The government's handling of the hostage crisis and the terms on which it was resolved have led to sharp differences within the National Democratic Alliance government, which could have far-reaching consequences.
VENKITESH RAMAKRISHNAN in New DelhiTHROUGHOUT the eight-day-long hijack drama, the crisis management efforts of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government were characterised by a shocking disunity of purpose and absence of cohesion. Incongruence of opinions on matters of policy and operati onal details were accentuated by sharp differences that had their origins in a crude attempt at power play by sections within the political establishment. The disharmony in the top rungs of the government only served, along with other operational factors , to prolong the ordeal of the hostages at the hands of the hijackers. In the final analysis, it served as a crucial factor that led the government to strike a potentially damaging deal with the hijackers.
In a grim moment of national crisis, the government's responses to rapidly unfolding developments were shown up to be far from sharp. The few efforts at crisis management that were initiated also proved to be ineffectual and failed to inspire trust. Furt her, during the first few days of the hijacking, the government responded with callous insensitivity to the fears and concerns of relatives of the hostages.
There were serious disagreements within the Union Council of Ministers and among leaders of the ruling coalition on the terms on which the release of the hostage should be secured. So serious were the differences that a few Ministers were kept out of sub sequent confabulations on the hostage crisis; a few others, who perhaps felt that their opinions were not being given due consideration, opted to stay away. The failure to take Opposition leaders - and even members of the Union Cabinet - into confidence on the contours of its negotiating strategy drew sharp criticism. Observers believe that the bitterness engendered within the government, and particularly within the principal constituent of the ruling coalition, is bound to have unpleasant long-term con sequences.
CLEAR signals of the disunity in the government came to light at a meeting of the Union Cabinet on December 31, which was held even as steps were under way to implement a deal with the hijackers and secure the release of the hostages. According to highly placed sources in the government, Union Home Minister L.K. Advani and Defence Minister George Fernandes were outspoken in their criticism of the manner in which the hostages-for-terrorists deal had been finalised and the terms of the arrangement. Such a deal, Advani is reported to have said, would "only reinforce India's image as a soft state"; that, he added, was not what "people expected" from the National Democratic Alliance government.
Following up on this, Advani is believed to have sent a two-page handwritten note to Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee recording his reservations over the government's handling of the hostage crisis and the specific terms on which the deal was finalised. Acco rding to informed sources, the note also criticised the failure to detain the hijacked plane at the Amritsar airport, where it landed on December 24.
Neither the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) nor the Home Minister's Office would confirm or deny the contents of the purported note (or even whether Advani wrote such a note). However, sources in the BJP confirmed that the note was indeed written; in their opinion, the document would set off ripples in the political establishment in the near future.
Defence Minister George Fernandes, who was forced to keep a low profile throughout the crisis, has also come out against the government's failure to drive a "hard bargain" during the negotiations with the hijackers. He is reported to have stated at the C abinet meeting on December 31 that the Crisis Management Group (CMG) constituted under Cabinet Secretary Prabhat Kumar and coordinated by Brajesh Mishra, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, had from the beginning failed to take into consideration all the strategic factors while dealing with hijackers. He is reported to have said that the Prime Minister's initial position - against negotiations with the hijackers and the Taliban - had failed to reckon with the possibility that India might be requi red to negotiate with them at a later date. Fernandes argued that the Prime Minister's stand had in effect weakened the government's bargaining power and ultimately compelled it to accept a deal that was unsatisfactory in many ways.
According to a few leaders of parties other than the BJP within the NDA, at the Cabinet meeting Advani and Fernandes articulated their criticism of government policy with a vehemence that would normally be associated with Opposition leaders rather than w ith key members of a ruling coalition.
By all indications, not all this criticism was motivated by differences on policy considerations; evidently, personality factors too were at play. Both Advani and Fernandes are believed to have been miffed at the manner in which a group consisting of Ext ernal Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra took charge of the crisis management efforts, pointedly excluding all others. It was this group, backed by the PMO, that was calling the shots right from Day One. Even officials of the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing, who come under the Home Ministry, were made to report to this group. The Prime Minister had underlined the primacy of this group even at the first meeting he held on December 24.
At the December 24 meeting, which was attended by Advani, Parliamentary Affairs Minister Pramod Mahajan, Civil Aviation Minister Sharad Yadav and Fernandes, Brajesh Mishra and Prabhat Kumar presented a briefing. Significantly, Ministers other than Jaswan t Singh and Sharad Yadav were not assigned specific tasks at this meeting. Sharad Yadav was given the limited role of going to Dubai on December 25 to accompany the first batch of hostages who had been released by the hijackers. Jaswant Singh was involve d in the minute-to-minute operations on the crisis management front. The precise reasons for excluding Advani and Fernandes from the crisis management efforts are not known, but sources in the bureaucracy said that it was linked to the "incompatibility b etween these senior ministers and the Prime Minister's favourite group".
Neither Advani nor Fernandes directly questioned the wisdom of handing over an operation that was overwhelmingly related to the Home and Defence Ministries to a group of bureaucrats and the External Affairs Minister, but their displeasure was evident. Fe rnandes went to the northeastern region in the line of duty, and Advani proceeded to Chennai for the BJP National Executive meeting. Consequently, Advani, who is considered to be the Number Two in the government, did not participate in three Cabinet meet ings during the crisis period.
Significantly, leaders and activists close to Advani and Fernandes gave voice to their criticism of the actions of the CMG. The succession of bungles by the CMG ensured that these critics had adequate ammunition. The failure to capitalise on a situation in which the hijacked aircraft had landed on Indian soil, at Amritsar, came in for particular criticism. It was clear that the CMG had devised no coherent action plan to deal with the hijacking even though by then two and half hours had elapsed since the time the hijackers had commandeered the aircraft.
Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra directly handled all sensitive matters connected with the government's efforts to end the hostage crisis. As part of these efforts the CMG undertook initiatives to use sections of the Deoband-based Muslim clergy to influe nce the Taliban government of Afghanistan. According to Home Ministry officials who were involved in these operations, many among the CMG were clueless about Deobandis or other sections of the Muslim clergy, and the exercise took quite a while.
EVEN as this group was grappling with the fine details of opening a channel of communication with the Taliban and the hijackers, the Prime Minister's public statements showed up an incoherence in the government's approach. The government, he said, would not buckle under acts of terrorism; the hijacking, he added, had "brought home with its full impact the horror of terrorism". He then exhorted the people to "face the terrorist challenge with determination and self-confidence."
However, during his interactions with the relatives of the hostages, the Prime Minister himself betrayed a lack of determination and self-confidence. Evidently exasperated by the barrage of questions on just what the Government was doing to secure the re lease of the hostages, Vajpayee reportedly concluded the meeting with a statement to the effect that if the government's actions failed, "gala kaat ke phaansi chada do" (you can slit my throat and hang me). Needless to say, this acerbic remark did nothing to lift the morale of the hostages' relatives or infuse any degree of determination or self-confidence in them.
Another aspect of the CMG's operations was the extremely secretive manner in which they were carried out. Not only Opposition leaders but even Ministers were kept in the dark about many vital questions connected with the negotiations. So much so that at one of the Cabinet meetings, Trinamul Congress leader and Railway Minister Mamata Banerjee castigated Jaswant Singh for withholding information from Cabinet members.
THE experience of Opposition leaders was even more curious. Communist Party of India (Marxist) general secretary Harkishan Singh Surjeet told Frontline that the government seemed to be playing a game of hide and seek during the operation. "Even th ough the Prime Minister spoke to me on the telephone after the deal was finalised with the hijackers," Surjeet said, "he did not give any details. All that he told me was that the Foreign Minister was going to Kandahar to bring international pressure on the Taliban government and the hijackers. However, later I learnt about the real purpose of the visit." He was at a loss to understand the government's action in hiding such crucial facts, he said.
Other Opposition leaders such as Mulayam Singh Yadav of the Samajwadi Party (S.P.) and A.B. Bardhan of the Communist Party of India (CPI) too criticised the government on this count. Mulayam Singh Yadav told Frontline that the fact that the govern ment took three days to convene the first all-party meeting was adequate evidence of its insincerity about securing the cooperation of the Opposition. "The government had a duty to keep the Opposition informed of various measures it was taking on a natio nal crisis like this. They did not do it. And now the prestige of the country has been lowered," Mulayam Singh said.
Surjeet said that at the all-party meeting on December 27, the first convened by the government, he had emphasised the importance of ensuring the safe return of all the hostages without compromising on national interests. Surjeet said that the deal as fi nalised represented a compromising of national interests. He demanded an independent inquiry to uncover all the facts and fix responsibility for this "blunder". Bardhan said that the Government had painted itself into a corner and eventually had no alter native but to give in to the terrorists.
Congress(I) spokespersons too have raised questions about the hostages-for-terrorists deal finalised by the government. In all likelihood, the Opposition parties, including the Congress(I), will close ranks to question the government on its actions durin g the hijack crisis.
A combined onslaught by the Opposition would doubtless be an embarrassment for the government, but from all accounts, it is not the only quarter from which the government will face criticism. A forceful attack against the Prime Minister and the group of politicians and bureaucrats who handled the crisis management effort is welling up within the NDA and, more significantly, within the BJP. A section of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the parent organisation, is believed to be supportive of this o ffensive, which could take the form of a virulent campaign against Pakistan and Islamic fundamentalist organisations and gradually acquire a Hindu communal character. The message of such a campaign would be that the Prime Minister is too weak to handle t he situation and that the country needs a "strong nationalist"' with "character". Clearly, this campaign is bound to create a new situation within the BJP and the NDA, the outcome of which is hard to fathom at the moment.
