An ambiguous entity

The first East Asian Summit produces agreement on general principles of community-building but debate remains as to the role and extent of the community involved.

P.S. SURYANARAYANA in Singapore

HISTORY is more often made imperceptibly than through self-conscious efforts to shape events. The political story of the first East Asia Summit (EAS), held in Kuala Lumpur on December 14, and hailed by the 16 participants as a "historic" meeting, is an anticipated historical turning point that is proving elusive. This does not, of course, mean that the leaders of the 16 countries - including the 10 members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand - have embarked on `mission impossible'. At the same time, the EAS has set an ambitious but ambiguous target of "community-building" in the general region of East Asia. No attempt has been made to define either the extent of the region in focus or indeed the scope of the desired "community" (a nomenclature without the meaningful capital C).

It is easy to criticise the participants, who included Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Australian Prime Minister John Howard, for such ambiguities. However, given the sheer economic and political diversities of the participant-countries and their pre-summit divergences over their actual and stated goals, they adopted an EAS Declaration that all of them could project as a win-win formula in some form or another. The reason is not far to seek: there is hardly anything more substantive than mere general principles in the document that was labelled the "Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit".

Viewed objectively, at both a formal meeting and informal talks the leaders did their best to keep the just-begun EAS process alive. For some, the eventual goal was clearly the formation of a definitive regional economic bloc with political and strategic dimensions. For others the exact nature and role of an East Asian community remained a subject for debate. The 16 participants divided into two camps during pre-summit negotiations. On the one hand, India had found common ground with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and some ASEAN members, on the creation of such a definitive community, in the name and style of an East Asian Community (EAC), if only because the summit itself was named after this region. On the other China had found common ground with South Korea and several ASEAN members, most notably Malaysia, the EAS host, for the formation of a specific EAC (not to be confused with the EAS) within the domain of the ASEAN+3 forum. The Plus-Three countries are China, Japan and South Korea.

The first-ever EAS, on December 14, called by the ASEAN+3 itself, was going to be a litmus test of leadership. And, so it proved to be. To be sure, this was not a case of much ado about the idea of a community. It was, in effect, a diplomatic tussle over the territorial limits of a community in the general region of East Asia, a question of who should be in and who should be kept out.

Complicating this is the nature in which the EAS community has emerged. ASEAN's 10 members had already pledged themselves to form a definitive entity with economic, political, and strategic-security dimensions. As a logical extension of this idea, the ASEAN+3 had also set for itself the long-term goal of an EAC. In one sense, political logic dictates that the formation of an EAC need not necessarily depend on the creation of an ASEAN Community. A truly cohesive ASEAN Community is conceivable only if all the 10 members can integrate themselves as some kind of a common market. Currently, some among the ASEAN members are far less economically developed than the others. Furthermore, while the "ASEAN way" forbids any interference by the group in the internal affairs of its member-states, the collective entity is becoming increasingly aware of the burden of having to accommodate a member with a perceivably unjust political dispensation at home. Myanmar is the case in point, and the ASEAN this time tried, at the collective level, to nudge this country to liberalise its political system. Critics have argued that ASEAN has done "too little, too late", given that the Myanmar military rulers had already extended the detention of the celebrated democracy campaigner Aung San Suu Kyi.

While this was a political aside during the latest series of ASEAN-organised summits in Kuala Lumpur, the point is that the ASEAN Community can come into being only at a pace comfortable to all 10 members of the group. However, the eventual formation of an EAC, depends not on the internal relations of the members of ASEAN, but on the political comfort level between ASEAN as a collective entity, , and the Plus-Three countries. Thus far ASEAN's individual dialogue partners, including the United States, Russia, the Plus-Three countries, India and others, have been able to deal with the 10-member group, regardless of its internal economic imbalances and political crosscurrents.

Viewed from this perspective, the ongoing effort at creating the "ASEAN Community" and the move by the ASEAN+3 to work for an East Asian Community should be seen as exercises on two different or "parallel" tracks.

Significantly, the first EAS was not affected by the fact that China and Japan, two among the Plus-Three countries, are now at odds with each other over political issues. As a distinguished diplomat-participant at the East Asia Summit said, China and Japan felicitously "put on their EAS hats" and remained proactive over the issues at stake.

For the EAS, the choice of a 16-member "community" as a long-term goal, was considerably narrowed by the other two goals that were set earlier, namely an ASEAN Community and an EAC. In the event, the EAS settled for general principles lest the process should end with the first summit itself. It has now been agreed that the EAS will meet annually, with ASEAN as the "driving force".

The EAS leaders said they shared "the view that the East Asia Summit could play a significant role in community-building in this region" and declared that "the efforts of the East Asia Summit to promote community-building in this region will be consistent with and reinforce the realisation of the ASEAN Community, and will form an integral part of the evolving regional architecture".

ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong believes that these strands can be seen as elements of a vision of "one common community" for all 16 participants. He is no less aware, though, that the final destination is still not clearly identified.

It is in this atmosphere that the politics of the EAS process should be assessed. The decision by ASEAN to invite India followed the perception within this group that India could "balance" China in any potential community the EAS might set up. Singapore and Indonesia played a major part in creating an ASEAN consensus in favour of India.

The presence of India, an emerging economic power and a rising political force, in the proposed EAS-level community will certainly be a matter of deep competitive interest to China, which is already facing the challenge of Japan within the ASEAN+3 forum itself. However, China is actually more concerned about whether or not the ASEAN-driven EAS, which is also described as an "outward-looking" dialogue forum, will invite the U.S. sooner or later. It is in this context that China and a few others, including India will not be averse to the idea of Russia as a full-time EAS participant.

Sources on the inside track of the EAS indicate that there is no ban against any future move by ASEAN to change the rules of admission to this summit process in order to accommodate the U.S., which is presently precluded from the summit. However, the U.S. is regarded by some key members of ASEAN as a powerful force for "stability" in the Asia-Pacific region, including East Asia. Any advocates of a U.S. entry should, however, bear in mind Harvard scholar Stephen Walt's assessment of U.S. diplomacy. The U.S., according to him, "remains a remarkably immature Great Power - one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with the reality of its own conduct and one that often treats the management of foreign affairs as an adjunct to domestic politics".