese military personnel. More importantly, he has now pledged to upscale the ODA aid to Iraq for more development works in Samawah, including a power project.

Narrowly defined as a socio-economic perspective, Japan's balance sheet in Samawah is something that Koizumi is proud of, and this is generally acknowledged across East Asia as a job well done.

However, Iraq's plight today is not so much a self-inflicted tragedy as a colossal crisis caused by foreign powers, especially the U.S. with a global profile and worldwide ambitions. And, Official Japan continues to be an intimate ally of the U.S. in East Asia and a "global partner" of the latter in dealing with such issues as international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Japan's links of this magnitude with the U.S. raise inevitable questions about the security-related impact of Koizumi's move insofar as East Asia is concerned. A key point is that Koizumi stays engaged in Iraq. Not only through the enhanced ODA route but also as a military ally of the U.S. on non-lethal aspects of cooperation. Japan's undiminished U.S.-friendly attitude has not been lost on other East Asian powers, given especially the unchallenged doubts over Washington's continuing military and other operations in Iraq.

Some Japanese foreign policy insiders have recalled, with agony, how the U.S., as in a sharp comment by Winston Churchill at one stage, can be counted upon to take the right action only after expending all wrong options.

However, Japan's neighbouring states reckon with the reality, as perceived by them, that Koizumi is not likely to bequeath to his successor a foreign policy of treating the U.S. as a power that could get Tokyo enmeshed in troubles abroad.

Official Japan's gradual re-emergence as a military power in its own neighbourhood is being increasingly debated across East Asia. The new context is Koizumi's decision to stay very close to the U.S. even while bowing to the wishes of the Japanese people and withdrawing the GSDF from Iraq. Back in 2003 and 2004, Koizumi had sought to explain his policy of involvement in Iraq as a step essential to sustain the viability of the U.S.-Japan military alliance in East Asia, where China's rise as a potential superpower is common knowledge. This alliance has since been updated, and the controversies surrounding the updates do not negate the logic behind Koizumi's current move to stay the course with the U.S.

The other reason cited by Koizumi in 2004 for his U.S.-supportive involvement in matters concerning Iraq was that Japan should participate in the international community's reconstruction efforts in the West Asian state. Although many Japanese recognised that Iraq was then being laid waste, at least to some extent, by the U.S. itself, Koizumi's policy was based on the reasoning that Japan, once accused of indulging in cheque-book diplomacy that posed no risks to the lives of Japanese soldiers and citizens, should begin to play a role as a responsible member of the international community.

Christopher W. Hughes, a Western expert on post-imperial Japan's current re-emergence as a normal state, argues that Tokyo "is once again becoming a great military power in East Asia and, increasingly, globally" too. However, Tokyo "will fulfil this role within the confines of the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance". Japan's immediate neighbours, such as China and South Korea, viewing Japan's re-emergence from their independent perspectives, are not so convinced about how far the U.S. will hold a "militarising" Japan in leash.

Significantly in this context, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said in Seoul on June 22 that "it is important for us to be equipped with stronger defence capabilities so that Japan would be subject to more damage than benefits in case of a military provocation" by Tokyo.

Not long ago, a Japanese strategic affairs specialist, Michishita Narushige, had advocated "closer coordination" between the U.S.-South Korea alliance and the Japan-U.S. alliance for long-term stability on the Korean peninsula. However, the U.S.-South Korean alliance has, in more recent years, run into some rough weather, while Koizumi has strengthened Japan's alliance with the U.S. And, now comes Roh's plea for deterrence against a possible Japanese "military provocation".

Although this perception is not related to Iraq, Koizumi's decision to humour the U.S., even while withdrawing Japanese troops from Samawah, is a strategic reality that is not missed by Tokyo's neighbours.