A lecture to Pakistan

Bill Clinton has done some plain-speaking to the Pakistanis, but India must realise that the United States frames its policy on the basis of its own national interest and not on Indian concerns.

BILL CLINTON did not deviate from his Pakistan agenda. His plain-speaking through a direct television address to the people of Pakistan served as a warning to the country's leadership. He made a call to Pakistan to correct its course on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts. When his public remarks were so direct and pointed, there is little doubt that he was harsher in his private talks with the Chief Executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf.

Islamabad had been converted into a garrison town in preparation for the Clinton visit. Army personnel were present everywhere. The U.S. used a "decoy" aircraft to ensure that nothing went wrong at the Chaklala airbase when Clinton's plane touched down t here on March 25. Pakistani newspapers reported that Chaklala looked more like a U.S. airbase; some even claimed that Pakistani military personnel at the airport were unarmed.

There was no arrival statement, joint statement or departure statement. Press coverage of the Clinton-Musharraf meeting was closely regulated. A picture of the two sitting some 10 feet apart was circulated; the television shots permitted were also of the same league. Clearly, the U.S. did not want anyone to "use" a meeting between its civilian President and a military ruler.

Clinton said that it was up to the people of Pakistan to decide their future. "Of course, no one from the outside can tell Pakistan how it should be governed. That is for you, the people of Pakistan, to decide, and you should be given the opportunity to do so. I hope and believe you want Pakistan to be a country where the rule of law prevails; a country where officials are accountable; a country where people can express their points of view without fear; a country that wisely forsakes revenge for the wo unds of the past, and instead pursues reconciliation for the sake of the future. If you choose this path, your friends in the United States will stand with you."

He went on: "I hope you will be able to meet the difficult challenges we have discussed today. If you do not, there is a danger that Pakistan may grow even more isolated, draining even more resources away from the needs of the people, moving even closer to a conflict no one can win. But if you do meet these challenges, our full economic and political partnership can be restored for the benefit of the people of Pakistan."

What Clinton did was to lay down a classical carrot-and-stick policy framework for an erstwhile ally whose role in bringing down the Soviet Union was duly acknowledged in the television address. If you do this you can gain this, and if you do not then yo u stand to lose a lot.

On the regional front, Clinton did not mince his words. He was far from diplomatic in his assertions though his statements were couched in a manner that few could take direct offence at.

He said:

"Like all key moments in human history, this one poses some hard choices, for this era does not reward those who struggle in vain to redraw borders with blood (Kargil). It belongs to those with the vision to look beyond borders, for partners and commerce and trade...

"I believe it is also in Pakistan's interests to reduce tension with India. When I was in New Delhi, I urged India to seize the opportunity for dialogue. Pakistan also must help create conditions that will allow dialogue to succeed. For India and Pakista n, this must be a time for restraint, for respect for the Line of Control and renewed lines of communication.

"I have listened carefully to General Musharraf and others. I understand your concerns about Kashmir. I share your conviction that human rights of all its people must be respected. But a stark truth must also be faced. There is no military solution to Ka shmir. International sympathy, support and intervention cannot be won by provoking a bigger, bloodier conflict. On the contrary, sympathy and support will be lost. And no matter how great the grievance, it is wrong to support attacks against civilians ac ross the Line of Control... We (the U.S.) want to be a force for peace. But we cannot force peace. We can't impose it. We cannot and will not mediate or resolve the dispute in Kashmir. Only you and India can do that, through dialogue."

President Clinton added that he would do everything possible to restore the Lahore process.

In an indirect reference to the Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden, he mentioned the "core" issue of terrorism: "There are obstacles in your progress, including violence and extremism. We Americans have also felt these evils. Surely, we have both suffered en ough to know that no grievance, no cause, no system of beliefs can ever justify deliberate killing of innocents. Those who bomb bus stations, target embassies and kill those who uphold the law are not heroes... Just as we have fought together to defeat t hose who traffic in narcotics, today I ask Pakistan to intensify its efforts to defeat those who inflict terror."

Those Indians who congratulate themselves that "their" point of view has been finally endorsed by the U.S., fail to realise that U.S. concerns about terrorism stem from U.S. interests, not Indian ones. If Pakistan plays ball on the crucial issue of Osama bin Laden and terrorism, India might find that Washington becomes less harsh on Islamabad. American foreign policy is determined by the national interest, and not extraneous considerations. And, as everyone knows, the national interest is an ever-changi ng concept.

The fact remains that Pakistan today faces enormous pressure to restructure its foreign policy. When Clinton points to the danger of it becoming even more isolated, he is talking of what will happen in the days to come if Islamabad does not correct its c ourse.

By all accounts, Musharraf showed no signs of accommodation. He did not state that he was willing to create conditions that are conducive to a dialogue with India or to stop supporting attacks on civilians across the Line of Control. He repeated the oft- repeated Pakistani view that there was no "official support" for militant groups operating in Kashmir.

The General, speaking at a press conference shortly after Clinton left Islamabad, made it clear that he was not about to take any "unilateral steps" to reduce tensions with India. If India stopped its "repression" in Kashmir, then Pakistan would use its influence over the militant groups to moderate their activities, he said.

Clearly such a quid pro quo is simply unacceptable to India. The time has come for Pakistan to shut down the camps that train terrorists - the time has come for Pakistan to realise that 11 years down the line its strategy in Kashmir is leading now here, no matter what the cost to the people of Kashmir and the Indian security establishment.

Having said that, India must keep its channels of communication open with Pakistan: this is not to suggest that New Delhi rush into a substantive dialogue with Islamabad. Clinton's message to both India and Pakistan was that the dialogue must be resumed. "Normal" diplomatic activity between the two countries should commence. One American scholar recently described the state of communication between India and Pakistan as worse than that between Iran and the U.S.

There is a big lesson for India in Clinton's visit to Islamabad. New Delhi, which was dead set against such a visit, must have realised the benefits of Clinton's plain-speaking. Had Clinton not gone to Islamabad, his message could not have been as loud a nd clear as it was.

New Delhi must also realise the benefits of engagement as opposed to the politics of untouchability. Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Lahore in February 1999 came on the eve of a gruesome massacre of innocent civilians in Kashmir at the hands of "jehadi f orces". Similarly, India at every opportunity must raise the issue of terrorism with Pakistan.

New Delhi must realise that Kargil was not Nawaz Sharif's or Musharraf's baby. It was a Pakistani creation. Upholding the virtues of Sharif and condemning Musharraf (Sharif the "approver" of Kargil and Musharraf the "author") does not make for sound poli cy.

Clinton has come and gone, but the regional situation in South Asia remains much the same - despite his lecture to the Pakistanis and the emerging contours of a new relationship between the U.S. and India. If Clinton was serious about the lecture, then i n the weeks and months ahead one must see concrete evidence of continued engagement between Washington and Islamabad. If that engagement fails, then the pressure will surely begin to mount on the unelected regime.