Inviting India

The state and non-state parties to the Sri Lankan conflict want India to play a more active role.

B. MURALIDHAR REDDY in Colombo

AS Sri Lanka grapples with yet another round of ethnic conflict, the spotlight is on India. It is no surprise, since the island-nation is a mere 18 nautical miles away from India. With the wave of assassinations and bomb explosions reaching a new high in the past few weeks, the debate on the India factor is getting shriller. It revolves around questions such as whether India can afford to be a silent spectator to the events happening in its neighbourhood, what options it has before it, and what could be the possible scenarios.

Ironically, the various parties involved in the guessing game have their own expectations of India. The clear indications from New Delhi about the nature of its approach to the latest phase of turbulence has had little dampening impact on the expectations of key players. The perceptions in Sri Lanka on the influence India could exert in determining the course of events could actually be a cause for anxiety for New Delhi. For India, no common denominator is available from the varied expectations to define its role and carve out a please-all strategy. It is as if every interested party wants New Delhi to become a partner in its own pursuits. In other words, no one is ready to concede an unfettered role to India.

The ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and its chief and President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapakse, has not missed a single opportunity to talk about the importance of India and the role it can play in helping the government tackle the turmoil. Since assuming office in November 2005, Rajapakse has invoked the India factor and its relevance repeatedly in finding a lasting solution. However, these pronouncements are short on details.

However, senior Ministers and also the Foreign Office do spell out in private some of the things New Delhi could do in the short and medium term. The emphasis appears more on military rather than political involvement. They want greater military cooperation from New Delhi to take on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealem in the context of the latter's newly acquired capabilities. In addition, they want India to make public statements on the need for a solution within the framework of a united Sri Lanka in order to disabuse the minds of the Tigers of any illusion that one day India would reconcile to a Tamil Eelam. The government wants India to convince the various constituencies in Sri Lanka of the virtues of federalism or what is often referred to as the `Indian model' as the ultimate solution.

Colombo is of the view that New Delhi has not paid enough attention to the growing military power of the LTTE, particularly in the context of the danger it poses to stability in the region. There have been murmurs about the insufficient appreciation on the part of India of the aerial raids conducted by the Sri Lankan military targeting the military airport supposedly built by the LTTE in the north. The exhortations by New Delhi on the adverse effect of collateral damage and civilian casualties, of course behind closed doors, are viewed as proof of India's indifference to the ground realities. Colombo's logic is that it is a war-like situation, if not war, and India should give the necessary leeway to Sri Lanka to deal with it, without raising too many questions.

The LTTE, the principal non-state party to the conflict, has its own expectations. Anton Balasingham, chief negotiator and ideologue, in a much-publicised interview to an Indian television channel, chose to articulate them. "As far as that event [Rajiv Gandhi assassination] is concerned, I would say it is a great tragedy, a monumental historical tragedy for which we deeply regret and we call upon the Government of India and the people of India to be magnanimous to put the past behind and to approach the ethnic question in a different perspective," he said.

Asked whether the LTTE could assure India that an event like the Rajiv Gandhi assassination would not happen again, Balasingham replied: "We have made pledges to the Government of India that under no circumstances we will act against its interest and that ever since the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, India played a detached role. What we feel is India should actively involve [itself] in the peace process."

It is a clever-by-half approach on the part of the LTTE. Without acknowledging its role in the assassination of the former Prime Minister, Balasingham tries to tell India to forget the past and focus on the rights of Tamils. He wants India to team up with the LTTE to take up the cudgels with the Sri Lankan government on behalf and in the name of Tamils.

Balasingham did not bother to clarify the LTTE's position as stated in its `Oslo communique', where it has returned to the position of `self-determination' and an independent Eelam state. There is wide consensus within and outside Sri Lanka that the appeal made by the LTTE for greater Indian involvement is a result of its own isolation in the international community. Perhaps it was a renewed effort to reach out to constituencies in Tamil Nadu that were disillusioned with the LTTE after the assassination.

The other non-state actors from the Tamil-speaking community concede that they have lost ground to the LTTE thanks to the policy of systematic elimination and co-option followed by the LTTE supremo V. Prabakaran in the past two decades. These parties have their own wish lists. They would like India to help them regain lost ground, particularly in the North and East. Besides, they want New Delhi to put pressure on Colombo to ensure that the legitimate grievances of Tamils are addressed and the process for genuine power-sharing between the South and the North and East is put on the fast track.

Veteran Tamil leader and president of the Tamil United Liberation Front V. Anandasangaree, in a lengthy letter to Rajapakse in the last week of June, made a strong case for the adoption of the `Indian model' to resolve the ethnic conflict and to isolate the LTTE. He argued for a sincere attempt by Colombo to end the conflict, on the grounds that the LTTE would settle for nothing less than Eelam, and said that a workable model on devolution of powers could be the beginning of a strategy to isolate the Tigers.

The non-LTTE political forces also desire a greater role from India in encouraging those who are willing to take on the LTTE. Of course, they have no clear thinking on how New Delhi could help them in regaining lost ground in the Tamil areas.

India, on its part, is watching the situation closely and sticking to a nuanced position emphasising the need for an `expeditious' solution to the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Sri Lankan society. A statement issued after a meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera in the third week of June said that the Prime Minister had conveyed India's abiding commitment to the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka even while the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Sri Lankan society needed to be addressed expeditiously. It said he emphasised the need to make all possible efforts to strengthen the ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE and to work towards a devolution package that would win the approval of the major political parties and restore ethnic harmony.

The statement went on to add that Samaraweera conveyed to the Prime Minister that for his government, war was not an option and that it remained committed to a political solution. The government had invited the LTTE for talks to strengthen the ceasefire, he said. At the same time, an all-party conference in Sri Lanka decided to set up an advisory committee to look into different variants of a devolution package. India more or less repeated its position a day after the assassination of the deputy Army chief of Sri Lanka Lt. Gen. P. Kulatunga, on June 26 by a suspected suicide squad member of the LTTE on the outskirts of Colombo. Condemning the killing, India made it known that there could be no military solution to the ethnic conflict.