The findings of the pre-poll survey done in Gujarat by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies.
AS the electoral battle in Gujarat moves into the last lap of its long and drawn-out campaign, it is clear that the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party enjoys a substantial lead at the starting point. The pre-poll survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) and co-sponsored by Frontline and NDTV, in the week before the scrutiny of nominations, reveals that the BJP enjoys a comfortable lead of 15 percentage points over the Congress, its only serious rival in the State. When asked whom they will vote for if the elections were held tomorrow, 50.5 per cent of all respondents indicated their preference for the BJP as compared to only 35.8 per cent who preferred the Congress. In the last Assembly elections held in 1998, the BJP enjoyed a 10 percentage point lead over the Congress. The BJP seems not only to have held on to that lead but perhaps added to it. The survey indicates that it will be a direct fight between the BJP and the Congress with very few votes going to the other parties. While it is difficult in a survey to estimate the vote share of small formations, it is clear that none of the other parties had managed to register any significant presence by the time the survey took place.
The setback for the Congress is actually higher than these figures indicate. Between the last Assembly election and now, the then Rashtriya Janata Party (RJP) of Shankarsinh Vaghela, which polled 11.7 per cent votes last time, has merged with the Congress. If the votes for the two parties were merged, the Congress should have had an upper hand at the start of the race. This possibility had not materialised for the Congress in the last parliamentary elections held in 1999. In that election, the BJP led by 7 percentage points in terms of votes and established a lead in 112 Assembly segments in the State. A year ago, the cycle seemed to have turned; a series of defeats in the by-polls and panchayat elections in 2001 indicated that the ruling party faced a near certain defeat in the forthcoming Assembly elections. The pre-poll survey shows that the BJP has not only recovered from that dismal position, but has actually regained the same kind of dominance in the State that it has enjoyed for the last seven years.
The lead for the BJP measured by this survey is much more than the margin of possible error. Even if the survey erred in estimating the vote share by 3 per cent (that is, if it over-estimated the BJP by 3 per cent and underestimated the Congress by 3 per cent), it still means that the BJP enjoys a formidable lead of 9 percentage points over the Congress. The region-wise division of voting preference shows that this lead for the BJP is not concentrated in any one region of the State. Though the sample of the survey is insufficient to offer robust estimates for the regions, the general trend indicates that the BJP's lead exceeds 10 percentage points in all the regions except Central Gujarat. Its lead appears highest in the North and the South, but the Saurashtra-Kutch region that was unaffected by riots also reports a clear lead for the BJP.
If the BJP manages to hold on to anything like this lead until December 12, its victory will be a foregone conclusion. In a straight bipolar contest like Gujarat, a lead of more than 5 percentage points in vote share ensures a comfortable victory in terms of seats in the Assembly. In the last two Assembly elections in the State, the BJP won a two-thirds majority on the basis of a close to 10 percentage point lead in vote share over the Congress. If the trend indicated by the survey continues and the gap in vote share increases this time, it could well be a landslide in favour of the BJP and a worse drubbing for the Congress than it received in the last Assembly elections. The Congress has not won an Assembly election in the State since 1985.
The election outcome, however, is by no means foregone yet. The survey was carried out two to three weeks before the day of polling. Many of the voters did not know who their candidates were. While the State has been in campaign mode for more than six months, the last and final round of campaigning and canvassing was yet to take place. Any late swing could change the picture substantially. The survey does show that the BJP voters are more prone to changing their voting preference between the survey and the date of final elections. When asked if they would vote in the coming Assembly elections the way they had voted in the survey, a greater proportion of BJP voters than Congress voters said they could change their mind. As many as 11 per cent of all the respondents (22 per cent of the BJP voters) who preferred the BJP in the survey said they might change their mind before the final day of polling. Their number is nearly double that of the unsure Congress voters. If half of them switch from the BJP to the Congress, the final result could be much closer than the survey depicts. The other imponderable is the turnout factor. The sections that support the Congress are known to turn out in higher numbers to vote than BJP supporters. Gujarat has witnessed some very low turnout elections in the last one decade. The survey figures do not take this factor into account.
The other interpretation could be that the BJP vote appears more vulnerable, not because its voters are more likely to change, but simply because it has a greater number of floating voters that back the winning party in every election. A look at how traditional voting loyalties relate to the current voting preferences brings this out. The BJP's dominance in the last decade has ensured that around 40 per cent of voters identify themselves as "traditional BJP voters" while the traditional Congress vote bank is around 30 per cent. There are as many as 27 per cent floating voters who do not identify themselves as traditional voters of any one party. The survey indicates that the BJP has retained four-fifth of its traditional voters, a better retention rate than the Congress. The retention rate of its traditional voters for the BJP is 83 per cent compared with 78 per cent for the Congress. The BJP also looks like snatching a little more of the traditional Congress voters than the inroads the Congress can make in the traditional BJP vote. But what gives the BJP a decisive edge is the fact that it enjoys a big lead among the floating voters. Viewed as a percentage of all the voters in the State, the BJP establishes nearly a 6 percentage point lead over the Congress thanks to the floating voters. These votes look more vulnerable because they are a recent and perhaps a temporary acquisition.
Social profile of voteA look at the social profile of the voters of the two major formations indicates a continuation of the patterns witnessed in the last few elections but with some changes. The BJP's rise to power in the last decade has been accompanied by a sharp caste-class polarisation of the electorate. The BJP countered the KHAM (Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasi, Muslim) combine of the Congress by mobilising and polarising the rest of the Hindu society in its favour. A series of anti-reservation and anti-Muslim riots are known to have played a crucial role in this consolidation of the Hindu vote resulting in the rise of the BJP to power. The BJP drew most of its votes from the non-KHAM sections, especially the upper caste, upper class voters including the dominant peasant community of Patidars, while attempting to wean away the Kshatriyas, Adivasis and Dalits. The survey indicates that the BJP has held on to this social base and made some inroads into the traditional social base of the Congress.
The BJP is being backed overwhelmingly by upper caste Hindus. The support of the Patidars (or the Patels) for the BJP is not as high as that recorded by our surveys during the days of Keshubhai Patel, but as many as 74 per cent are still with the BJP. The party has also retained a decisive edge among the lower OBCs. While all the four components of the KHAM combine still lean in favour of the Congress, the lead for the Congress has thinned down. Notwithstanding Shankarsinh Vaghela leading the Congress, the Kshatriyas (an unusual political coalition of some upper caste Rajputs and a large number of upwardly mobile OBCs with Kshatriya surnames) are almost evenly split between the Congress and the BJP with only a 3 percentage point lead for the Congress. Compared with the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, when nearly two-thirds of Adivasi and Dalit voters voted for the Congress, the BJP has made some gains in these sections, especially among Adivasis. The Gujarat riots witnessed significant anti-Muslim violence in the Adivasi dominated areas of Central and North Gujarat.
Similarly, the class profile of voting preference shows that the better-off sections favour the BJP and the poorer sections lean towards the Congress. Here, too, the BJP has made gains compared to the situation in the last elections. Earlier its vote share among the very poor was only one-fifth; this time it is two-fifth. The Congress has lost support among the lowest strata but not made up for it in the upper segments. The urban-rural divide does not show any significant difference. The BJP enjoys the same lead in both the segments. As in the past, women vote more for the Congress. The lead for the BJP is 12 percentage points among women, compared with 18 percentage points among the men. As in the past, the BJP does better among younger voters. All in all, the social profile of the vote does not represent a sharp break from the past. The BJP seems to have managed to recover the social bloc it created in the 1990s.
THE question is: how? What enabled the BJP, a party with sagging popularity and morale, to recover within less than a year and spring back to electoral strength? If the ruling party does manage to hold on to this lead and win the Assembly elections, this question is likely to be debated for a long time to come. At this stage we can look at some of the preliminary answers and see what more needs to be known. The simplest explanation of the re-election of an incumbent government, namely good performance, does not take us very far. A simple question of how satisfied the voters are with the performance of the State government over the last five years elicits a positive response. Two-thirds of the voters express moderate or high satisfaction with the government, a fairly impressive record when compared with other incumbent governments of the recent past. Clearly, the ploy of replacing Keshubhai Patel has helped the BJP in presenting a new look government to the voters. The opinion on this question is split along party lines, but that is to be expected.
But this does not seem to explain the vote. The response itself begs a question: what is it about the performance of the BJP government that voters are satisfied with? A detailed examination of how voters assess the performance of the BJP in different aspects throws a different light on the subject. The responses to queries on the law and order situation, corruption, electricity and livelihood opportunities amount to an indictment of the BJP government. More respondents believe that the things got worse under the BJP regime than those who believe they got better, with a large number saying that the government made no difference. The government's report card is particularly bleak on the crucial question of livelihood and employment ("dhanda-rojgarni sthiti"). Clearly, if the election were fought on questions like this, the BJP would run for cover like most incumbent governments in the recent past. The satisfaction is a little higher for drinking water, thanks to the government's aggressive publicity on Narmada. Interestingly, the overall assessment of the developmental work done by the Government is more positive than any specific item. The question is: how does a government with such indifferent approval for much of its work get an overall positive rating? Are the people voting BJP because they are happy with its work or do they say they are satisfied because they plan to vote for it anyway?
Narendra Modi is also not the answer to this riddle. To be sure, he is the most popular candidate for the Chief Ministerial post, way ahead of Shankarsinh Vaghela of the Congress or Keshubhai Patel of his own party. Another direct question on which of the two Chief Ministers of the BJP was better returns a clear 2:1 verdict (3:1 among the BJP voters) in Modi's favour. An average Gujarati wants to defend Modi against all the charges that he faces within and outside the State. A clear majority of those who respond agree that Narendra Modi has enhanced the prestige of Gujarat, that he is a very effective leader Gujarat has got after a very long time and give him credit for expediting Narmada work. They are keen to defend him against charges of hurting the State's economy, exposing Gujarat to risks of terrorism, and being un-Gujarati in his speeches and campaign style. All this might sound surprising and even shocking to those who read the news on Gujarat from outside the State, but would not surprise those who have followed the tenor of media coverage of the events of the last one year and the campaign itself. To an average Gujarati, Modi is not the villain of the piece. At the same time, it needs to be remembered that he is not the darling of the masses either. Each of the positive assessment of Modi is contested by a significant number. He is not riding a personal popularity wave. His popularity rating is not higher than for many of his predecessors and counterparts. We do not know if much of his popularity rating is not a passing phenomenon. A direct question on how the replacement of Patel by Modi affected the voting pattern does not yield very much. On balance, the move brought a little more electoral support to the BJP than it cost the party. But that too does not explain such a major comeback for the ruling party.
Does the answer then lie in communalism, especially the intense polarisation engineered through the post-Godhra carnage? Has the experiment in this "laboratory of Hindutva" paid off ? This question must not be answered in haste, for it concerns more than the horse-race for the seat of power in Gandhinagar. On this question hinges not just the future of Gujarat and that of Muslims but the future of the democratic enterprise and the very idea of India. The survey provides some pointers and raises many uncomfortable questions.
In response to a direct question, as many as 19 per cent of all respondents say Godhra and post-Godhra developments influence their decision about voting. This figure alone is not enough to conclude that the swing-back towards the BJP is due to communal violence. A detailed analysis of the exact nature of the impact of the recent communal violence on voting decisions does not lead to clear conclusions, for many of these voters could not specify the exact nature of this effect. It would be too hasty and perhaps unjust to think that all these ordinary voters approved of the massacre of Muslims and jumped on to the BJP bandwagon. But it is clear that the BJP has succeeded to keep the Godhra incident as an unrelieved experience on an unresolved tension for a large number of Hindus and use it to its advantage. For many respondents Godhra and post-Godhra violence is something that can overpower all other considerations.
On the face of it, an average Gujarati does not approve of the post-Godhra carnage ("ramkhan" or "hullad"). When asked directly to chose between three possible responses to this violence, two involving degrees of approval and one expressing complete disapproval, an overwhelming majority of 72 per cent said it was "completely unjustified". This is as true of the Hindu respondents as of those who intend voting for the BJP. But this consensus breaks down as soon as we pick up the role of the State during this violence that invited widespread censure and condemnation. On balance more people disapprove the State government's handling of the riots than approve of it, but this is a contentious arena where partisan differences begin to play a role. Similarly, the government's cussed handling of the post-riot relief work also invites popular censure. A majority of the respondents, including a majority of Hindus, believe the government did not do enough or did nothing.
The survey attempted to probe deeper than these direct questions could and went into the popular psyche on the communal issue. A series of statements were read out to the respondents and they were asked if they agreed with them. The answers do not reveal as communally polarised a situation as is sometimes believed or projected. But it does bring out deep prejudices, social distance and hostility. On balance, most of the soft communal statements won approval from a majority of Hindu respondents. A majority agreed that one cannot have the same empathy for followers of other religions as one has for one's own, and that democracy means the rule of the majority community, that religious conversions and inter-religious marriages should be banned by law. The majority of Hindu respondents are not directly opposed to democracy but hold a strongly majoritarian understanding of what democracy should mean. But all the responses do not fall in this line. A general statement about all religions being the same also gets approval, while the demolition of Babri Masjid invites more disapproval than approval. Besides, it should be noted that the approval for communal statements is seriously contested by a large number of Gujarati Hindus.
A simple question brings out how some of the prejudices are anchored in ignorance or disinformation. When asked to guess the number of Muslims in the State, only one out of five respondents who ventured a guess came anywhere close to the actual figure of 9 per cent. Three-quarters of the respondents over-estimated the Muslim population, with about half the respondents believing that they were more than 20 per cent in the State. Education made little difference here. Graduates are as likely to believe in disinformation on the Muslim population as are illiterates. Interestingly, Muslims themselves participate in this myth-building. Four out of five Muslim respondents overestimate their numeric strength.
It would be hard to provide clear survey evidence that the BJP's apparent comeback is directly related to the anti-Muslim carnage and the communal polarisation. But the survey does provide some clear pointers. If all the communalism-related questions are put together to form a measure of intensity of communal feelings, we see a direct association between this measure and the vote for the BJP. The higher the communal feeling, the greater the tendency to vote for the BJP, even disregarding the performance issues. The Congress leads only among the minority of `secular'-minded Gujaratis. The other evidence comes by classifying all the survey locations into those affected by the communal carnage and those unaffected by it. The BJP's lead over the Congress is 10 percentage points in the non-affected area but goes up to 24 percentage points in the violence-affected areas. At least in the short run, the anti-Muslim violence seems to be delivering electoral dividends to the BJP.
There is another very disturbing pattern. In India, unlike many Western democracies, there has been little association between peoples' religious practices and their political behaviour. In many ways, this disassociation provided space for secular politics. Even the rise of the BJP in the last decade did not change this pattern. The CSDS surveys of the last two elections found little relationship between voting for the BJP and being a practising Hindu - not even in Gujarat. For the first time, this survey reveals a clear pattern. Those who worship regularly and participate more in collective religious activities more frequently are more likely to vote for the BJP. The BJP's lead over the Congress among the very regular and practising Hindus is as high as 44 percentage points. This should be seen in the context of 40 per cent of the respondents reporting that their level of participation in religious activities has gone up in the last ten years. This perhaps also helps to understand why some of the deep caste divisions of the State seem to operate with less intensity in this election. In many ways, this one dimensional and political Hinduism is exactly the result that the "laboratory of Hindutva" would like to produce. Understanding this model and thinking of ways to recover and expand spaces for the politics of tolerance is the challenge posed by Gujarat.
Yogendra Yadav is a Fellow at the CSDS, Delhi and Director of Lokniti, a research programme of the CSDS. P.M. Patel is Professor, Department of Political Science, MS University of Baroda.
