VOLTE-FACE ON IRAN

United States President George W. Bush. - BRENDAN SMIAL OWSKI/AFP

Is India's vote against Iran's nuclear programme at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting only an aberration or a shift in foreign policy? In any case, the government's weak defence of its action fails to conceal the arm-twisting by the United States.

Woh baat saare fasane me jiska zikr na tha / woh baat unko bohat nagavar guzri hai - Faiz Ahmed Faiz

(The matter which did not figure in the entire story/Is the one which offended her the most.)

UNSPOKEN, unspeakable considerations govern the United States' drive against Iran. India's vote in support of the U.S.-sponsored resolution on Iran in the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on September 24 in Vienna is one of those major episodes in India's foreign policy whose consequences will long be with us. Its impact on India's prestige in the world will be considerable; not least in the eyes of those who were able to make it bend.

It would be well worth the while of any school of journalism to prescribe press comment on the vote as a case study. The majority reflected the official line, filled in what officialdom left unsaid and revealed a lot. The chorus was impressive, as indeed it has been on similar occasions.

Category `A' comprises profuse assurances of help to Iran by getting a deferral to the United Nations Security Council by two months. Category `B' comprises five elements: it is not in India's interests to have a nuclear-armed Iran; Iran has been hostile to India in the past; the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President makes Iran a theocracy; at stake was the India-U.S. nuclear deal of July 18; and finally, the U.S. is, after all, committed to make India "a great power". Every one of those five in Category `B' can be sourced to some correspondents of standing. They conflict diametrically with the profession of help to Iran (Category `A').

There have been times before, to be sure, when India voted contrary to the lofty principles it proclaims. But Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi made those decisions in New Delhi under the compulsion of circumstances, in the light of the national interest and in exercise of free judgment. The Iran vote came after a prolonged twist of India's arm and the noise of the cracking bones reverberated at home and abroad. India was seen to wilt under pressure.

The trend can yet be arrested without impairing the national interest or friendship with the U.S. The falsehoods trotted out in defence must be exposed as also the major premises in the thinking of Indian supporters of the vote. It is no help to Iran to join in pronouncing a death sentence, unjustly and immorally, and flaunt a two months' stay of execution as a diplomatic achievement. M.K. Bhadra Kumar, who was Joint Secretary in the Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, has nailed to the counter the lie about Iran's hostility by testifying publicly on the basis of his personal knowledge. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao sent Dinesh Singh, then Minister for External Affairs, to Iran to seek its support ahead of the meeting of the U.N. and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). "Iran ensured that no harm was done to India and that India did not have to come to the witness box... . there are many parallels that can be drawn between 1994 and now; both IAEA and the OIC work on the basis of consensus; but, after Iran's objection, consensus was lost and the resolution on Jammu and Kashmir could not be tabled. India could have made a reciprocal gesture when the IAEA vote came up." India's vote was crucial.

Questioning the logic of this "unprincipled and cowardly" vote against Iran, Bhadra Kumar recalled that Iran's gesture had come at a time when India was going through a difficult period. "There was an economic crisis and communal tension. India was vulnerable to American pressure and Kashmir was witnessing perhaps the bloodiest phase coupled with the Clinton Administration's unhelpful attitude" (Asian Age, October 5).

Everyone knows of Iran's help in the fight against the Taliban, on access to Central Asia and much else. But if the past is at all to be recalled, why forget the U.S. record? Even now, as it seeks to impose an exclusive relationship with India - "with us or without us" - it feels itself free to forge deals inimical to India's interests. China's Ambassador to the U.N. Wang Guomaya said on August 3 that the U.S. Ambassador John Bolton and he had joined hands to block the G-4 resolution on the U.N. Security Council's expansion. "We agreed to make sure our interests are being maintained."

What of the U.S. President George W. Bush's credentials as a secularist? "I am driven with a mission from God. God would tell me, `George go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan.' And I did," he told a Palestinian delegation (The Guardian, October 8). Andrew Blackstock, director of the Christian Socialist Movement, aptly remarked: "History is littered with examples of people doing the most bizarre and sometimes wicked things on this basis." He advised Bush to fulfil "the needs of the poor".

Ahmadinejad defeated the powerful Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani at the polls because he was perceived to be a champion of the poor and a crusader against corruption. Bush's indifference to the poor was well described by Professor Robert Jensen (Hindustan Times, September 26) and his corrupt regime by Frank Rich ("The Republican culture of corruption", The New York Times, October 4). Why must Indians echo American jibes at Iran's leader? It is irrelevant to the vote anyway.

What is relevant is India's national interest of which India's "neocons" have a simplistic, vulgar notion; as they have of the relevance of morality in foreign affairs. Realpolitik is not synonymous with, nor is the national interest served by, mindlessly "acting dirty". The subject is as ancient as it is complex. "All government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter. We balance inconveniences; we give and take; we remit some rights that we may enjoy some others... . Man acts from motives relative to his interests... ," Edmund Burke sagely remarked.

Was this balance struck after a cool analysis? Three questions are relevant. Precisely when did India perceive a nuclear Iran as a threat? Neither the External Affairs Ministry nor the Defence Ministry's Annual Report (2004-5) mentions this, nor did any Minister or official before August 2005. Secondly, when did India pledge its vote to the U.S.? Lastly, were India's leaders and officials unaware of the U.S.' real objectives in its drive against Iran?

The Economist reports (October 22) that the nuclear deal of July 18 "was negotiated hastily and in secret by a clutch (sic.) of senior administration officials". Indian negotiators were spared. American diplomacy is built around "linkages" which the powerful alone can impose. "No formal requests were made, and no formal responses were given." Action by the other side was "noted" (Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger, page 753). The U.S. imposes unstated linkages beyond the written accord.

India is not a pushover. If the U.S. flaunts its Congress, India has its Lok Sabha. The French President Charles De Gaulle knew how to resist pressure; even risk a breach. Submit once, and you are asked to submit again and yet again. Witness U.S. Ambassador David Mulford's insolent remarks, on October 6, on foreign direct investment (FDI) limits in the insurance sector. His later explanation is unworthy of credence.

Though not a part of the July 18 deal, the Iran issue did figure in the talks. This brings us to the dog that did not bark. U.S. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns briefed the press that very day and mentioned a host of matters that were discussed Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma, Bangladesh and "the wider region and South Asia". It is not odd that Iran was omitted. That would have been a giveaway. Collaboration on Iran had begun and was reflected in the IAEA on August 11, Burns later revealed. There was yet no promise on the vote. But India knew the U.S. aims and its true agenda.

Is it not strange that while the U.S. feels endangered by Iran's nuclear programme, its neighbours do not? Russia has invested millions in the Bushehr nuclear reactor, on which it concluded a deal in 1995. It is all for engagement with Iran in order to secure proper safeguards without undermining Iran's rights to peaceful use of atomic energy. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke candidly on October 15 after her talks with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow. Asked if Iran had "the right to enrich" uranium, Lavrov replied that "according to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and according to the Charter [sic.] of the IAEA, the countries that are participants to this treaty have this right" (emphasis added throughout). In contrast, Rice said it was "not an issue of rights; this is an issue of whether or not the fuel cycle can be trusted to Iran". It is not Iran but the West which flouts the NPT.

Remember, on August 13 Bush said that "the use of force" against Iran was an option albeit "the last" one but "you know we've used force in the recent past to secure our country". And this was said on Israeli television.

Is Iran such a threat to the U.S., "dangerous enough to justify a war, which is what the U.S. and sometimes Israel seem to think?" Martin Wollacott of The Guardian asked (The Hindu, May 14, 2005). He warned that "manufactured crises can easily get out of hand... the inescapable fact is that Iran would not be in breach of its treaty obligations".

At the last NPT Review Conference, the U.S. tried to rewrite it to reduce the right to enrichment and failed. Wollacott asked against whom could Iran possibly use nuclear weapons without inviting ruin, the U.S. or Israel. "The conclusion must be that an Iranian weapon might constrain Israel in their dealings with Iran, but it would not threaten them or anybody else." It is this unspoken consideration to which Faiz alluded that drives the U.S. to a frenzy. India could not possibly have missed this aspect to the U.S. agenda. Bush has "winked at Brazil's decision to build a uranium-enrichment plant", The Economist noted (October 22).

Iran's nuclear programme began nearly 40 years ago. An American company provided 93 per cent enriched fuel for a research reactor. The aim was to acquire a complete fuel cycle, including the production of 23,000 MW electricity by nuclear power plants. Iran signed the NPT and entered into a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on June 19, 1973. The NPT binds nuclear weapon states to work for nuclear disarmament, which they do not, as India repeatedly complained before going nuclear. Prof. John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, a member of the "realist" school, holds that "the country that acquires nuclear weapons becomes unattackable. It is precisely for that reason that it wants them". Witness: North Korea.

Kenneth M. Pollack holds that "in the fall of 2003, it [Iran] seemed more determined than ever to acquire nuclear weapons as the only way to prevent the U.S. from invading Iran, the same way it had Afghanistan and Iraq". In January 2002, Bush dubbed it a part of the "axis of evil" with Iraq and North Korea.

He adds: "For the Iranians, the one problem with the transparent approach was that they feared (and still do) that if all of their nuclear facilities were overt, the U.S. and/or Israel could mount a military strike against them" (The Persian Puzzle; Random House; pages 365-6). He served in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Council. "Never before had post-revolutionary Iran been so willing to help the United States as it had in Afghanistan and Iraq."

The NPT enables a country to acquire legally every step in uranium enrichment and plutonium extraction. It bars signatories from taking the finished fissile material and loading it into a bomb. Iran has natural uranium deposits and has opened a uranium mine. It can become self-sufficient. It can acquire the nuclear option without going nuclear - as India and Pakistan did. Iran cannot be deterred from this by threats of force or attempts to "overthrow the Iranian government via convert action", as some in the U.S. Administration advocated. Pollock rejects this as a good "realist". He criticises the U.S. insistence that Iran comply with its demands "before lifting the sanctions it has imposed". Iran claims that the U.S. has frozen $30-40 billion of its assets. He advocates "the Grand Bargain" with Iran of which the nuclear issue will be a part. Bush and his team scorn diplomacy.

The Director-General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, told an American publicist a few months ago that Teheran is seeking a grand bargain - a comprehensive normalisation of relations with the West in exchange for concessions on nuclear issues. "The prize they seek, above all, is better relations with the U.S."

Iran was always under the U.S. scanner and that of the IAEA. ElBaradei, an independent and upright man as his reports on Iraq and Iran show, walked a tight rope. He rejected U.S. pressure, scolded Iran for its lack of candour but was determined to be fair. He went to Iran for the first time in 2000 and again in 2003. Prof. Piroz Mojtabed Zadeh, professor of geopolitics in Teheran University and Director of the Eurosevic University based in London, and Kavah L. Afrasiabi, an Iranian political scientist living in the U.S., explain what has been afoot with detachment (International Herald Tribune; August 12, 2005). Iran's main concern was not to be forced by the European Union-3 (E.U.-3 - the United Kingdom, France and Germany) and the U.S. "to become permanently dependent on foreign nuclear fuel sources. No Iranian politician, let alone the newly installed President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, could be expected to jeopardise his political career by accepting such a demand". In return, Iran promised consistently "objective guarantees of the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme". It accepted more and more safeguards over time. Last March, it offered expanded monitoring even beyond the scope of the intrusive Additional Protocol.

To the U.S., a report by David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science & International Security (ISIS) in Washington on December 12, 2002, came as a boon. "Satellite images of two sites in Iran show the construction of secret nuclear fuel cycle facilities, according to ISIS assessments and confidential sources. The facilities in the two satellite images appear related to the production of enriched uranium and heavy water, two materials that may be used in a civil nuclear programme or in the production of nuclear weapons." But the report fairly added: "Under the Safeguards Agreement, Iran is not required to allow IAEA inspections of a new nuclear facility until six months before nuclear material is introduced into it."

One of the sites, near a town called Arak, was a heavy water plant under construction. The second, at Natanz, has a fuel fabrication facility, but was suspected to be a uranium enrichment plant: "most likely type of enrichment plant is a gas centrifuge facility. The facility does not appear to be operating". The ISIS also added: "Iran stated at the IAEA General Conference in September 2002 in Vienna that it was pursuing a `long term plan' to construct `nuclear power plants and the associated technologies such as fuel cycle' facilities. A few years ago, a senior Iranian official told ISIS that Iran was pursuing a complete fuel cycle." Concern was understandable; not so political exploitation of the discovery. The sole issue was how to increase transparency. This required engagement. The IAEA Director-General has consistently advocated that. The West (the U.S. and the European Union) preferred duress. Iran had informed the IAEA of plans to build the plant in Arak in May 2002.

Centrifuges at Natanz came from Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's Wal-Mart. Traces of uranium hexafluoride, feedstock for enrichment, found in them were traced to that source. The Director-General accepted Iran's explanation and absolved it of breach of NPT on this score. Iran admitted it had acquired two tonnes of slightly refined uranium called "yellowcake" from China and uranium hexafluoride and uranium from Pakistan in two other lesser degrees of refinement. It was building a plant near Isfahan to convert yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride. These disclosures were belated; but the process, surely, did not stop there. The Director-General would report breaches as well as progress in Iran's cooperation, which Siddharth Varadarajan documented in his outstanding reportage (The Hindu, September 21-23). The IAEA found discrepancies in utilisation in as many as 15 countries. The U.S.' ally South Korea refused to let the IAEA inspect facilities connected with its laser enrichment programme and later admitted uranium enrichment in secret to a grade sufficient for fissile material. "The only major unexplained issue is the extent of Iran's research work on the P-2 centrifuge," ElBaradei concludes.

As late as October 3, 2004, ElBaradei said: "So far, I see nothing that could be called an imminent danger. I have seen no nuclear weapons programme in Iran. What I have seen is that Iran is trying to gain access to nuclear enrichment technology, and so far there is no danger from Iran." The situation has not changed since, surely.

Varadarajan's reportage and R. Ramachandran's succinct summation (Frontline, October 21) make a survey of some seven reports of ElBaradei between June 6, 2003, and September 2, 2005, and the Board's resolutions on them from June 19, 2003, to September 24, 2005, superfluous in what is mainly an analysis of the implication of the shift in India's policy.

Two landmarks bear recalling the Paris Agreement between the E.U.-3 and Iran on November 15, 2004, and the E.U.-3's rescission of it in August 2005. It is this move which has exacerbated matters. The E.U.-3's intervention was welcomed. It signed with Iran the Teheran Statement on October 21, 2003. Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol and "voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA". The E.U. recognised Iran's rights under the NPT. Iran informed ElBaradei on November 10, 2003, that it would suspend enrichment related and reprocessing activities. The suspension would cover all activities at the Natanz facility, production of all feed material for enrichment and import of enrichment related items. On December 29, 2003, it suspended the operation and/or testing of any centrifuges there.

ElBaradei's report of February 24, 2004, recorded all this: "Iran has presented all declared nuclear material to the Agency for verification... has been actively cooperating with the Agency in providing access to locations... . the Agency has made good progress in verifying Iran's statements regarding the UCF project" (paragraphs 71-73). The Uranium Conversion Project at Isfahan turned uranium oxide to uranium hexafluoride gas under the IAEA's inspection. The gas is the feedstock for centrifuges that enrich uranium - 4 per cent for power plants; 20 for research reactors and 90 for weapons. The NPT allows uranium conversion and other process for enrichment. It bars manufacture of nuclear weapons. On December 18, 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol.

The Paris Agreement of November 15, 2004, recorded that "Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis to continue and extend its suspension of the activities... above... the suspension will be sustained while negotiations proceed on mutually acceptable long-term arrangements. The E3/E.U. recognise that this suspension is a voluntary confidence-building measure and not a legal obligation." Implicitly, Iran was entitled to all those activities under the NPT so long as the IAEA could inspect them under the Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. All it could not do was to "seek to acquire nuclear weapons". The IAEA's role was to keep watch on this. The E.U. and Iran "agreed to begin negotiations on long-term arrangements".

That "agreement will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on security issues". A steering committee was set up. "Irrespective of progress on the nuclear issue, the E3/E.U. and Iran confirm their determination to combat terrorism, including the activities of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups such as the MeK. They also confirm their continued support for the political process in Iraq aimed at establishing a constitutionally elected government." Iran was prepared for a wider deal; a step towards the Grand Bargain. The U.S. was not satisfied. It instigated, if not forced, the E.U.-3 to resile from the Paris Agreement.

The first sign of trouble came on July 18, 2005, when Dr. Rohani, Iran's representative, sent an anguished message to the E.U.-3: "Today, in Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon, I find strong and inescapable reasons and elements that bind us... . negotiations, particularly those conducted since the Paris Agreement, have brought us very close to an agreement." But, "we have received information from public and diplomatic channels that following our presidential elections, you have been contemplating to withhold a proposal which could potentially lead to an agreement on the core issue of our enrichment programme". He gave an offer - commencement of work at Isfahan at low capacity and under "full-scope monitoring" and at Natanz under similar curbs. The E.U.-3 ignored Iran's detailed proposal of March 23, 2005. "Confinement of Iran's enrichment programme in order to preclude through objective technical guarantees any proliferation concern." Five such guarantees were listed, including "ceiling of enrichment at LEU [low enriched uranium usable for bomb] level". Also offered were legislative and regulatory measures and enhanced monitoring including "continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at the conversion and enrichment facilities". What more could Iran possibly have offered?

Iran pressed for an accord, solicited the E.U.'s proposals and set a deadline. Instead of the E.U.'s proposals, it received a letter of July 29 which shattered all hopes. Iran notified the IAEA on August 1 that it would resume uranium conversion activities in Isfahan, invited the IAEA to implement the safeguards before the resumption, but stressed that "Iran will continue to maintain its voluntary suspension of all enrichment related activities".

The E.U.-3 admitted it had promised to give its proposals by early August. But it did not offer them in its response the next day, which threatened instead, to seek a special session of the Board, end the parleys and "pursue other courses of action". The vote on September 24 was part of this programme.

The proposals that were sent to Iran eventually on August 8 confirmed its suspicions. Entitled "Framework for a Long-Term Agreement", they comprised assurances on security, economic cooperation, drug-trafficking, terrorism and so on. But their core lay in Iran abandoning its "fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors" (paragraph 34), in return for a promise of assured supply of fuel, of which India has had rich experience since 1974 and even now in 2005. No self-respecting nation would accept this.

The E.U.-3 statement of August 9 removed all doubt. It sat in judgment on Iran's needs: "We do not believe that Iran has any operational need to engage in fissile material activities of its own." Iran had offered the most stringent safeguards. What the E.U.-3 sought was termination of its nuclear fuel cycle, its independence.

Burns revealed on September 8 that India had cooperated with the U.S. at the IAEA on August 11 when the Board adopted a resolution expressing "serious concern" at Iran's action and urged it to "re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities". Not a word of the E.U.-3's volte-face. India's slide had begun.

ElBaradei gave his report on September 2, the last in the series. He impartially listed Iran's "failures to report" as well as its "corrective actions". Iran was asked to provide more information. He acknowledged that "since December 2003, Iran has facilitated, in a timely manner, Agency access under its Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol to nuclear materials and facilities, as well as to other locations in the country, and has permitted the Agency to make environmental samples as requested by the Agency".

Iran's "policy of concealment continued until October 2003 and resulted in many breaches of its Agreement" with the IAEA. But, "since October 2003, good progress has been made in Iran's connection of the breaches, and in the Agency's ability to confirm certain aspects of Iran's current declarations". ElBaradei's report of November 15, 2004, said "all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been accounted for and therefore such material is not diverted to prohibited activities. On November 10, 2003, he said: "To date, there is no evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to above were related to a nuclear weapons programme." His concern related to "undeclared nuclear material or activities" - the realm of the unknown. Hence the plea for time. But no danger lurked in Iran and its offers were positive.

On September 2, 2005, he sought greater cooperation and candour from Iran and more time from the Board of Governors. It refused to grant that. Between the report of September 2 and the vote on September 24 came a flurry of activities. As American pressure built up relentlessly, Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, came to New Delhi on August 31. Natwar Singh was in Teheran between September 2 and 4. Reportedly, he conveyed the E.U.'s concern to Iran's leaders. It was a tense and tough dialogue. He went there to promote trade, energy cooperation and the gas pipeline. But Natwar Singh categorically said on September 3: "We support the pursuit by Iran of its peaceful nuclear energy programme in keeping with Iran's international obligations and commitments." He refused to take questions, saying the matter was confidential. The British Prime Minister and E.U. President Tony Blair came to India on September 7.

It was against this background that the U.S. House Committee on International Relations held its hearings on September 8. Its avowed theme was "The U.S. and India: An Emerging Entente?" But it was centred entirely on Iran and was choreographed by the State Department. Since Tom Lantos played a dominant role, his credentials deserve note. In Indian political lingo, this Democrat is a defector. Congressional Quarterly's Politics in America 2004 - the 108th Congress describes him (page 90) as one who "has become an unexpected and valuable ally of President Bush and House Majority Leader Tom Delay on foreign policy issues, particularly those affecting the Middle East (West Asia)... Condolezza Rice befriended Lantos during her time as provost at Stanford University, so now he has ready access to a key administration policy maker... .

"Lantos and many of Bush's foreign policy advisers share a muscular view of foreign policy in which they seek to employ unquestioned military dominance and perceived moral authority to right global wrongs... . The GOP-Lantos alliance has had the most impact on U.S. policy toward the Middle East. Like Republican neo-conservatives, Lantos believes that a strong assertion of U.S. power can transform the region in the U.S. interest. Perhaps the House's most influential Jewish lawmaker, he pushed early for military action against Saddam Hussein, backs a tough Israeli stand against the Palestinian Authority, has sharply criticised Saudi Arabia for financing terrorism and has backed new sanction on Iran and Libya."

He was co-author of the 2002 resolution authorising a war against Iraq. "It is Lantos, not [Henry] Hyde, who often plays the driving role in setting the Committee's agenda and thus the House's foreign policy stance. Hyde learned a painful lesson about Lantos' power soon after taking the International Relations gavel in the 107th. At Lantos' urging, the Committee defied Hyde by approving a State Department authorisation Bill" against Hyde's wishes. "Since then, Hyde has rarely moved legislation without Lantos' support, and he often advances Lantos' proposals."

The opening remarks of Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, in the hearing are noteworthy. "It... appears that, in addition to the commitments outlined in the public announcement, several understandings of one type or another have been reached between the two parties, some of which may have been consigned to writing, others perhaps encapsulated in a wink and a nod." He called Lantos first and gave him far more time than he gave to anyone else.

Lantos came with a prepared statement. He said at the outset: "I would not like to see a set of developments with respect to India whereby we agree to undertake a tremendous range of path-breaking measures to accommodate India, while India blithely pursues what it sees should be its goal and policy vis--vis Iran. There is quid pro quo in international relations. And if our Indian friends are interested in receiving all of the benefits of U.S. support - and I personally indicated my support for India as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council... . We have every right to expect that India will reciprocate in taking into account our concerns... . Without reciprocity, India will get very little help from the Congress." The printed text of the July 18 deal was by-passed. A sub-text was mentioned and that was Iran throughout. Members kept taunting India for its policies during the Cold War and ridiculed the non-aligned movement (NAM).

Lantos said: "I am particularly concerned over recent remarks by the Indian Foreign Minister that India will not support the U.S. drive to refer Iran's nuclear weapons effort to the U.N. Security Council. This position is contrary to what we understood the Administration was trying to achieve in forging this arrangement."

He could not possibly have "understood" the Administration's aims without a briefing by Rice or Burns. "New Delhi must understand how important their cooperation and support is to U.S. initiatives to counter the nuclear threat from Iran. That includes supporting our efforts to refer Iran's 18 years of violations of the NPT to the U.N. Security Council. Anything less than full support will imperil the expansion of U.S. nuclear and security cooperation with New Delhi."

Those who yearn to acquire a great power status on America's shoulders should reflect on this: "It is also important, if India is to assume truly the status of a great power, that it move beyond the confines of South Asia and support efforts to establish stability and democracy elsewhere - for example, in Iraq." What would India's prestige be today if, as some advocated then, it had accepted the U.S. pleas in July 2003 to send India's troops to Iraq? That Lantos is for India becoming a permanent member of the Security Council should alert us to what such a bounty can entail - a surrogate status.

Most others who followed Lantos in the hearings supported him admiringly, cutting across the party divide. Burns' reply to questions on Iran reveal that the Indian government was less than candid to its people: "India does not wish Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, and I believe the Indian government has gone on the record to say that. We have had, over the last several weeks, and specifically the last few days, a series of conversations with the Indian government about the best way to achieve that, to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapon state."

Burns' colleague Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, disclosed that India-U.S. collaboration had begun in August, if not earlier. But when did the nation first hear of its government's concern about a nuclear Iran and through whom? Joseph said: "At last month's meeting of the Board of the IAEA India did join in the resolution on Iran, which expressed serious concerns about Iranian activities, specially, the resumption of work at its conversion facility at Isfahan, and also called on Iran to stop that activity and to basically re-suspend it, the measures that it had taken, and return to the negotiations with the E.U.-3. Since then, there have been a number of disconcerting statements made not only by India, but by a number of other governments."

Thus, by September 8 there was no firm promise on the vote; but soundings had begun in March as Burns disclosed. "We began during Secretary Rice's trip to Delhi in March to talk about the outlines of this new relationship in all of these dimensions, not just the nuclear field, but the others. And as we approached the visit of Prime Minister [Manmohan] Singh in mid-July, we had conversations with a few of our allies in Europe, in fact, with the Indians, about what we might be able to do to gradually integrate the Indians into - in terms of practice - compliance with non-proliferation regimes. We also did not believe, frankly, for a long time before the visit that it would be possible to reach this agreement... . We actually reached this agreement largely through discussions that Secretary Rice had the day prior to the visit and the morning of the visit... . The last piece of this was the reciprocal piece that Congressman Lantos mentioned in his remarks, and that is that we were not willing to enter in an agreement unless we had a visible and verifiable set of commitments that the Indian government was willing to undertake. And we achieved those just a few hours before the President sat down with the Prime Minister." Burns linked "the agreement" with "the reciprocal piece" (read: Iran).

Lantos took the floor again to grill Burns, who told the Committee more than what our government told us, which was practically nothing before September. "May I ask you specifically, Mr. Secretary, what discussions have you had, or has Secretary Rice had, with the Indians concerning their Teheran policy?"

Burns: "Congressman Lantos, thank you very much. And I - we share your concern. I discussed this issue with the Indian government. I'll have another conversation tomorrow morning. I know that Secretary Rice will be meeting with both the Indian Prime Minister and the Indian Foreign Minister in New York during the UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] meetings, and I'm sure she will raise this issue with him as well.

"When you [Lantos] were out of the room... both Under Secretary Joseph and I responded to a question from the Chairman on this, and what we said was that we believe that India shares our goal of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons power. And now what we're discussing with the Indian government this week is tactics, how do we do that." India agreed with the U.S. strategy but was uncertain about "tactics". But did it also agree with the assessment of Iran as a "threat"?

Burns added: "We've said to the Indians that we hope that they will regain support for the decision that they helped us to take on August 11th in the IAEA Board of Governors." Joseph declared that "a nuclear-armed Iran represent the greatest state threat to us as a nation and I think to the international community". The IAEA never accepted this. Did India?

The U.S. might well have acquiesced in India's abstention if it had stood firm. Representative Brad Sherman asked: "Did it cross the mind of anybody at Foggy Bottom [the State Department] in negotiating this deal with India to get an absolute commitment that India would be with us, and if you couldn't get that at least an absolute commitment that they would abstain on this upcoming issue?"

Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia and plebiscite in Kashmir were talked about briefly in the September 8 hearings. But the main object was to send "a bipartisan mandate from this Congress that we expect the Administration to be tough when it comes to India's relations with Iran". That mandate was inspired by the Administration. The charade worked.

The very next day, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said in New Delhi that India was against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and there should be no weapons. But since Iran itself had renounced them what was his sub-text? There was "no ambiguity" about India's stand, he said. Iran should adhere to its international obligations - implying clearly that it was not doing so. Confrontation should be avoided. The pro-American tilt was unmistakable.

By the time the Prime Minister said on September 16 in New York that "another nuclear state in our neighbourhood was not desirable", the pledge had been given as Amit Baruah reported in The Hindu on September 17.

The Prime Minister's remarks on September 16 that "Iran as a signatory to the NPT must honour all its commitments" missed the point that it was ready to do that. It was the U.S. and the E.U. which sought to rewrite the NPT and deprive Iran of its rights under it, as Russia pointed out repeatedly. Iran accepts uranium enrichment at a low, harmless grade under any safeguards. The U.S. refuses any enrichment, under any safeguards.

Thanks to leaks by Burns to The New York Times' Steven R. Wiesman, we can trace the last phase of India's surrender to the U.S. On September 10, he reported "an unusual diplomatic struggle with Russia, China and India" to secure their votes for activating the United Nations Security Council. "Last week, both Russia and India rebuffed the United States and its European allies, saying they opposed sending the issue to the Security Council at this time. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on Friday [September 9], however, that she and President George W. Bush would try to change their minds at the United Nations meetings next week... by tradition an issue is not referred to the Security Council without a broad consensus." The U.S. decided on a vote though it was "without any precedent". He added: "The Indian Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh visited Teheran last weekend and afterward Indian officials said they agreed with Russia."

Iran proposed at this stage widening negotiations beyond the E.U.-3 "to include members of the non-aligned bloc on the Board" of Governors (The New York Times, September 12). India ignored the proposal. On September 15 came another Burns (or Rice?) warning through Weisman: The U.S.' "insistence that a reluctant India join in the confrontation" with Iran. The vote was to be a step in the confrontation, not a move for negotiations and we knew that "a Bush Administration official" (that is, Burns) said, "They have to make a basic choice." An Indian official "who asked not to be quoted by name was against the referral and against banging them [Iran's new leadership] on the head".

India's vote was crucial to success. Weisman reported: "In effect, Bush Administration officials say, India must now choose who is the best partner to meet its surging energy needs - Iran or the West" - a threat that covers the gas pipeline as well. "Administration officials have warned India that if it fails to cooperate on Iran, the civilian nuclear energy agreement could be rejected by Congress." That is why Lantos was set up to perform by his organ-grinders in the State Department.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met President Bush on September 13. On September 16, a U.S. spokesman said that the U.S. had "broad consensus" on bringing "pressure" to bear on Iran.

In all this drama, the stand taken by ElBaredei, who knew the facts, has been overlooked. A Vienna report published in the International Herald Tribune of September 20 said he was opposed to referral to the Security Council. The issue was "regrettably going through a period of confrontation and brinkmanship".

Also ignored was an important proposal which President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made at the U.N. General Assembly on September 17. He proposed: "Mandate an ad-hoc committee to compile and submit a comprehensive report on possible practical mechanisms and strategies for complete disarmament." Besides, Iran "is prepared to engage in serious partnership with private and public sectors of other countries in the implementation of uranium enrichment programme in Iran. This represents the most far-reaching step, outside all requirements of the NPT, being proposed by Iran". The U.S. was not excluded. He knew that this exposed Iran to more intrusive surveillance.

India could have intervened to bridge the divide. It chose to support the U.S. The Prime Minister asked Iran's President, on the phone on September 23, to take "a flexible position so as to avoid a confrontation". He "repeated the necessity for Iran to make concessions to this end". India supported resolution of "all issues through discussion and consensus in the IAEA".

This implied that Iran was responsible for the confrontation and ignored the E.U.-3's volt-face in August. India had not expressed any concern when in retaliation Iran resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan then. Equally misplaced was the Prime Minister's remark in Chandigarh on September 24 that Iran "must undertake all the obligations which go with its being a signatory to the NPT"; as if Iran, and not the West, was in breach of the NPT. But then, the decision "to vote with the U.S. in a crunch situation was taken even before" the Prime Minister met Bush on September 13. "At this bilateral meeting Iran is said to have come up for discussion" (Amit Baruah, The Hindu, September 17). India played for time, hoping that a vote would not be necessary, but it had decided that if it came to the crunch it would vote with the U.S. As it happened, America's arrogance and Venezuela's principled stand belied India's expectations and it had to vote with the U.S. Had it abstained, the U.S. would have acquiesced, but Indians lacked the nerve.

The Board of Governors' resolution on September 24 is noteworthy for three reasons. There was nothing in ElBaradei's report of September 2 remotely to warrant referral to the Security Council; the resolution ignored the E.U.-3's conduct and Iran's offer; and it flouted the IAEA's Statute as well as the Iran-IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

In all these years, not once has ElBaradei endorsed the claim of Greg Shulte, U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA, that "Iran's activities pose an increasing threat to international peace and security". Neither did India. But this is the very basis of the referral to the Security Council. The resolution finds, in the very first two paragraphs, that "Iran's many failures and breaches" of the Safeguards Agreement "constitute non-compliance in the context of Article XIIC of the Agency's Statute" and it "finds also that the history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities... . and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security". This is dangerous. Remember, on Iraq the U.S. did not seek the necessary second resolution to authorise the war, but used an ambiguous one which contained formulations such as this.

ElBaradei is asked to continue his efforts to implement this and earlier resolutions while noting, inconsistently, in the preamble his finding that "good progress has been made in Iran's correction of the breaches and in the Agency's ability to confirm" aspects of Iran's declarations.

The next step? "The Board will address the timing and content of the report required under Article XIIC and the notification required under Article IIIB.4." This need not necessarily be done in November under this paragraph (3).

Article XII deals with safeguards. Its paragraph C says: "The staff of inspectors shall also have the responsibility of obtaining and verifying the accounting referred to in sub-paragraph A-6 of this article and of determining whether there is compliance with the undertaking referred to in sub-paragraph F-4 of Article XI, with the measures referred to in sub-paragraph A-2 of this article, and with all other conditions of the project prescribed in the agreement between the Agency and the state or states concerned. The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director-General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient state or states to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations."

Persistence in non-compliance entails no more than suspension of assistance, demand for return of material and suspension of membership. There are, besides, two preconditions - denial of access to inspectors (A6 of Article XII) or breach of undertaking to use IAEA assistance for peaceful purposes and observe the safeguards on the project (paragraph F4 of Article XI). There is another major flaw - Article XI deals with "Agency projects", that is, projects set up with the IAEA's assistance.

Article XIIC does not apply because (a) there was no report by inspectors of refusal of access; (b) no such report by the Director-General to the Board (c) and no demand by the Board to Iran "to remedy forthwith any non-compliance" while formally citing Article XIIC. Para A-2 of Article XII concerns "health and safety measures".

Article III B covers the IAEA's "functions". Paragraph B4 requires it to report annually to the General Assembly "and when appropriate to the Security Council". Precisely, when? If "there should arise questions that are within the competence of the Security Council". That is, if there is a threat to peace the Board "may also take" measures under Article XIIC.

It has been overlooked that both Articles IIIB and XIIC are subject to Article 19 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement. Article 19 says clearly: "If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director-General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement, to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute of the Agency and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the Government of Iran every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance." These procedural safeguards have been thrown to the winds. There is no finding of inability "to verify" by the Director-General or of menace to security. Therefore, any referral to the Security Council on the basis of the resolution of September 24 would be illegal. The resolution itself is illegal as it flouts the Statute of the IAEA and the Safeguards Agreement.

ElBaradei's statement after the vote revealed his misgivings. The civil servant is bound by the resolution. "I would decline to comment on the wisdom of the Board's decision."

The matter will come up at the "regular Board meeting" on November 24. He was assured by Larijani that Iran "would continue to work actively with me" and "everyone acknowledges that the issue remains very much here in Vienna, that there is ample room here, still, for negotiations".

India's explanation of its vote drips with inconsistencies. Citing the preambular reference to "good progress" as the Director-General had reported, it said "finding Iran non-compliant in the context of Article XIIC of the Agency's statute is not justified. It would also not be accurate to characterise the current situation as a threat to international peace and security". But these were paragraphs 1 and 2 of the resolution and its very core. Deferment of referral came in paragraph 3. A death sentence was pronounced, most unjustly. Execution was stayed till the next session. This is lauded as an Indian achievement. India had "two major preoccupations... . more time" and "we were opposed to the matter being referred to the U.N. Security Council at this stage because we did not believe that this was justified in the circumstances", presently, that is. The italicised words significantly qualify rejection of the findings and leave open acquiescence in referral to the Security Council later.

This was a decision for the political leadership to explain to an anguished nation; not for a civil servant to expound. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's performance at a press briefing on September 26 was disgraceful. He stooped to polemics which would shame an undergraduate debater. "In abstaining on this resolution - the 12 countries who abstained on this resolution - in fact in a sense agreed to its passage. There was only one country which sought a vote on the resolution. If that country had not sought a vote on this resolution, in fact the tradition is of having resolutions on this issue being passed by consensus, and that would also have been the case this time as well. So, I think, please take an overall view of this matter. I do not think that there should be too much speculation about what are the reasons why India decided to vote for this resolution." But for Venezuela's "No", India's surrender would have gone unnoticed.

This betrays a guilty conscience. He professed to endorse "the point that was being made by the non-aligned countries that we should not be in too much of a haste". NAM's opposition was not procedural; it was, as he well knew, fundamental.

Shyam Saran added: "With respect to Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, that is something which we have ourselves no reservations about." Does India support Iran's stand on enrichment specifically, as Russia does? Why gloss over this? To say "we do not believe that the time has come for this matter to be remitted to the Security Council" is inadequate. Since we "do not regard the current situation as constituting any kind of threat to international peace and security" opposition to referral should have been unqualified.

A correspondent pointed out that, given India's rejection of the findings, "the factual basis upon which the resolution is based... is flawed and you have yourself reservations and caveats. Would it not have been more logical for you to abstain from a vote which in effect is preparing the ground for a reference to the Security Council?" The Foreign Secretary replied: "Any resolution which is adopted in any U.N. body or in any multi-national agency is usually a compromise... . If you look carefully at the draft, even though there may be a reference to Article XIIC and to Article IIIB, it is not something which is held to be currently operational. It is something that is left to the subsequent meeting of the Board to determine... . What it says is that currently there is no reference to the Security Council."

Another correspondent recalled: "Nobody knew that India was part of this great diplomatic negotiation that was going on. It is for the first time that we are being told. Is this a transparent way of doing things? You issue a statement at midnight that this is the vote. It was pre-decided that India is going to vote in this manner." Shyam Saran replied: "I am afraid, you are making assumptions which are not based on facts. As far as our consultations with various parties are concerned, they are... . Why should you expect that on all delicate negotiations a blow-by-blow account should be given to the press?" Such prevarication and evasiveness is common among politicians. It is sad to see a civil servant stoop to this.

The government must publish a White Paper on the deal of July 18 and its vote on September 24. There can be two opinions on the deal. But if there was any doubt on the integrity of the vote, Shyam Saran dispelled it efficiently.

Sensitive accords should not be hastily concluded to time with visits of heads of state or government. Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, 1954, requires a formal "agreement for cooperation" and lists eight requirements. Uniquely, this deal was outlined in a joint statement full of loose ends to tie up. On October 27, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack revealed publicly what had been long suspected - India would have to separate civilian and military nuclear facilities as a precondition for the U.S. to present the agreement to the Congress and to amend the Act of 1954 as its part of the deal. There is no guarantee, of course, that Congress will make the amendment. But India will have burnt its boats. But the formal text of the agreement will first have to be drawn up. On October 28, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Dr Anil Kakodkar said: "Putting the deal into effect is not very simple." Many scientists asked "on condition of anonymity... whether it was wise on the part of the government to enter into an agreement with the U.S. since it has never proved to be a trustworthy ally" (The Times of India, October 29). Will the draft agreement now be hastily drawn up to time with President Bush's visit to India next year? He is damaged goods and his ability to push the deal through the Congress is in doubt unless India agrees to further concessions.

Nor should public opinion in India be ignored. Nehru had to back out of the Voice of America deal in 1963 (Michael Brechber; "India's decision on the Voice of America; A study of Irresolution"; Asian Survey, July 1974). Indira Gandhi had to abandon the accord of March 28, 1966, on an Indo-American Foundation she concluded with President Lyndon Johnson in Washington D.C., "fortunately for all concerned, on further reconsideration... but it had at first seemed a feasible idea", Dennis Kux opined (Estranged Democracies, page XXIII).

It is unwise to make an entire foreign policy hostage to a single issue (be it Tarapur) or a single country (be it the U.S.). The U.S. would have exposed itself if it had reneged on the nuclear deal over an abstention in the IAEA. Explanation of such a vote could have addressed international concerns. In the war of nerves that India fought unarmed, it was overlooked that India had considerable leverage. Soon after the deal of July 18, reports from the U.S. had it that there were considerable "expectations" of huge Indian orders for military hardware.

The vote did not make the U.S. more flexible while Iran repeated its offers to negotiate. It has "no problem with resuming talks" (October 4) and "we are ready to continue unconditional talks".

The sticking point is conversion of uranium into gas at the Isfahan facility under the IAEA's surveillance. The West objects to that. Shyam Saran conceded on September 26 that it had a legal right to do so under the NPT. Its suspension was a confidence-building measure but was not "legally required". These words will haunt India. Its options are very limited - continue with the surrender or stand up. As a way out, will India craft a compromise which concedes Iran's right to a nuclear fuel cycle, tightens the safeguards and increases transparency to ensure that nuclear weapons are not produced? Why not build on its President's offer of September 17?

Whether the vote on September 24 was an aberration or a sign of a calculated shift in foreign policy will become all too clear in a matter of months.