Since the outbreak of the war in the Gaza Strip after the Hamas-led attack on Israel of October 7, 2023, the responses of regional actors have evoked curiosity and scrutiny. While Israel’s massive retaliation and the resultant humanitarian crisis in the Strip have drawn nearly universal criticism, the responses of Arab countries, especially those of regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Qatar, have been perceived as muted. Notably, the Arab powers have refrained from taking a proactive position and have focussed on prioritising their own interests over the Palestinian cause.
There was an initial Saudi attempt to evolve a collective response by convening a joint Arab-Islamic summit in Riyadh on November 11, 2023, but it did not lead to any consensus on how to respond to the unfolding events. While the resolution issued after the extraordinary joint summit expressed support for Palestinian statehood and blamed Israel for the non-resolution of the conflict and the worsening humanitarian situation, it failed to devise any collective pathway to deal with the problem. Hence, countries such as Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Iraq have taken the relatively hard-line position of censoring Israel, while the Gulf Arab states, Egypt and Jordan have been cautious in expressing their views. Even countries such as Syria and Jordan, which have in the past championed the cause of Palestinians, have been more circumspect.
The low-key response of the Arab powers is rather curious. Egypt, which was at the forefront of fighting Israel until the 1979 peace deal, has prioritised its security concerns over allowing refuge for displaced Gazans in its territory. It has focussed on working with Israeli and Gazan authorities, in consultation with the US, Saudi Arabia, and international aid agencies, to ensure the passage of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. But it has refrained from any vehement criticism of Israel while appearing not to condone its actions either. The only other country that has been involved in mediation efforts is Qatar, which, due to its hosting of the Hamas political office since 2012, has an advantage over other Arab actors. Qatar has used its relations with the US and Hamas to host talks for a ceasefire but has not been able to exert any significant influence on the outcome.
The response of the signatories of the Abraham Accords, namely the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, is noteworthy: none of them has ended relations with Israel. While Manama has recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv, it has refrained from ending political and economic ties. Morocco has been critical of Israeli actions and has allowed demonstrations in support of Palestine, but its diplomatic relations with Israel have remained intact. The UAE was initially forthcoming in expressing its disapproval of the Hamas attack but has gradually adopted a cautious stance and has been critical of Israeli actions. Nonetheless, it has not ended relations with Israel, and bilateral economic ties continue to prosper.
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Among the Arab countries, Saudi Arabia’s role has come under scrutiny, especially because of its claims of Arab and Islamic leadership. The initial Saudi reaction to the Hamas attack focussed on carefully underlining the need for restraint, avoiding escalation, and highlighting the plight of Palestinians under Israeli occupation without endorsing the actions of Hamas. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia focussed on condemning Israel for its massive military response, causing unprecedented death and destruction in the Gaza Strip and a significant humanitarian crisis. It has supported international calls for a ceasefire and committed itself to extending financial support to alleviate the humanitarian sufferings of the affected Palestinian population and for post-war reconstruction.
What explains these contrasting responses? Why have the Arab powers taken such contradictory stands on the ongoing and escalating conflict? What are the major factors that inform their position?
Prioritising peace and stability
Besides the obvious ones, several other factors have influenced the way Arab powers have chosen to respond to the crisis. Primarily, Arab actors have focussed on prioritising peace and stability instead of fuelling the conflict. This is significant as the region has just come out of a devastating decade of conflicts and wars in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings that began in Tunisia and soon gripped the entire region. The tensions, rivalries, and geopolitical competition among regional actors, the rise of terrorist groups like the Islamic State, and the sectarian warfare in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen underlined the futility of fighting and continuing hostilities, especially considering the mounting economic and security costs. Hence, since the signing of the Abraham Accords, regional countries led by the Arab Gulf states, namely the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain, have worked towards reconciliations among themselves and with the rival regional actors, including Israel, Iran, and Türkiye. The reconciliation efforts since then, although not interlinked, emanated from a spirit of prioritising diplomacy, peace, and stability over fighting, hostilities, and conflicts.
The reconciliations are part of the gradual shift in focus of the Arab Gulf powers, especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia, towards prioritising economic development and prosperity. Hence, mini-lateral initiatives such as I2U2 (India, Israel, the US, and the UAE) were floated to create a new cooperative mechanism to combat challenges to sustainable development and avoid over-reliance on China. Similarly, India and Saudi Arabia, together with the European Union and the US, took the lead in launching the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor to strengthen economic engagement by reviving the ancient trade route connecting India and Europe passing through the Arabian Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean. In fact, before the October 7 attack, Saudi Arabia and Israel were engaged in not-so-secret talks mediated by the US to explore a potential Saudi-Israel reconciliation. Many analysts believe that one of the goals of Hamas in attacking Israel was to scuttle any possibility of a Saudi-Israel normalisation.
Security concerns
The Arab powers are also concerned about the potential threat of a wider regional war, especially as Iran and Israel have engaged in confrontation. This has put the Arab Gulf states in an extremely precarious situation. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has tried to champion the Palestinian cause to enhance its position in the Arab and Islamic world. On the basis of its religious and ideological convictions, Iran does not consider Israel a legitimate state, and the Iranian leadership has often threatened to wipe out Israel from the region’s map. Israel believes this is an existential threat. The Iranian support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, which fought a war against Israel in 2006 that led to the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon, bolstered its position. Iran has gradually replicated the Hezbollah experiment to expand its political and military presence in Palestine by supporting Hamas, in Yemen by supporting Houthis, and in Iraq and Syria by floating Shia militias.
However, the Iranian support for these armed non-state actors (ANSAs) has become a serious security threat to the Arab powers. While the Arab Gulf states have for long been wary of Iranian ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons, the mushrooming of ANSAs in their neighbourhood at Iran’s behest has emerged as a bigger security and geopolitical threat.
The Saudi military intervention in Yemen in March 2015, although unsuccessful, was focussed on eliminating the Houthi threat. Similarly, the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil installations and the 2022 attacks in the UAE underlined the security threat posed by the Iran-aligned militia, forcing the Gulf states to seek a path of reconciliation with Iran.
The fear of an Israel-Iran war after the Israeli targeting of Ismail Haniyeh in Iran, the killings of Hassan Nasrallah and Yahya Sinwar, and the intensification of the Israel-Hezbollah war have further exposed the Gulf Arab states. Iran has warned them against allowing Israel to use their airspace to target Iran. Furthermore, the Iranian threats of targeting oil installations and infrastructure in the Gulf in the event of a US-Israel attack on Iran make the Gulf state vulnerable.
The targeting of the Red Sea shipping route by Houthis and the possibility of Iraqi militias joining Iran in targeting their interests make Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait wary of the security threats emerging from the ongoing and escalating conflict and would prefer to avoid taking sides.
Highlights
- Arab powers, including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Qatar, have been perceived as muted in their responses to the Gaza conflict. Saudi Arabia’s joint Arab-Islamic summit in November 2023 did not lead to a consensus on how to respond.
- The fear of an Israel-Iran war and the intensification of the Israel-Hezbollah war have exposed the Gulf Arab states. The targeting of the Red Sea shipping route by Houthis and the possibility of Iraqi militias joining Iran have made these countries wary of the security threats.
- The fear of militant Islamism among Arab states has informed their response to the Gaza crisis. The Hamas ideology, tracing its roots to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, poses a potent threat and can establish a dangerous precedent in other countries in the region.
Militant Islamism
The fear of militant Islamism among Arab states, too, has informed their response to the Gaza crisis. Since the Arab Spring protests, political Islam has gained greater support on the Arab street, as reflected in the electoral victories in Tunisia and Egypt. Arab powers have gradually become sensitive to the threats posed by militant Islamism. Countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have banned the Muslim Brotherhood, calling it the fountainhead of all forms of terrorism. Although the action against extremist and militant Islamism goes back to the rise of Al Qaeda and the September 11, 2001, attacks in the US, the proliferation of Islamist actors in the wake of the Arab Spring has alarmed countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have since worked with Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco to neutralise the threats emanating from militant Islamists.
The fact that Hamas traces its roots to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which believes in Islamic republicanism over Islamic monarchies, has been a major factor in the Arab powers’ muted response to the Gaza crisis. They make a distinction between the Palestinian cause and the Hamas position that refuses to give up armed struggle as a means to achieve a Palestinian state. For the Arab powers, the Hamas ideology poses a potent threat and can establish a dangerous precedent that can be replicated in other countries in the region.
Support for Palestine
For the Arab powers, however, the Palestinian issue remains a major concern. Although it was not a priority in their foreign policy before the October 7 attacks, the ongoing conflict and its ability to revive the appeal for the Palestinian cause on the Arab street means that countries like Saudi Arabia cannot afford to ignore it.
Notably, sympathy for Palestine and antipathy to Israel resonate strongly in the Arab and Islamic world. The Abraham Accords signed by the UAE and others remain unpopular among the Arab masses. Saudi Arabia was, even before October 7, skittish about going ahead with a rapprochement with Israel and was emphasising some concessions on the Palestinian front as a condition to move ahead in the reconciliation talks. After the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war, the Saudi leadership has made it clear that it will not make any deal with Israel without finding a solution for Palestinians.
Reliance on the US
Finally, the continued reliance on the US, especially for security, informs the Arab position. Although countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt have over the years worked on expanding their external relations, especially with Russia, China, and India, towards strengthening their economic and strategic engagements and reducing reliance on the US, they continue to be dependent on the US to ensure their security. The threats from Iran, militant Islamists, and numerous ANSAs in the neighbourhood mean that the Arab states remain vulnerable to security threats. Their focus on regime security means that they have historically been wary of developing a strong military, which means that the reliance on the US remains significant for both procurement of arms and for defence in times of crisis. It became evident during the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen, where the US reluctance to join the war against Houthis created a dilemma for Saudi Arabia and the UAE and undermined their security.
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The Israel-Hamas war, its expansion into an Israel-Hezbollah conflict, and the continuing possibility of an Israel-Iran confrontation have put the Arab powers, especially the Gulf Arab states, in a precarious position. The potency of the Iranian threat, including from Iran-aligned ANSAs, means that Gulf states are not in a position to side with Israel in case a war breaks out. However, relying on the US for their security means that they will also be wary of facilitating Iranian actions.
Moreover, the Arab powers are aware of the strong resonance of the Palestinian cause on their streets, which means that they will be unable and unwilling to abandon their support for Palestine and a two-state solution. As one views the evolving situation in West Asia since the October 7 events, what becomes clear is that there is no discernible Arab response. The Arab countries have taken positions that reflect their national interest and focus on prioritising peace and stability without necessarily giving up on support for Palestine.
Md. Muddassir Quamar is an associate professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.
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