The Delhi Text

1. Centrality of Kashmir

"Kashmir is the core issue... Let this be recognised".

2. Need for compromise:

"The road ahead needs compromise from both sides. By this I don't mean one-sided compromises. 'Give and take' is involved if you want to improve the situation. We know about the internal problems of India and the internal problems of Pakistan. We need to rise above these problems. This needs boldness, courage, statesmanship."

3. Shimla & Lahore Accords:

"It has been made out that I have rejected the Shimla Accord and the Lahore Declaration. There can't be anything further than the truth than this. I said the Shimla Accord and the Lahore Declaration haven't moved ahead to bring about normalisation. I didn't say anything about rejection."

(Earlier that day, Foreign Secretary Inamul Haque instantly contradicted Jaswant Singh's charge that Pakistan was showing "selectivity" in adherence to accords (The Hindu, July 15, 2001).

4. Issues other than Kashmir:

To a question by N.Ram about the interpretation of his statement on arrival, which suggests that only a resolution of the Kashmir dispute will lead to "full normalisation", General Musharraf responds: "This is another misperception about what I said". It is "absolutely wrong" to say that his stand is that nothing can move forward unless the Kashmir issue is resolved, "But what I said was, 'Kashmir is the core issue.' My English is not good. Let us find another word, some other adjective (for 'core'). What I mean is that this is the issue on which we have fought wars, which has come in the way of peaceful and amicable relations between Pakistan and India. Let this be recognised. I have nothing against taking up other issues in tandem. What I am against is this. 1) You can't take up other issues at the cost of the Kashmir issue. You have to include Kashmir (in any meaningful effort to normalise and improve India-Pakistan relations) 2) Having taken up various issues in tandem, we cannot move ahead only on those issues and leave the Kashmir issue behind.... Lets take the other issues along." To a question noting that if Pakistan had "core concerns" on Kashmir, India had its concerns (vis-a-vis Pakistan) and should not these also be taken up, General Musharraf responds: "Why not? Everything must move in tandem."

5. The process for a a solution:

"Step I, I feel, is the initiation of dialogue. We have taken this step. The second is: we must recognize Kashmir as an issue, as the issue that has been in the way of peaceful and normal relations between India and Pakistan over more than 50 years. Let's recognize this frankly and honestly. The third is: a structure for solving it, may be a time-frame even."

6. Terrorist violence in Kashmir:

Progress in the talks on Kashmir would have "an indirect bearing on the militancy (in the part of Kashmir with India)."

7. The Nuclear Question:

V.P. Singh asked, "We are both nuclear powers. How do we reduce the scope of accidents, of mishaps, of miscalculation?" Musharraf agrees that the implications of nuclear weaponisation by India and Pakistan need to be addressed. To a follow-up question by N. Ram on what kind of measures he is prepared to discuss with India to end the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan and whether he is willing to talk about agreements for non-deployment and non-induction of nuclear weapons, General Musharraf responds that on this issue, "It is better to be blunt. I think that on this issue, these things have generally been initiated by India and we have had to react. On the blasts, on the deployment. Once after India did that, we have reacted, starting raising forces. We can agree to any regime of nuclear restraint, of reducing the risks."

Asked specifically whether he will be willing to discuss an agreement (with India) on non-deployment and non-induction of nuclear weapons, he answers: "Why not?"