In dread of democracy

Yasushi Akashi, Japan's special peace envoy to Sri Lanka. - SENAVIDANAGAMA/AFP

There is a cold calculation behind the LTTE's decision not to attend the donors' meeting in Tokyo: it does not want to agree to the principles of peace and democracy as desired by the donor community.

THE peace process for Sri Lanka facilitated by Norway and involving the United National Front government of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) led by Velupillai Prabakaran has reached an impasse. Raising concerns about the progress of the process, the LTTE announced on April 21 its unilateral withdrawal from the negotiations. The Tigers also stated that they would keep out of the international donors' conference scheduled to be held in Tokyo on June 9 and 10.

The present strategy of the Tigers of keeping the talks suspended on the one hand and refusing to go to Tokyo on the other has baffled observers of the Sri Lankan political situation. Obtaining large-scale financial assistance from international donors was regarded as a key factor motivating the LTTE to continue participating in the peace process. Boycotting Tokyo, therefore, did not appear to be a serious option for the Tigers. Analysts felt that the Tigers' threat to boycott the Tokyo conference constituted merely a subterfuge to gain from Colombo concessions in the politico-military sphere.

When the LTTE stuck to this hardline stance despite international pressure, it seemed that there were other reasons behind it. It appeared that the issue of attending the Tokyo meet was no longer merely a bargaining chip: the plan to boycott it had a definite objective. Evidence seemed to indicate that the real objective of the LTTE was two-fold. First, to avoid attending the Tokyo talks at all costs. If that objective failed, the second strategy was to "sanitise" the agenda in such a manner that things would be favourable to it. The political haggling that it engaged in smacked of filibustering aimed at prolonging a state of uncertainty till the desired end was reached.

A BRIEF sequential overview of events would help in identifying the Tokyo "allergy" symptoms displayed by the LTTE. The Tigers' decision to keep out of the conference was initially perceived as a knee-jerk response to the snub it received when the United States refused to accommodate its representatives at a seminar on aid to Sri Lanka held in Washington on April 14 and 15. Since the LTTE has been designated as a foreign terrorist organisation by the U.S. State Department since October 8, 1997, the U.S. refused to grant visas to Tiger representatives. The seminar was supposed to be a preparatory exercise for the Tokyo meeting.

At the conclave attended by more than 35 aid-giving countries and international organisations, unofficial pledges to the tune of $3.5 billion to be paid over a period of three years were made. These pledges were to be formalised in Tokyo. Realistically it was expected that in Tokyo, Sri Lanka would receive at least $1 billion a year, for three years, depending of course on the progress of the peace process.

Initially donor nations and agencies were reluctant to give money until the core issues were resolved and a permanent peace was ensured. The Government of Sri Lanka prevailed upon the donors to allocate money for urgent measures of rehabilitation, reconstruction, resettlement and medium-term development. It was argued that such a generous approach was necessary to foster and concretise peace. Thus the cart of development was put before the horse that is conflict resolution.

The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE claimed to have entered a partnership at the first round of direct talks in Sattahip, Thailand in September 2002. It was announced that both would seek and accept jointly international aid for rehabilitation and development. When Norway hosted a conference in Oslo last November, the Tigers were prominent participants. The LTTE made it appear to its Tamil constituency that participation in the peace process had bestowed respectability and international legitimacy on it. This illusion was rudely shattered when the U.S. kept the Tigers out of the Washington event and thereby demonstrated that they remained "terrorists".

Thereafter, a piqued LTTE charged Colombo with betrayal and began levelling accusations against it. While confirming its decision to boycott the Tokyo meet, the LTTE declared that the Sri Lankan government was focussing only on the Sinhala-majority South and had neglected the Tamil-majority North-East. It cited documents relating to its poverty alleviation programme called "Regaining Sri Lanka" as proof of this.

The Tigers, however, conveniently ignored the Special Needs Assessment Study of the North-East. This study was commissioned by a sub-committee chaired jointly by the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The assessment was made by a team of 70 economists from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who in their 67-page report gave pride of place to recommendations made by the LTTE. The North-East assessment report stipulated that $459 million be allocated for projects that were needed immediately and another $921 million for medium-term projects in the North-East. In spite of this, the LTTE publicly accused Colombo of planning to ignore the interests of the North-East at the Tokyo conference. This neglect, from its viewpoint, justified a boycott of Tokyo.

This naturally led to the international community mounting pressure on the LTTE to reconsider its decision. Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen and Japanese special envoy Yasushi Akashi went to Kilinochchi to persuade the Tiger supremo V. Prabakaran to reconsider the decision. Japan set a May 14 deadline.

Given the fact that the war-ravaged North-East was in urgent need of rehabilitation, no organisation claiming to represent Sri Lankan Tamils would have spurned opportunities for the region's development assistance. The Tigers, too, were deemed to be a responsible group sensitive to the needs of the people. A boycott by them of the Tokyo summit was, therefore, unthinkable.

Besides there was an element of absurd theatre in this exercise. Why should the LTTE, upset over the U.S. cold-shouldering it, keep out of Tokyo when Japan was bending backwards to welcome it? All this made political observers feel that the LTTE was threatening a boycott only to extract concessions from Colombo with regard to matters such as High Security Zones, Maritime Zones and so on.

The Tigers, however, remained unyielding and went on to up the ante. LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham wrote to Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgessen demanding a full-fledged interim administrative structure for the North-East that would be dominated by the LTTE. All money allocated to the North-East should come under the control of this interim body. The LTTE's position was that there was no worthwhile structure available to utilise properly international aid for the North-East. As such there was no use attending the Tokyo meet and getting more aid without setting up a viable mechanism such as the interim administration, the LTTE said.

The LTTE had, right from the beginning of the peace talks last year, wanted such an interim administration to be set up. But when representatives of the Sri Lankan government explained the problems involved in forming such a set-up, the Tigers shelved the proposal. Now the Tigers have resurrected it. The LTTE wants concrete guarantees from Prime Minister Wickremasinghe if it is to review its decision on attending the Tokyo conference.

This, again, raised suspicions that the LTTE was not really keen on going to Japan but would rather opt out of it. The relatively maximal demand of an interim administration seemed to reinforce this feeling. Statements made by LTTE political wing chief S.P. Tamilchelvan in an interview that he gave certain Colombo newspapers seemed to confirm this. In a reversal of the LTTE's earlier position, Tamilchelvan said that the Tigers were not requesting any postponement of the Tokyo conference. He seemed to evince no interest in the matter and conveyed the impression that it was Wickremasinghe's problem.

The LTTE's intransigence on the issue seemed evident when Wickremasinghe submitted his proposals to the Norwegian envoy, Eric Solheim, to set up a mechanism on the lines of an interim administrative structure for the North-East. In a letter written by Balasingham to Wickremasinghe on May 30, the LTTE rejected the proposed structure. Thus it seemed somewhat obvious that the LTTE was not interested in going to Japan but was only pursuing a hard line with the motive of absenting itself from the Tokyo talks if and when it took place.

The LTTE mindset was revealed further when a Tamil daily, Sudaroli, published an editorial on May 28 warning the Tigers that the Tokyo event was a trap and that the LTTE should not rush into it. The newspaper organisation maintains very close connections with LTTE leaders and has in the past accurately reflected Tiger sentiments. If the editorial was a correct index of the LTTE attitude, it meant that the Tigers were apprehensive to the point of paranoia about attending the Tokyo meeting.

DETAILS gathered by this writer through interaction with knowledgeable diplomatic sources in Colombo as well as with Tamil circles close to the LTTE hierarchy, revealed the factors behind the LTTE's reluctance to attend the Tokyo event. Even though the LTTE tries to take the moral high ground and justifies its action or inaction on the ground of its being in the interests of the Tamil people, its real intention is to safeguard its own interests. The LTTE feels threatened by the combined efforts of the international donor community to compel it to adhere to democratic norms, demilitarise and conform to its obligations as stipulated in the ceasefire agreement.

The international agencies and donor nations backing the peace process are concerned about the LTTE's flagrant violation of the ceasefire obligations and democratic norms. The continuing incidents of violence, abductions, conscription, assassinations and so on are creating strong doubts about the LTTE's bona fides. Allocating massive amounts of money on carte blanche basis to the LTTE is not desirable from the donors' point of view. Realising the limitations of the Colombo government as well as the facilitator, Norway, in this regard, some Western nations took the initiative of trying to link aid to firm adherence by the LTTE to democratic norms and human rights.

After intensive discussions in Colombo, a group of diplomats, with the approval of their respective governments, came up with the proposal to get the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government to sign a document incorporating the basic principles as a benchmark document. Although both sides were to be signatories, it was obvious that the non-democratic, authoritarian LTTE will bear the greater pressure. A draft titled "Basic Principles for Peace and Development" was formulated on April 3 in Colombo.

The LTTE has, during the peace talks, made several promises regarding democratic and human rights norms. These assurances have for the most part been observed only in the breach. What the international community was trying to do was to hold the LTTE to its promises. The donors also regarded the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to be custodians of the funds they were going to allocate; hence they required greater accountability and a visible improvement in performance on their part. Thus aid was not going to be given easily. Firm assurances were to be obtained. Continuous flow of aid was to be conditional on reciprocal adherence to certain norms. Although both sides were to sign this draft, it was the LTTE that was going to be affected if it flouted democratic norms.

AMONG the key issues incorporated in the "Basic Principles" agreement was the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement. This included unrestricted access to all areas for the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, but the SLMM has not been allowed entry into LTTE-controlled areas in the Wanni or even the eastern hinterland. It also meant a ban on the recruitment and conscription of children, abductions, extortion in the name of taxation, assassination of political opponents by the LTTE and so on.

It also meant that the LTTE should allow local government elections, for a start in regions controlled by it. This would be followed by a greater level of democratisation. The LTTE would also have to comply with the human rights road map drafted at the sixth round of talks in Hakone, Japan. There were also going to be strict accounting procedures for aid distribution. Issues such as demilitarisation and demobilisation were to be addressed later. The donor community sought to use conditional aid as the leverage to get the LTTE to comply.

The Basic Principles draft was not on the agenda at the Washington meeting. It was, however, discussed informally and approved. Thereafter letters were sent out to both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. The Basic Principles draft was enclosed. The letter explained the rationale behind the Basic Principles document. The letter stated as follows (as excerpted):

"Action against these principles presents both an opportunity and challenge for all stakeholders: negotiating parties, civil society and donors. The June 2003 Tokyo conference provides an opportunity for the donor community to pledge its commitment to medium term development in Sri Lanka. In order to ensure sustained resource flows of funds pledged in Tokyo, the donor community seeks a commitment to action by the negotiating parties, based on the already agreed basic principles.

"Donors see this as a partnership. The donors have outlined a framework linking development assistance to the achievement of positive milestones in the peace process within these basic principles. This framework is outlined in the attached paper and annex.

"We look forward to opening a dialogue with you on the elements outlined in the paper. Based on these discussions, between now and the Tokyo Conference we propose working with representatives from the Peace Negotiating team and civil society to agree on the milestones needed to measure concrete progress on the implementation of these basic principles. A periodic review process to assess the extent of progress is also needed."

The donors thought this issue could be discussed at the seventh round of talks in Thailand scheduled from April 29 to May 2. Thereafter they hoped to interact further with the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, and develop the concept. The aim was to have a comprehensive agreement with reciprocal deadlines linking human rights and democracy with promised aid.

The LTTE, however, has upset the process by its defiant and unyielding attitude. There is a cold calculation behind its decision. The Tigers just do not want aid with strings attached. Given its authoritarian, anti-democratic structure, the LTTE is in no mood to agree to the basic principles of peace and democracy as desired by the donor community. It would prefer to boycott the Tokyo meet rather than agree to relax its iron grip on the Tamil people and help foster democracy and human rights.

Already the LTTE's recalcitrant approach has nullified the substantial progress made by the donor community in developing the Basic Principles document. There seems to be no possibility that the Tigers would be pressured to commit themselves to the document. If the Tigers do decide to attend the Tokyo event, they will first make sure that they will not be subjected to unwelcome pressure in any way.

It is transparent that the LTTE's position about attending the Tokyo conference is not driven by any concern for the Tamil people but only a desire to preserve its authoritarian, anti-democratic structure. By defying international opinion, it has only alienated itself further from others.