On the launch pad

Even as ISRO gets ready for the launch of INSAT-3C in January 2001, it is apparent that it needs to change radically its strategies and outlook if it were to augment the building and launch of satellites to meet the ever-increasing domestic demand.

INSAT-3C, the second of the INSAT-3 series of satellites of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), is slated for launch aboard the European launch vehicle Ariane 4 as its exclusive payload on January 16, 2002. This exclusive launch was offered to the ISRO following the failure of the new and powerful launch vehicle Ariane 5 in July aboard which INSAT-3C was scheduled to be launched in August 2001. The launch was then postponed to November, pending a review of the Ariane 5 failure. The review, which was completed in September, called for some system modifications in the launch vehicle. Following this, the INSAT-3C launch was re-scheduled for January 2002.

The order in which the INSAT-3 series of satellites is being launched would confuse even a regular tracker of INSAT activities. The first of the INSAT-3 series was INSAT-3B, which was launched aboard Ariane 5 in March 2000. This was essentially owing to an emergency need of extended C-band (XC) transponders for Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) operators, following the in-orbit failure of INSAT-2D in October 1997 following a total power loss. The unexpected loss of six XC transponders aboard INSAT-2D could not be compensated either by the acquisition of the in-orbit satellite ARABSAT-1C (redesignated as INSAT-2DT and moved over to the Indian slot in the geosynchronous orbit at 55E) or by the launch of INSAT-2E (in April 1999) as neither satellite had XC transponders.

INSAT-3B could not be followed up with INSAT-3A as had been originally planned, because of problems associated with the meteorological component of INSAT payloads. (In fact, the original agreement with Arianespace, the launch operator, was for INSAT-3A and 3B.) INSAT-3A, unlike INSAT-3B and INSAT-3C, carries a meteorological payload with a Very High Resolution Radiometer (VHRR). However, the failure of the VHRR scan assembly aboard INSAT-2E, which led to the infamous fiasco in the prediction of cyclone landfall by the India Meteorological Department (IMD) during the Orissa super cyclone, resulted in a reshuffle of the INSAT-3 series.

The repeated failure of the meteorological payload aboard INSAT - earlier there were problems in respect of receiving IR data from INSAT-2A and INSAT-2B - required a complete relook at the met payload, the VHRR in particular. This meant a further delay in the launch of INSAT-3A resulting in the advancing of the launch of INSAT-3C. (Although INSAT-3D is a dedicated meteorological satellite, it does not, at least as per plans on paper, carry a VHRR. However, the ongoing review of INSAT meteorological payload may have some impact on its design as well.)

INSAT-3C carries 24 normal C-band transponders, 6 XC transponders, two S-band broadcast satellite (BSS) transponders and one mobile satellite service (MSS) transponder. Unlike INSAT-3A and 3B, it does not carry any Ku transponders. This two-tonne- plus satellite will be located at 74E in the geosynchronous orbit. In all, a total of 111 transponders on the INSAT system will become available after the launch of INSAT-3C (see Table). In addition, ISRO has leased 10 C band transponders from Thaicom satellite.

However, INSAT-2B, launched in July 1993, is at the end of its life; all transponders on it (six C band, two XC band and two S band) have been vacated, except for one channel, Gyan Darshan of Doordarshan. INSAT-2C is also nearing its end. Although this satellite was launched only in December 1995, its life can at best be prolonged for another nine months (against a nominal life of seven to eight years of an INSAT-2 class satellite). To compensate for the loss of thrust during launch, it had consumed some extra propellant. INSAT-2C has 20 operational transponders, of which three are in Ku band.

While it is hoped that the satellite will last until the proposed launch of INSAT-3A in the third quarter of 2002, any emergency need arising from INSAT-2C's end of operational status could lead to a crunch situation in transponder availability as, according to ISRO sources, demand for 3C transponders from user agencies of the government, namely the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and Prasar Bharati, itself will fully engage the satellite. But, more pertinently, 2C has 3 Ku transponders used by the Ministry of Communications and 3C has no Ku transponder.

Besides the government agencies, the main beneficiaries of the launch of INSAT-3C will be VSAT operators as there is a dire need of augmenting the XC band capacity in the space segment. The VSAT network has been growing at an annual rate of about 20 per cent, according to B. G. Bhalla, secretary, VSAT Service Providers' Association. In spite of the fact that Ku transponders were not bandwidth-limited as XC transponders were, VSAT operators had not really been served well by the availability of Ku transponders aboard INSAT-2C and 3B, he said. Although not bandwidth-limited, one of the key problems of Ku transponders is that they are power-limited, which is not the case with XC transponders. The problem with INSAT's Ku transponders has been their lower power as compared to foreign satellites that have footprints over the Indian region.

When Ku transponders were being offered to VSAT operators, the INSAT Coordination Committee (ICC) had fixed a tariff of 1.5 times the XC tariff. However, to their dismay, VSAT operators soon found that the data transmission efficiency of the INSAT Ku transponders was only half of the designed rate. So the association proposed a cut in its tariff by 50 per cent, Bhalla said. Accordingly, the ICC approved in May a 40 per cent cut. But, the Department of Telecom services, in its own wisdom, has finally given only a 20 per cent discount on the tariff.

Apparently, unlike Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and broadcasters, VSAT operators have not been allowed to negotiate directly with the operators of foreign satellites that have Ku capacity for the Indian region. According to Bhalla, at present the Department of Space negotiates on their behalf and, in this arrangement, the Ku tariffs of foreign satellites is 1.8 times the INSAT tariff. But, in spite of the higher tariff, many VSAT operators have found it profitable to avail themselves of the transponder space of foreign satellites. At present, most of them have got transponder space on the GE-2 satellite.

Quirky situations like these abound as a result of the Indian satellite communication policy. The chief among them, of course, is the fact that while there was as of May 2000 a policy of permitting private parties (besides VSAT operators) to access space segments on INSAT satellites, the policy cannot yet be made operational as there are no guidelines. "In principle, we can offer transponder space to private parties but we are yet to work out the methodologies to do this after taking care of the government's requirements. Moreover, while there have been demands from private parties, we just would not have enough room even after 3C. Maybe when 3A goes up it will become possible," says K. Kasturirangan, Chairman, ISRO.

Because of the strange policy according to which the satellite builder does not sell satellite capacity directly, VSAT operators are given access through the Ministry of Communications, which leases out transponders from the ones allocated to it by the ICC. (Incidentally, it is the Ministry of Communications that makes money on this and not the Department of Space.)

Another fallout of this policy conundrum is that while private parties have been allowed to uplink directly from Indian soil as part of the Satcom policy of 1999, they can do so only to foreign owned satellites as privately owned Indian satellites do not exist. The arrival of satellites put up by ASC (owners of the Zee TV network) in 16 to 18 months would change the scene unless transponder allocation to private parties on INSAT satellites becomes a reality before that. As a result, today there are more foreign satellite transponders than others carrying signals of the large number of television channels in the country and beaming down on Indian soil. (Contrast this with the United States' satellite communication policy, where you can only uplink to, and receive from, satellites with a majority U.S. ownership.) It is indeed a big irony that while there is such unmet domestic demand, ISRO thought it proper to lease out transponders to a foreign operator. Or was it a calculated move to circumvent policy hurdles?

ISRO had leased out nine lower extended C band (LXC) transponders out of the 17 transponders on INSAT-2E to INTELSAT for $11 million for a 10-year period. In fact, the transponders are effectively worth 11 as two of them have a 72 MHz bandwidth as against 36 MHz of the rest, which means an income of $1 million for one transponder. In turn, INTELSAT has leased these transponders (designated as APR-1) to users over the Asia Pacific region and most of them have been Indian television channels. Moreover, INTELSAT has leased them out at higher rates, about $1.4 to 1.5 million a transponder, and Indian private parties have had to pay in foreign exchange. Strange as it may appear, this is the only way an Indian private party could avail itself of the facilities offered by an Indian satellite. And equally strange is the fact that for the present this is the only way - by selling its capacity to foreign operators - that ISRO itself can make money on the satellites that it has built. While ISRO argues that returns on the leased transponders are assured for the entire 10-year period for itself, it is not so for INTELSAT, which is dependent on demand and the fact that the rates would fall as years go by.

Clearly, the way out of this problem can only be through, on the one hand, a thorough review of the manner in which the satcom component of the New Telecom Policy is being implemented and, on the other, a much shorter turn-around time for satellite building and launching on the part of ISRO. Sadly, there is a lot left to be desired even with regard to the latter. The launch of 3C, and 3A later, does not give much hope that ISRO's technical skills and capability are enough to meet the demand and competition in the market. With every launch there is only a feeling of deja vu. It is always a case of the impending crunch and crisis in the domestic demand for the space segment being partly offset. It is time that this changed, and only ISRO can do that. But that requires innovative thinking, changed strategies and a radical outlook.