THE challenge posed by North Korea, or the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), to the international community is immensely qualitative. But the global community, insofar as it is led by the United States, if at all, has got used to a quantitative assessment of the challenge.
On July 4, when the U.S. was still making preparations for its Independence Day celebrations, North Korea struck once again. Pyongyang test-fired seven ballistic missiles (its neighbour, South Korea, kept the count) on that day and set off alarm bells. The missiles, detected and variously described by the DPRKs neighbours as either Soviet-style Scuds or their upgraded variants in the Rodong class, were assessed to have had a demonstrated reach of 400 to 500 kilometres.
The leaders of some concerned countries wasted no time in denouncing Pyongyang for its defiance of the international community. The proliferating nuclear experts in the region pointed to a pattern in North Korean leader Kim Jong-ils behaviour. It was not the first time that he had chosen an American holiday or remembrance day to announce his presence in East Asia, the effects of which are felt on the other side of the globe.
For instance, Kim chose the U.S. Memorial Day in May to carry out a second nuclear weapons test. The first one was detonated in 2006. On the American Independence Day in the same year, Pyongyang test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which was described by the West as a damp squib. More recently, in April, Kim resorted to a controversial satellite launch. This too was assessed by Western, Japanese and South Korean experts as a failure. However, they noted that the DPRK used that launch as a smokescreen for test-firing either a long-range missile or an ICBM itself in disguise.
As this report is written, the country is widely believed to be preparing to test-fire more ballistic missiles of varying ranges. DPRK-watchers do not rule out yet another nuclear weapons test in due course. In the first four days of July itself, the tally of missile tests credited to the DPRK crossed 10.
While all this was said to be true to Kims political form, the relative silence of North Korea about its latest feats was strange. This led to a near-comical situation with the U.S. denouncing the first batch of missile tests even before confirmation of them came. The new diplomatic practice of denouncing the DPRK for its acts of omission and commission in the nuclear and missile domains may degenerate into a circus if serious steps are not taken. These steps are not just about imposing credible costs on the country for continuing to violate the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Any qualitatively sound response to this challenge from the DPRK should also encompass credible first steps along the arguably long road to the total elimination of nuclear weapons the world over. The U.S., Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom, India, Israel, Pakistan and, perhaps, Iran as well may have to initiate this long process of global nuclear disarmament. It is, of course, possible that these countries consider the solitary case of the DPRKs nuclear and missile challenge to be too insignificant to launch global-scale action for nuclear disarmament. If this be so, the qualitative response to Kim may have to be fine-tuned at the micro-level concerning his country. But such a strategy is unlikely to work as long as those responding to the challenge from his side are seen by him as adopting double standards or worse.
There is, of course, a growing circle of opinion, especially in behind-the-scenes diplomacy in East Asia, that Kim is not at all acting rationally. This view is gaining currency in the light of evidence that the DPRK seeks to sustain itself through humanitarian supplies. China, as North Koreas close neighbour, is credited with extending a lifeline to the impoverished people under Kim. For China, this is as much a humanitarian choice as a strategic decision. The general line of argument in this situation is that any implosion of Kims highly militarised state, even if it be for the reason of mass poverty, could become a burden on China itself for its society and exchequer.
South Korea, too, provided some humanitarian aid. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, however, decided against the continuation of such aid as it was seen to have had the unintended effect of rewarding Kim for his intransigence. The aid extended for the basic sustenance of North Koreans was suspected to have been siphoned off by Kim and his minions. Other instances of generosity extended towards North Koreans can perhaps also be cited. But, the point being made is that the sensitivities of Kim should not count for much, especially when he is suspected to be acting irrationally.
While it is difficult to clinch this debate one way or the other, a truly objective assessment of the security dynamics in the DPRKs neighbourhood will indicate the need for a qualitative response to Kim on the following lines. Such a response will, for the immediate present, flow from the steps already initiated under the auspices of the U.N. More importantly, though, the response should quickly be extended to a collective search for a truly viable security architecture in East Asia. It is, of course, easier to identity the task than to outline a viable security mechanism. But the collective search by the U.S., the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and possibly India cannot be postponed any longer. This view does have some resonance in East Asian diplomatic circles.
The U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718 and 1874 are currently in place to address the situation relating to the DPRKs nuclear and missile programmes. Arms embargo on the DPRK and a degree of economic sanctions against it are the chief ingredients of these resolutions. Of these, Resolution 1874, adopted after the DPRKs second nuclear-weapons test, significantly provides for a degree of proactive interceptions and inspections of cargo deemed to be contraband under the U.N. norms.
By July 4, a North Korean cargo vessel, suspected to be carrying nuclear-related or missile-relevant cargo, was shadowed by a U.S. Navy destroyer on the high seas. At one stage, when the ship was believed to be heading towards Singapore after setting sail from a North Korean port, the city-state authorities declared that they would act appropriately. It was later clarified by or on behalf of the U.S. that the vessel was bound for Myanmar. Shortly before the July 4 anniversary, the U.S. indicated that the North Korean ship had, in fact, reversed course after heading in the direction of Myanmar. Subsequently, a top U.S. naval officer maintained that the changing of course by the vessel proved the effectiveness of U.N. Resolution 1874.
The resolution, which does not sanction the use of force as such to deal with the DPRK at this stage, provides, nonetheless, for interceptions and inspections of suspected North Korean cargo. A high degree of cooperation from the DPRK personnel, or even the multinational crew of ships flying its flag, would still be required for any such interceptions and inspections.
At a high strategic level, the U.S. has once again reaffirmed its extended nuclear deterrence with regard to both Japan and South Korea. Under this doctrine, Americas nuclear umbrella will continue to be available for the protection of these two countries in extreme emergencies. Tokyo and Seoul are sworn enemies of Pyongyang.
Unsurprisingly, the DPRK has responded to this development with a bearing on the security of both Japan and South Korea. Kim has not only vowed to stay the nuclear course but also frowned upon all external efforts to revive the stalled six-party talks on Korean denuclearisation. The parties to the talks are the U.S., the two Koreas, China (in the Chair), Japan and Russia. Kim has called for the denuclearisation of South Korea, too, arguing that U.S. nuclear weapons are stockpiled there for the purposes of the extended deterrence.
The U.S., however, is not said to have kept any nuclear weapon on South Korean soil. Washingtons global strategic reach is cited to reason out that it does not have to keep atomic weapons in South Korea in order to be able to provide it with a nuclear umbrella. This oft-repeated argument may acquire a new meaning in the context of some new evaluations of the Pentagons strategic reach. These evaluations are not directly related to the DPRK puzzle as such. But experts such as Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. have argued how the U.S. military forces are fast losing the ease of access to various theatres across the world, including the ones in East Asia.
Overarching such nitty-gritty aspects is the issue of a peace and security settlement of the 1950-53 Korean War, which ended only in an armistice deal. It is this larger framework that requires to be addressed as part of a qualitative approach to solving the DPRK puzzle.
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