Tough targets, hard bargaining

TWO significant developments took place between COP-7 in November 2001 (which paved the way for the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol) and COP-8 a year later. On February 14, 2002, U.S. President George Bush reaffirmed the statement he made in July 2001, after pulling out of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, and announced climate change policy measures to effect reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that are indexed to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than be bound by the unrealistic absolute emission targets set by the Protocol.

The U.S. perceived that the Kyoto targets would lead to an unacceptable burden on its economy. In April 2002, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the process of ratification by the Russian Federation had been initiated. In September, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov said at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg: "I believe that the ratification will take place in the very near future." (Fifty-five parties to the Protocol, including countries accounting for a total share of 55 per cent of carbon dioxide emissions by Annex-I countries, are required to ratify the Protocol if it is to come into force.)

Up until COP-8, 96 countries have ratified the Protocol, including 24 (of the 34) Annex-I countries, which account for a total of 37.4 per cent of the emissions. With the U.S. keeping out of it, Russia's ratification is crucial for the Protocol's entry into force. These developments, on the one hand, belied the hope of getting the U.S. back on board, and, on the other, the Russian assurance held out the hope of the Protocol surviving. Given the mandatory 90-day period for the Protocol to come into force after ratifications, Russia should ratify it before September 1, 2003, for it to become operational before COP-9, scheduled for December 2003 in Italy.

In an open discussion held by two Russian parliamentarians, Rim Bakiev and Alexander Kosarikov, in one of the COP-8 side-sessions in New Delhi, it became clear that only the process of ratification by the Duma, the Russian Parliament, has been initiated. According to Bakiev, half the strength of the Duma (with 425 members) plus one should vote in favour for its ratification. He said about half the parliamentarians are against Russia committing to the Kyoto targets. So the Russian ratification is by no means certain.

The process began on April 11 with Putin's proposal for ratification. In late June, the Deputy Prime Minister signed the government's plan of action towards ratification. According to Kosarikov, the process is complex; its key element is the enactment of certain pieces of legislation that will provide the legal basis for ratification. As part of this, the government has prepared a report that will form the background paper for discussions. This report will be considered in November-December by the State Committee of Ecology and then by members of the State Committee of International Relations, who will present their views to the Duma. While apparently the report has said there are more benefits than disadvantages to the Russian Federation from ratification, it has expressed some reservations. For instance, it suggests that ratification should be done with the minimum risk to the Russian economy. "In my view the Protocol will not harm the economy. Even in the most pessimistic scenario, the situation should be manageable," Kosarikov said. "Creation of a national market for emissions trading would facilitate this and so the passing of the law is crucial," he added.

One of the decisions at COP-7 accorded following Russia's submission higher revised values for the capacities of Russia's forests as carbon sinks. This should make it easier for Russia to meet its commitment. Kyoto requires Russian emissions to be stabilised at 1990 levels.

Kosarikov pointed out that there are other issues, such as debt relief and other mechanisms of funding, which have to be considered. The incentive for Russia to sign will be the billions of dollars that it can earn by emissions trading, especially from what has come to be termed `hot air' the enormous surplus emission capacity available as a consequence of Russia's economic collapse. On the other hand, there could be indirect pressure from the U.S., with baits like investments, debt relief and transfer of energy-efficient technologies to Russia. Kosarikov said that a major part of the world's forest and freshwater resources were in Russia and these had to be protected in order to mitigate global climate change. But the high cost of maintaining these required international monetary support, he seemed to imply.

Like the U.S., Russia has also begun to raise the issue of the Kyoto targets being without any scientific basis. Yuri Israel of Russia, who happens to be the vice-chairman of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), pointed out that Kyoto did nothing by way of mitigating the long-term impacts of climate change that would affect Russia significantly. From the current level of 360 ppm (parts per million), global GHG emissions would increase by 20 ppm in the next 10 years whereas Kyoto offsets this only to the extent of 1-2 ppm, he said. In other words, he wanted COP-8 to move beyond Kyoto and seek commitments from all parties in the period beyond 2012. "From the Russian point of view this is more important than the Protocol," he said.

The key component of Bush's goals that is not harmful to U.S.' economic growth is a cut in GHG emissions "intensity" the amount emitted per unit of economic activity or GDP by 18 per cent over the next 10 years.

"This strategy," according to the U.S. State Department, "will set America on a path to slow the growth of GHG emissions and as the science justifies to stop, and then reverse, the growth." From the present intensity of 183 tonnes (carbon equivalent) per million dollars of GDP in 2002, the strategy aims to bring down the intensity to 151 tonnes per million dollars of GDP in 2012.

This is stated to be an accelerated reduction as compared to the emissions intensity in a `business as usual' (BAU) scenario based on current forecasts of GDP growth rate and existing climate change policies, which is calculated to be 158 tonnes in 2012. This works out to a 14 per cent cutback on intensity from the present. In terms of total emissions, using forecasts of GDP, the reduction from BAU is stated to be 4.5 per cent. "But this is higher by about 40 per cent over the Kyoto target," said Harlan L. Watson, senior climate negotiator and special representative of the State Department.

Asked how then the U.S. can claim that the emissions reduction "goal is comparable to the average progress that nations participating in the Kyoto Protocol are required to achieve", Watson stated that the European Union reductions "operate under a bubble" with a range of emissions, with countries such as Portugal and Greece emitting plus 25 to minus 27 per cent over their 1990 levels.