As the U.S. unfolds its new strategy for South Asia by offering to arm both India and Pakistan, there is serious concern about its repercussions on the peace process between the two countries.
B. MURALIDHAR REDDY in IslamabadWHEN Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's mother travelled to her birthplace in India along with her elder son and grandson, it was the most definite statement of Musharraf's personal association with the peace process. Precisely at such a juncture, trust the United States to introduce strains that could dampen the peace spirit and ultimately jeopardise the process.
In the name of a new vision and strategy for South Asia, described as win-win for both India and Pakistan, the Bush administration has, wittingly or unwittingly, set each against the other. Pakistan has been offered F-16 fighter planes, a request that has been pending since 1989, so that it feels more "secure" and plays a greater role as a partner of the U.S. India has been offered much more to enable it to undertake "global" responsibilities along with the U.S.
And yet no one is elated. Given the U.S.' poor track record - a glance at Pakistan-U.S. ties since 1950 provides overwhelming evidence of this - there is a sense of apprehension as to what it would entail. A cursory look at the documents and background briefings on the U.S. strategy in South Asia would prove beyond doubt that the new "vision" is yet another name to further its own interests in the region.
According to senior State Department officials, the Bush administration considers South Asia "vital to the future of the United States". "You have a region that... is going to be critical both in the world's future, demographically and economically,... with China on one side, Iran and the Middle East on the other, and, as we can see, a somewhat turbulent Central Asian region to the north," said a State Department official at a background briefing on March 25.
Incidentally, the briefing came almost immediately after the announcement that the President had authorised the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan. Asked about reported objections by Indian officials, the official responded that the issue needed to be seen in a larger context. "The challenge is how to embed the question of whether you sell F-16s to Pakistan in a broader conception of what do we want to do with Pakistan, but also what do we want to do with India."
The official cautioned reporters "not to over-interpret" the initial round of news reports. "As the days unfold, we'll see the Indian government making decisions on how it assesses the opportunities that are being offered to them in this new framework of cooperation," the official said. The reference perhaps was to the subsequent offer of strategic partnership to India.
The official U.S. explanation for the F-16 bonanza to Pakistan was that it was a follow-up to the 9/11 Commission recommendations in mid-2004 for a major effort to try to stabilise relations with Pakistan. In fact, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the United States government should "be willing to make hard choices too", as Musharraf did, "and make the difficult, long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan".
The question asked by a section of the Opposition and civil society in Pakistan is how the supply of F-16s amounts to a "hard choice" and to laying the foundation for a long-term relationship. Would it not trigger an arms race in the region when F-16s and F-18s and much more are offered to India? It is no secret that Pakistan's defence preparedness is India-centric.
Arming Pakistan with F-16s and the blanket support to Musharraf had, according to the Opposition, more to do with the U.S.' own immediate and medium-term interests in the region than with laying the foundation for a long-term strategic relationship with Pakistan.
Since Musharraf joined the U.S.-led coalition in the so-called war against terror in the aftermath of 9/11, Washington has turned a blind eye to its earlier insistence on "full restoration of democracy" and the return of the military to the barracks. Much to the consternation of the mainstream political parties, the Bush administration hailed Musharraf as the "best bet" for Pakistan and maintained a studied silence on his uniform.
Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who heads the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and lives in Dubai in self-imposed exile since 1998, expressed her disappointment with the U.S. for putting all its eggs in one basket, Musharraf's. She said that while the PPP welcomed defence cooperation with Washington, these relations need not grow at the expense of democracy.
"Any support by Washington to Islamabad may not be interpreted by the latter as endorsement of military dictatorship. It should be accompanied by policies that promote the holding of fair and free elections open to all parties and personalities. If this is not done, the danger is that [by] putting democracy on the back burner a situation could be created, which in the long run will not serve the national interest of Pakistan and its friends, including the sole superpower," the former Prime Minister argued.
She hoped that the "deal" to supply F-16s would give the U.S. administration more leverage to persuade the Musharraf regime to hold fair and free elections this year to overcome the crisis of legitimacy. A regime with legitimacy could defend the country more strongly by involving the people and giving them a sense of participation, she said, and added, "legitimacy comes from the ballot and not from the bullet".
Benazir is not a critic of Washington and has always looked to the U.S. government for support in her domestic struggles, particularly those with the military. Her grouse against the Bush administration is justified by the latest State Department report on the American role in "Democracy and human rights". The chapter on Pakistan notes that the government's human rights record has remained poor, although there has been improvement in several areas. It states that the constitutional amendments passed by the government strengthened the President's powers at the expense of the National Assembly.
The report notes: "The military remains heavily engaged in politics, and President Musharraf's decision to continue as Chief of Army Staff has spurred political debate. Political parties are generally weak, undemocratic institutions centred on personalities instead of policies. The judiciary is corrupt, inefficient, and malleable to political pressure. Politically motivated prosecutions of Opposition figures continue, as do concerns that Opposition leaders or their parties are not always allowed to function freely. Leaders of three major parties remained outside the country, and the leader of one Opposition party in Parliament remained in prison appealing a conviction for sedition. Despite its increasing freedom, the media lack journalistic standards and continue to practise self-censorship in some areas. Security forces have committed numerous human rights abuses, including extra-judicial killings and torture. Societal discrimination and violence against women and religious minorities persist."
For the record, Condoleezza Rice did raise the issue of democratic reforms during her meeting with Musharraf and was content with an assurance that the general elections in 2007 would be "free and fair". Obviously, her priorities were different. One of the top priorities was to pressure India and Pakistan to abandon their plans for the gas pipeline from Iran. She hinted at the possibility of U.S. economic retaliation under the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.
"We have certain issues with Iran because that country is involved in terrorism, has been interfering in the affairs of its neighbours and is also facing U.N. sanctions. So we not only expressed our concerns to India but also told Japan to stop [a] gas project with Iran," she told a private television channel in Pakistan in response to a question on U.S. opposition to the project. She avoided a direct reply to a question if she was in Islamabad to seek Pakistan's support for a possible intervention in Iran.
The growing unease in Pakistan on the U.S.-Iran row was further evident when Musharraf indicated recently that in the event of a war between the U.S. and Iran, Pakistan would remain neutral. Pakistan is obviously under continuous U.S. pressure to do more in its so-called war on terror. Any refusal risks Washington's displeasure and potentially disastrous economic and political consequences.
Condoleezza Rice also reiterated the U.S. demand that Pakistan divulge information concerning the dealings of its nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, who was involved in selling nuclear technology to a number of countries, including Iran. Within days of her return to Washington after her Asia tour came the announcement on the F-16s to Pakistan. With an air of triumph, Islamabad declared that there were no strings attached to the purchase. In particular, it was not conditional on abandoning the gas pipeline. However, observers noted that immediately before Washington's announcement, Musharraf told a TV channel that Pakistan was considering sending parts of its nuclear centrifuges to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for examination. It was interpreted as a move designed to help the U.S. case against Iran.
As the U.S. game unfolds, there are serious concerns in Pakistan about its repercussions on the peace process with India. The only consolation for the pro-peace constituency is the growing stakes of common persons in the process and the resultant pressure on the governments not to return to the old ways. Former Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain's statement during his recent visit to India that the "peace process was irreversible" perhaps reflects best the changing realities.
COMMents
SHARE