Musharraf's moves

General Musharraf's action of promoting himself as the country's President during the run-up to the India-Pakistan Summit is not expected to affect the course and outcome of the event in Agra.

IN Punjabi it is called jappi-pappi, for hugs and kisses. After two years of fuming, fretting and frowning at each other, India and Pakistan have suddenly begun to behave like the typical lost-and-united brothers of silver-screen tear-jerkers. The vibes at the highest levels between the two countries, particularly since the May 23 invitation to General Pervez Musharraf to visit India for a Summit meeting with Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee, are just too much. One wonders if it is an indication of the shape of things to come at the Agra meeting.

There is another irony. While the whole world is furious with Pakistan's military ruler for usurping the office of the President, India is actually smiling at him. Of course, having invited him and set the date for the Summit, India cannot but pretend as if nothing has changed in the corridors of power in Islamabad.

The drama staged in the presidential palace on June 20 in fact means little change vis-a-vis the Summit. The fact that India had extended the invitation much before Musharraf decided to wear the presidential hat only means that in its perception, it is the General who is in command of the situation. The only difference is that whatever the outcome of the Vajpayee-Musharraf parleys it would also have the stamp of approval of the President of Pakistan.

Why did Musharraf decide to don the mantle of President just ahead of his visit to India? Although there is no clarity on the subject, there is much speculation, and one in fact involves the India factor.

The reported advance greetings by Vajpayee, in the course of his telephonic conversation with Musharraf hours before he was actually sworn in as President, has only added to the mystery. Strangely, India has neither denied the reported conversation nor deemed it necessary to offer an explanation although the news received wide publicity in the media in both countries.

In a startling revelation, Musharraf told a group of Pakistani editors, with whom he had a three-hour-long interactive session as part of an exercise to ascertain the views of a cross-section of society on his India yatra, that he had spoken to Vajpayee thrice over the telephone in June. The bureaucrats on either side appear to be clueless about the conversations, or they are pretending to be ignorant. Interestingly, India chose not to contest the General's claim.

In the normal circumstances no attention would have been paid to such 'disclosures'. But coming as it did on the eve of the Summit, they have enormous significance. What is more extraordinary is that the Foreign Office in both the countries seemed to be out of the picture.

As one senior diplomat told Frontline "there is a sense of disconnect" between the highest level and the Foreign Office. The assessment, if correct, has its own implications. It could mean that the Indian Prime Minister and the man of many titles in Islamabad have come to the conclusion that for a meaningful progress in normalisation of ties it is better to keep the traditional institutions out.

It may be an uncharitable but true assessment. There is an overwhelming view among India-Pakistan observers that leaving the subject of normalisation of relations to the established institutions is a sure step to disaster. So the question that is seriously debated is whether a deal is being worked out (or whether it is already through) bypassing the traditional channels.

It must be said to the credit of Musharraf that in the run-up to the Summit he has made an attempt to take the nation into 'confidence' and prepare it for a certain degree of "flexibility" likely to be shown by Pakistan at the Summit. Undoubtedly it is a much tougher task for the General than for Vajpayee to prepare his nation for the likely outcome of the Summit. The constituencies in Pakistan that have developed a vested interest in the continuation of the Kashmir conflict are far too many. Many have enjoyed (and continue to receive) the patronage of the establishment, and at least one section of it from the all-powerful Army. The General has to some extent succeeded in taming the elements that were swearing by jehad as the only route for the "liberation" of Kashmir. The Jamaat-e-Islami is perhaps the best example. It was the Jamaat-e-Islami that was in the forefront of the agitation against the Delhi-Lahore bus ride of Vajpayee in February 1999 and was closely associated with the subsequent developments that led to Kargil. The Jamaat chief, Quazi Hussain Ahmed, is today talking of the dire need for the two countries to patch up.

The interactive sessions have helped Musharraf secure the much-needed national consensus for a give and take with India. Irrespective of what is likely to emerge at Agra, the foundation has been laid to create the necessary atmosphere for a sincere attempt towards reconciliation. Before initiating the consultations, he mustered the courage to tell a conference of Muslim scholars in Islamabad on June 5 (the birthday of Prophet Muhammad) on the need for them to be restrained in their anti-India tirade. His message to them was to stop dreaming about hoisting the Islamic flag on the Red Fort, and this did have some impact. Barring the likes of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, most of the extremist outfits have come round to accept the view that peace should be given a chance.

Notwithstanding all the rhetoric about the United Nations Resolutions, plebiscite and the untold miseries of Kashmiris on account of the "oppression and suppression" by the Indian forces in the Valley, Pakistan has sent out enough signals that all that it would expect from India is acceptance of Kashmir as the central issue in the tense bilateral relations.

The indications first came from Pakistan Foreign Secretary Inamul Haq. In his interactive session with a group of editors, Haq admitted that Pakistan was not looking for a resolution of the Kashmir conflict at the Summit and that it would not insist on an instant solution to the problem as a pre-requisite for normalisation of ties. He told the editors that the Summit would provide an opportunity to evolve a mechanism to address the Kashmir issue.

A few days later, while addressing representatives of political and other groups from Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, Musharraf himself confirmed the view. The message from the General was that he would deem his yatra to India as a success if it led to an agreement for a definite time-frame to address the Kashmir issue.

On the domestic front the assumption of the office of the President by the General has put the political parties in a dilemma. Most of the political and religious parties that had welcomed the resumption of the process of dialogue cannot be expected to go back on their views just because Musharraf has chosen to become the President. They are livid but their anger is essentially confined to the manner in which Musharraf grabbed the office.

Hence the boycott of the all-party meet convened by Musharraf by the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD), a conglomerate of some 18 parties, including the Pakistan Muslim League and the Pakistan People's Party. No doubt it is a setback for the General that the two main parties have refused to recognise him in his new capacity, but certainly it will not come in the way of the Summit.

At the moment no one seems to have any idea about the likely outcome of the Summit. But there is growing optimism. The best possible scenario envisaged is the establishment of a Joint Working Group on Kashmir. And the worst possible one is an agreement to continue the process of engagement.