No-win situation

Electoral compulsions and the prospect of some NSG countries opposing the Indo-U.S. deal forced the governments climbdown.

Prime Minister Manmohan

PRIME MINISTER Manmohan Singhs public presentations on the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal have, as a rule, been characterised by an element of drama. In his spirited promotion of the deal he went to the extent of throwing down a challenge of midterm general elections at the countrys political firmament. Such was his ardour for the deal that it was termed, in some political and administrative circles, as the most aggressive pursuit of governance by the Prime Minister. The same element of drama was present in his climbdown on the deal at a public forum in New Delhi in the second week of October.

Manmohan Singhs first forceful defence of the deal was in the August 17, 2006, Rajya Sabha speech, which is considered by many political observers as the most effective political intervention by the self-professed reluctant politician. In a display of emotive public discourse, he highlighted his conviction as well as credentials to advance the deal. Drawing a parallel between the nuclear deal talks and the economic reforms mooted by him in 1991, Manmohan Singh argued that successive governments had benefited from the policy of reforms, though he was initially criticised and called names. He asserted that he had enough commitment to the nation and its interests as the son of a person who had dropped out of school to become a freedom fighter.

It was with the same theatrical streak that he said in August this year that the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal was etched in stone and dared the Left parties to withdraw support to the government on this issue. Just a few days prior to the climbdown, Manmohan Singhs passion for the deal seemed to have rubbed off on United Progressive Alliance (UPA) chairperson and Congress president Sonia Gandhi, as she used a party rally held in Haryana on October 7 to castigate opponents of the deal as enemies of peace and development. The atmosphere created by these over-the-top proclamations increased the magnitude of the retreat.

When the climbdown finally happened on October 12, at the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit in New Delhi, Manmohan Singhs comment was that failure to carry the deal through is not the end of life. The stated reasoning for the climbdown was that the UPA government led by him was not a one-issue government. Elaborating, he maintained that the deal was honourable and in the interests of the country and hoped that the differences with the Left parties on the issue would be reconciled. He pointed out that the government has still one and a half years to go to complete its term and that he hoped and expected to stay the course.

Sonia Gandhi, who spoke in tandem with the Prime Minister at the meeting, further clarified Manmohan Singhs line of argument by stating that it was the Congress coalition dharma to address the concerns of its partners. More significantly, she added that the Lefts opposition to the nuclear deal was not unreasonable, and that they reflected its ideological concerns. She categorically stated that the Congress was not in favour of early elections and that the UPA was going to do all that it can to see that its programmes are implemented till 2009.

As far as real-politik messages go, this joint performance of the Big Two of the UPA made it clear that they had decided to put an end to the political impasse that had gripped the Union government for the past three months on account of the intense difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and the Left parties. The impasse had threatened to strike at the very root of the UPA government as the Left parties had stated in no uncertain terms that they would withdraw support to the government if it went ahead with the steps to operationalise the nuclear deal.

Until the climbdown, indications from the government, particularly the Prime Minister and other votaries of the deal such as Union Minister for Science and Technology Kapil Sibal, was that they would not budge, though both the sides had devised a negotiation mechanism in early September to thrash out the differences. Four meetings of the negotiation committee had taken place until October 12 and it was clear that there was no tangible progress in terms of finding a solution.

UPA chairperson Sonia

The UPA-Left meetings could not arrive at a compromise and this was clear from the fact that the Congress leadership at various levels indicated its readiness to face an election on this count and had begun exhorting party units in different States to prepare for that eventuality. This political climate had also impelled other political forces such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) under its leadership and the United National Progressive Alliance (UNPA) a grouping of regional parties consisting of the Samajwadi Party (S.P.) and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) to begin preparing for midterm polls. But the October 12 message from Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi has subdued the election frenzy.

There are many factors behind the climbdown. Discussions in the UPA as well as among the Left parties revolve around two central factors. The primary reason is the reluctance of a number of UPA constituents, particularly the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), to face elections at this point of time. Unlike the Prime Minister and the impassioned advocates of the nuclear deal in his team, DMK leader M. Karunanidhi and RJD chief Lalu Prasad believed that the government was more important than getting nuclear energy from the U.S. The second factor was the prospect of some Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) countries opposing the Indo-U.S. arrangement, which raised doubts about the very completion of the deal even if the Left parties were finally brought around to the governments view.

According to a senior RJD leader, these doubts strengthened the case of forces such as the RJD and the DMK. We asked the Congress leadership whether it was wise in this context to risk the very security of a government for a deal that we are not sure would come through, he said. By all indications, the twin factors came into full play on October 8, a day after Sonia Gandhis Haryana rally, where she had reflected Manmohan Singhs penchant for the deal.

Prior to October 8, Minister for External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee had held a series of meetings with Left leaders, including Communist Party of India (Marxist) general secretary Prakash Karat, Polit Bureau members Jyoti Basu and Sitaram Yechury, and West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. The discussions apparently centred around the next step to operationalise the deal, that is, finalising the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Mohammed El Baradei, the chairperson of the IAEA, was in India during this period and his presence was indeed perceived as a good opportunity to advance the negotiations. Several Congress leaders were of the view that Jyoti Basu and Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee would, with sufficient persuasion, be ready to endorse the nuclear deal and Pranab Mukherjee was apparently trying to work on the basis of that hope. However, by the morning of October 8 , it was clear that the CPI(M) stood united against the deal.

Sonia Gandhi herself decided to negotiate with the CPI(M) leadership in this situation. She had a meeting with Prakash Karat and Sitaram Yechury, who once again stated that the Left parties would not hesitate to withdraw support if the government began negotiations with the IAEA. The government sides argument at the meeting was that discussions with the IAEA leadership did not amount to operationalisation of the deal.

In New Delhi,

The Left leaders firmly rejected this position and maintained that the government should not take any step till the Left-UPA Coordination Committee on the nuclear deal came up with a consensus. This stand of the Left parties forced the Congress core committee hold a meeting late in the evening on October 8. The agenda was obviously the future course of action. It was clear that it could take only one of the two definitive paths: either go ahead with the deal and face the collapse of the government or accept the point made by the Left parties and put the deal on hold. By all indications, Manmohan Singhs supporters on the deal argued that it was better to lose office than backtrack on an honourable international treaty.

The advocates of the deal wanted immediate steps and, according to them, if that did not happen the deal was as good as dead. In their view, the Lefts insistence on putting the deal on hold till negotiations were over was just a ploy to kill it. It was here that the view of the UPA partners, who were also in touch with several Congress leaders, came into play. The leaders of the DMK, the RJD and even the Sharad Pawar-led Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) impressed upon these Congress leaders, including Pranab Mukherjee, that the need of the hour was to avoid early polls.

The other factor that came into consideration was the Congress own electoral compulsions. A senior south Indian Congress leader, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the party needed breathing space, at least till the third week of December, so that it could focus on the Gujarat Assembly elections. This, he pointed out, was an important factor that tilted the scales in favour of a climbdown. He also added that by the evening of October 9 the understanding on a climbdown was firmly in place within the Congress and the UPA.

It was this understanding that came out on October 11 in Patna, when senior Union Ministers Sharad Pawar and Lalu Prasad dismissed the idea of a midterm poll as mere speculation. Pawar said that there were some concerns for our Marxist friends about the nuclear deal and as the ruling coalition we are obliged to address this. He categorically stated that the government will not fall over the issue. One day later, Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh put the stamp of approval on Pawars statement.

Clearly, the impasse is over. But the big question within the Congress, the other constituents of the UPA and the Left parties is whether the truce will last, as hoped by Manmohan Singh, till May 2009, when the next general elections are due. The loss of face suffered by the Congress, and Manmohan Singh in particular, has not been taken lightly by advocates of liberalisation.

According to them the climbdown has serious repercussions on Indias foreign policy and its dignity in the international community. These people also point out that, with this climb-down, the Congress capacity to pursue independent economic policies has also been compromised. These sections would want to Manmohan Singh and his associates to use the climbdown as a tactical retreat alone and push their own policies in the future. The Left on its part would demand greater dedication to the pro-people components of the National Common Minimum Programme (CMP) of the UPA.

All these perceptions and the campaigns based on them would exert pressures on the leadership of the Congress and the UPA. The big question is whether the Congress leadership would be able to withstand these pressures. If it succumbs, the hope of continuing in government till 2009 could well be a mirage.