A report by intelligence agencies puts in perspective the situation in Iraq and calls for a military status quo rather than an increase in U.S troops.
IN early February, intelligence agencies in the United States released a report titled `Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead'. The opening sentence of the report is very stark. "Iraqi society's growing polarisation, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides' ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism." Given the current conditions, the intelligence analysts foretell, "the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate".
The White House has been loath to accept the phrase "civil war" to describe events in Iraq. The intelligence chiefs had no such political hesitancy. "The Intelligence community judges that the term `civil war' does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, Al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent attacks on coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence." Nevertheless, the intelligence chiefs write: "The term `civil war' accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilisation, and population displacements."
Anti-war politicians and activists seized upon this report to condemn the White House's new strategy to send an additional 21,000 troops to Iraq. The intelligence chiefs called for a political strategy rather than a military one. They urged the Sunni community to accept the current Iraqi Constitution and asked Shia and Kurdish leaders to accommodate Sunni needs within the federal structure. Additionally, the chiefs urged the White House to work "more directly with neighbourhood watch groups and [in] establishing grievance committees to help mend frayed relationships between tribal and religious groups, which have been mobilised into communal warfare over the past three years."
The problem in Iraq, the chiefs hold, is not driven from outside, namely Iran. "Iraq's neighbours influence, and are influenced by, events within Iraq, but the involvement of these outside actors is not likely to be a major driver of violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq's internal sectarian dynamics.' This is a rebuff to the White House's new forward policy against Iran and its agents within Iraq.
The White House has sought to use the document to justify its Surge policy. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley emphasised the document's caution that a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces "would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq". The intelligence chiefs do note that the U.S. forces "remain an essential stabilising element in Iraq". Their document calls for a military status quo, not an increase of the troops, but this has not constrained the White House.
President George W. Bush has been chastened by the defeat of his party in the legislative elections. On January 23, Bush gave his annual State of the Union address. In five previous visits to the legislature, Bush had been impervious to those who disagreed with him. This time he was less brazen, yet he remained firm on Iraq. "The war on terror [including Iraq] we fight today," he said, "is a generational struggle that will continue long after you and I have turned our duties over to others." The war on terror cannot go ahead unless there is movement in Iraq. The Surge is, therefore, a desperate attempt to settle the problem posed by instability in Baghdad, whose pacification would give the White House confidence to turn over more authority to the Iraqi state. For this, the President authorised the military to "add to the ranks" 92,000 troops over five years.
The U.S. military is not unanimous on White House strategy over Iraq. Some senior officers are worried over the lack of strategic clarity that befuddles Iraq policy. Is the military to quell an insurgency or is it to help build a nation; is it fighting a terrorist enemy or a nationalist force? The resistance grows, the mayhem continues and the Iraqi forces are unable or unwilling to shoulder the burden of security. Sergeant Herbert Gill asked journalist Tom Lesseter, "What is victory supposed to look like? Every time we turn around and go in a new area there's somebody new waiting to kill us."
As the young U.S. troops are lost in the thickets of Iraqi cities, they have come to rely upon aerial bombardment in their clashes. Furthermore, an overexposed and extended armed force has resulted in frayed machinery and demoralised troops. The Iraq Study Group reported: "The U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have been stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments in Iraq, with attendant casualties, greater difficulty in recruiting, and accelerated wear on equipment."
In January, governmental sources show that 1,900 people died in Iraq (up from 800 in January 2006). The death of these soldiers and civilians for no identifiable reason has created a crisis of confidence among the U.S. population, which is not only the electorate but also the catchment area for military recruitment. The military has been having a hard time rebuilding its force. Undersecretary of Defence for Personnel and Readiness David Chu pointed out recently: "Our real challenge out there isn't the young people. It's parents, coaches, teachers, who, when asked by a young person, `Well, dad, mom, should I do this?', too often get a sour and unsupportive answer." The "this" is to join the U.S. military.
In 2005, the U.S. Army missed its recruitment goals. For last year, it spent more money to hire Public Relations firms and additional recruiters. The numbers remain low. All that the Army can rely upon is the collapse of crucial sectors of the U.S. economy, such as the rural sector. A recent study by the University of New Hampshire's Carsey Institute says: "The higher enlistment rates in the armed forces among rural youth are possibly linked to diminished opportunities there."
The study links the hopelessness of rural America with the forces of globalisation, whose ironic effect is that it creates the legions for the U. S. armed forces. "Industries that have traditionally sustained rural people and places - farming, timber, mining, fishing and manufacturing - are employing fewer workers than they have in the past. Communities distant from urban areas and with few scenic amenities are struggling with low incomes, a low-skill labour force, limited access to services, and weak infrastructure. Competition accompanying globalisation increasingly moves jobs overseas or stimulates increased productivity - in both cases, eliminating the `good jobs' that sustain communities and historically promised young people a future." Instead, they turn to the military, although not at rates desired by the White House.
Alongside this recruitment crisis, there is now a decline of morale and a rise of anti-war consciousness within the ranks. A number of soldiers have refused to serve and several of them have been disciplined. On June 7, 2006, the first commissioned officer of the U.S. armed forces decided to say "no" to this insanity. First Lieutenant Ehren Watada refused his charge to travel to Iraq from Fort Lewis, Washington.
In a statement, Watada said: "It is my duty as a commissioned officer in the United States Army to speak out against grave injustices. My moral and legal obligation is to the Constitution. Not to those who issue unlawful orders. I stand before you today because it is my job to serve and protect American soldiers and innocent Iraqis who have no voice. It is my conclusion that the war in Iraq is not only morally wrong, but also a breach of American law."
The military has thrown the book at Watada because the Pentagon and the White House fear an epidemic of dissent. Representative Mike Honda of San Jose defended Watada in the press. "Watada has risked being deemed guilty of breaking one law in furtherance of a higher, moral one, rather than participate in a fight that, in his and my view, needlessly sends our compatriots to their deaths." Watada's trial has now begun and a verdict will follow very soon.
A few days before the Intelligence chiefs released their report, General William Casey sat before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee. He told the Senators, "Iraqis are poised to assume responsibility for their own security by the end of 2007, still with some level of support from us." The Intelligence chiefs were less hopeful. "The Iraqi security forces - particularly the Iraqi police - will be hard-pressed in the next 12 to 18 months to execute significantly increased security responsibilities, and particularly to operate independently against Shia militias with success." Between these assessments lies the fate of Iraq and its people as well as that of thousands of U.S. troops.
