Unified command will ensure cohesive strategy against terrorists: Lt General D.S. Hooda

The former chief of the Northern Command says India must take robust and strategic measures to eliminate terrorist activities within its own borders.

Lieutenant General D.S. Hooda. | Photo Credit: AKHILESH KUMAR

Lieutenant General (retd) D.S. Hooda, the former General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Northern Command, was in charge of the planning and execution of the Uri surgical strike across the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan. He is a co-founder of the New Delhi-based think tank Council for Strategic and Defence Research and a Senior Fellow at the Delhi Policy Group. Excerpts from an interview:

Militancy is on the rise in the Jammu region. What is your assessment of the situation?

Two years ago, according to the previous J&K Director General of Police Dilbag Singh, Jammu had been freed from militancy except one district where three or four terrorists were operating. The new DGP, R.R. Swain, has indicated the presence of 60-80 terrorists. These people are not locals. In the wake of infiltration attempts at the Line of Control and the international border with Pakistan, obviously there is a deliberate effort to revive militancy. One reason is that they are not getting much success in the Valley.

While it is crucial to deter Pakistan from using terrorism as a state policy through diplomatic, economic, and possibly military means, we must also take robust and strategic measures to eliminate terrorist activities within our own borders.

How is the current wave of militancy different from the previous one?

Their tactics have evolved. Previously, we witnessed fidayeen [suicide squad] attacks where militants would sneak into military areas and engage in prolonged gunfights until they were neutralised. Notable incidents include the 2013 attack on a police station and an Army camp in the Hiranagar sector, the 2016 attack at Nagrota, and the 2018 attack on the Sunjuwan Army camp among others.

These attacks followed a discernible pattern from militants originating in Pakistan. Today, however, the strategy has shifted to ambushes targeting military patrols and convoys, with attackers then vanishing into the mountains and forests. These regions are characterised by low population density and poor road connectivity, complicating counter-measures.

During such targeted attacks, especially the latest in Kathua district, there are reports about delayed reinforcement.

Assessing potential delays in reinforcements and evacuation is challenging. Jammu’s terrain and troop deployment differ significantly from Kashmir’s. For instance, in Kathua district’s Bani-Machedi area, where an ambush claimed the lives of five Army soldiers, troop presence was notably sparse at the time of the attack. This area is managed by the Western Command, headquartered in Chandimandir, whereas most of Jammu and Kashmir is under the Northern Command, based in the nearby Udhampur district.

Some experts have suggested that Pakistani army regulars may be involved in these ambush attacks.

Yes, there have been some reports claiming that both active and retired Pakistani army officers are involved in planning and executing these attacks. Some claim that a covert Pakistani operation, involving around 600 SSG [Special Service Group] commandos, is active in J&K. Since there is no credible information about this, I have my doubts.

The weapons from Afghanistan, previously used by militants and US forces, are now entering Jammu and Kashmir. What is the severity of this threat?

Not just weapons such as American-made M4 carbine assault rifles, there are also sophisticated night vision devices, drones, etc. But it is not such a big challenge. We are capable enough to hunt the terrorists down and eliminate them. 

Relationships between security personnel and local communities seem to have faltered after the ebb of the initial wave of militancy. Is there a significant gap in human intelligence gathering network? Many in sensitive areas feel they were treated as expendables.

We need to strengthen our outreach with the local communities. These are the people who helped us tremendously in rolling back insurgency in Jammu region. The Gujjar-Bakerwal community played a crucial role. When there is a long period of peace and normalcy, this outreach tends to weaken. Practically, it also happens when some troops get pulled out from the area as it happened in Jammu when they were sent to eastern Ladakh. This thinning out also affects such efforts.

Despite the claims of normalcy in the Jammu region, the internally displaced militancy affected migrants have not gone back to their native places in the past 10-15 years. 

It has more to do with other reasons. I commanded the 16 Corps in Jammu and later took over as Northern Army commander in 2014; we had this information that there were fewer than five “resident-militants” in Jammu region. On certain occasions, the infiltration bids would take place and the terrorists would carry out attacks. But the level of militancy-related violence was still quite low. Most civilian deaths were occurring due to ceasefire violations at the border. Such ambush attacks were unknown then. 

What are the important measures that need to be taken to deal with the situation?

We need to start with strengthening our counter-infiltration system at the LoC and the International Border. If we are successful in stopping the infiltration, half the problem is solved. In Jammu, there is some local support to terrorists but there are not many reports of local men joining terrorist groups. We have been talking for long about a smart fence to plug vulnerable gaps. We carried out some trials in both Jammu as well as Kashmir region. It has been over 10-12 years now, and we haven’t fully implemented the project as yet. I know a huge cost is involved, but then it is a matter of national security.

Apart from this, additional troops have already been moved into the area. The larger footprint of troops will not only keep terrorists under pressure but also help to strengthen the reachout to local people. Also, there is a need to increase the number of SPOs [Special Police Officers] in the J&K Police from local communities and strengthen the Village Defence Guards.

It is not just terrorists who need local support to survive, we also need local support to root them out.

What needs to be done to improve coordination between different the security forces deployed in the region?

A unified command system is essential for addressing the escalating situation. At present, multiple security forces, including the Army, the Border Security Force, the Central Reserve Police Force, and J&K Police, besides intelligence agencies, operate in the region with separate command structures and reporting lines.

A unified command will ensure a cohesive strategy against terrorists, enable more effective use of resources, and establish clear accountability.

We need to refine our counter-infiltration strategies. This involves harnessing advanced technology, strengthening the capabilities of the Special Forces, and expanding our human intelligence network.