Not good history

Former Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar's book on his country's foreign policy gives short shrift to any viewpoint other than Pakistan's.

ABDUL SATTAR is one of Pakistan's most accomplished diplomats. He was its Foreign Minister in 1993 and again from 1999 to 2002. P.N. Dhar and he are the sole survivors of the Shimla Conference of June 1972. Abdul Sattar negotiated with Jaswant Singh the draft declaration at the Agra Summit in July 2001.

He had two choices. One was to shut himself up in a library, delve into the archives and produce a scholarly work on Pakistan's foreign policy. He had a precedent in S.M. Burke's two superb volumes - Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (Oxford University Press, 1973) and Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (University of Minnesota Press, 1974). Burke served in Pakistan's diplomatic service and became a distinguished member of the faculty of the University of Minnesota as a full-fledged scholar. Understandably, the cloister did not attract Abdul Sattar.

The other option, then, was to write a memoir that friends, like the reviewer, hoped he would. He chose the third option and, as the phrase goes, fell between the stools. He writes in the Preface: "Emulating the example of worthy predecessors like Ambassador S.M. Burke, who wrote the first book on Pakistan's foreign policy, I have tried, in this recapitulation, to contribute to the transfer of knowledge acquired, at times, through participation in policy implementation and formulation, but more continuously by osmosis, during my association with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for over forty years. My assignments at the foreign office and in missions abroad provided useful opportunities to form perspectives on key foreign policy issues. I have put together a plain narrative, faithfully recalling the facts and constraints of the time when the policy decisions had to be made, and their rationale, as far as possible in the words of the policymakers. This book is not a critique but I hope it will provide a factual basis for objective appraisal and help identify lessons useful to future policymakers."

He has not emulated Burke's example. His was a work of scholarship. Sattar's is not. Burke wrote: "My outlook is necessarily Pakistani... However I have not failed to state what non-Pakistanis have said, and have carefully documented this version." He relied on primary sources. He is tendentious to a degree and gives short shrift to any viewpoint other than Pakistan's.

The "Concise History" is too concise by half; hurried and perfunctory. His account of the origins of the Kashmir dispute takes the cake for its lapse from objectivity, even by the pathetic standards of this unfortunate subcontinent. Was it not Mohammal Ali Jinnah who asserted that the ruler, not the people, had the right to decide on the State's accession to India or Pakistan? And was it not Jinnah, again, who turned down Mountbatten's written proposal to him, in Lahore on November 1, 1947, to hold a plebiscite in all the three States - Kashmir, Junagad and Hyderabad? Until 1951, the honours of rejection of proposals by the U.N. Commission for India and Pakistan and the U.N. mediators were evenly divided between India and Pakistan.

To be fair, there are issues on which he is critical of Pakistan; on Kargil, for instance. He writes of "intrusion of armed personnel from Pakistan" and that "few foreign countries credited Pakistan's disclaimer". But it is a sketchy narrative. Abdul Sattar remarks in the Preface: "The task of a Pakistani researcher suffers from multiple handicaps, perhaps common to developing countries; antiquated secrecy laws are just one of the hurdles. Where records do exist, adequate personnel are lacking for sifting and declassification. The foreign office has started the exercise but the task is time-consuming and current issues always take the first claim on the time of senior officials. Particularly difficult to reform is the tendency of leaders and high officials to talk with foreign leaders and diplomats, especially on more sensitive issues, in one-to-one conversations, and at times on the telephone, without keeping notes for the record. The oral culture of decision-making makes construction of policy a daunting exercise. Fortunately, books written by officials and scholars with access to leaders or their papers provide invaluable material and these sources have been consulted for this book" (emphasis added, throughout).

This is not altogether correct, for he has neglected important sources. But it is his reflections on the conduct of diplomacy which matter. These the veteran owes to history to deliver in a full-length work of memoirs.