All-out war

It is a fight to the finish in Sri Lanka, and a bloodbath is inevitable before the government can possibly vanquish the LTTE.

in Colombo

On the brink of war in 2006. An undeclared war in 2007. And now an all-out war. Sri Lankas plunge into disaster became complete in 2008.

The New Year dawned with the assassination of United National Party (UNP) Member of Parliament T. Maheshwaran in broad daylight inside a temple in Colombo, the capital. The next day, an explosion in the heart of the city, targeting a military vehicle, killed four people, including a soldier.

The Mahinda Rajapaksa government blamed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for both the incidents and lobbed a political grenade by pulling out of the Norwegian-brokered 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with the Tigers. For all practical purposes, the CFA was a dead article, observed more in the breach than in practice by both parties, particularly since the escalation of hostilities in mid-2006. Yet, the governments decision to remove the fig leaf triggered strong disapproval from the international community.

The expressions of concern within and outside the island nation over the repercussions of a declared war were expected, given the trail of death, destruction and displacement of people left by the undeclared war in the last 18 months. The country had slipped into such chaos that the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), an offshoot of the CFA, decided in April 2007 to suspend rulings on ceasefire violation. By last count, in April 2007, the CFA had been violated nearly 4,000 times. The SLMM was simply not equipped to keep a count of the numerous instances. After all, it was a mission meant to monitor a ceasefire and not its violation.

However, the decision of the government to announce a unilateral withdrawal from the CFA has nothing to do with these violations. It is based on the assessment that the Tigers have been cornered like never before. In the words of Army chief Sarath Fonseka, the end of the LTTE is certain by June 2008. Of course, the Sri Lanka military has made spectacular gains in recent months against the Tigers. But Sri Lanka-watchers are sceptical of the assertions made by the military leadership, given the three-decade-old bloody history of the island nation.

The Tigers are not expected to crumble without causing maximum possible bloodshed. For all the losses it has suffered, the LTTE continues to have the capability to wage a conventional war in the north, fight unconventional battles in the east, and carry out hit-and-run and suicide missions in the south. In other words, a bloodbath is inevitable before the Sri Lanka military can possibly barge into LTTE-held territory in Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu districts. The failure of the government so far to come out with a credible political package to address the legitimate grievances of the minorities makes the task of isolating (or Colombos ambitious goal of annihilating) the Tigers tougher.

A glimpse of what could follow in the coming days and weeks was available on January 8. The Nation Building Minister, D.M. Dissanayake, became the target of a roadside blast triggered by suspected LTTE cadre 18 km from Colombo. Panic and gloom have gripped the citizens of Colombo. The feeling of the average person in the street is that war has arrived at their doorstep.

Apparently, the Rajapaksa government resolved to put a formal end to a moribund CFA after taking into consideration all the relevant factors. Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama, who shared the news with the diplomatic corps and the media, was at pains to emphasise that the government was fully conscious of the dangers ahead in the post-CFA era and was capable of tackling the challenges it held.

The decision of

Unfortunately, the Minister and the government could not avoid the temptation of a blame game with the Ranil Wickremesinghe government, which they accused of compromising the vital interests of the country by forging a flawed CFA. It was entered into without proper consultation by the government of the day, with even the Cabinet of Ministers not being privy to its contents. Legitimate concerns of the security forces had not even been taken into account. It had the effect of alienating the democratic Tamil political forces and focussed solely on the LTTE, the Minister argued.

Bogollagama was being economical with truth, to say the least. Rajapaksa was elected to the office of President in November 2005 on the plank of abrogation of the CFA but chose to continue with it for the next two years and two months. For all its shortcomings, the CFA was seen by several sections within Sri Lanka and the entire international community as giving some relief to the beleaguered citizens of Sri Lanka even if it failed to change the stripes of the Tigers.

The Foreign Minister claimed the termination of the CFA did not in anyway hamper the process of a negotiated political settlement and Norway would continue to play the role of a peace negotiator. The assertions of Bogollagama, however, do not tally with the attitude of the Rajapaksa regime towards Norway. Replacement of Norway as the peace negotiator was the other main election pledge of Rajapaksa. Norway has had an uneasy relationship with the Rajapaksa government in the past two years as it was suspected of being soft towards the LTTE. It is certainly not a coincidence that the representative of the Government of Japan, Yasushi Akashi, was due to visit Sri Lanka from January 13 to 15 to discuss with the government the current situation of the peace process and its future. Though it has not made it explicit, Japan is ready to take over the role of Norway but does not have the same support that Norway had from the international community.

Predictably, the architect of the CFA, the UNP led by former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, was livid with the government for the abrogation of the CFA and the finger-pointing. It issued a detailed and hard-hitting statement refuting the contentions of the Rajapaksa regime. The party pointed out that it had entered into a memorandum of understanding with the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) in October 2006 to cooperate on a negotiated political settlement referred to in the CFA. It further said that the CFA had been upheld by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka.

According to the UNP, the abrogation of the CFA was a politically expedient decision taken at the behest of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) in return for their support to the government in Parliament. Withdrawal from the CFA was the main demand of the JVP on the eve of the crucial third reading of the budget in Parliament in December if the government wanted its MPs votes in favour of the budget. The JVP, which voted against the budget at the stage of the second reading, abstained from voting at the final stage and enabled the Rajapaksa regime to win the budget vote by a big margin.

At Kabithigollewa hospital

The UNP government entered into the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE in 2002 at a critical time when we had suffered severe military setbacks and the economy was in a shambles. The LTTE had captured key military bases in the north and attacked vital economic targets such as the Katunayake airport. The Colombo port was not operational and the economy had recorded a negative growth. Under these circumstances, the main objective of the ceasefire was to find a negotiated settlement to the ongoing conflict and to safeguard the territorial integrity of the country, the UNP said.

Concurring with the UNPs view, the Foreign Ministers of the Nordic countries noted in a statement: The Cease Fire Agreement had a number of positive consequences. During the first three years, conflict-related casualties dropped to almost zero, which means that as many as 10,000 lives may have been spared. The agreement allowed for greater freedom of movement for all people in Sri Lanka, and opened for economic development. It also improved the human rights situation and the protection of civilians. However, violations of the agreement have been particularly numerous and increasingly serious during the past two years.

The LTTE chose to wait for a whole week before formally responding to the governments decision to terminate the CFA. In a lengthy statement, essentially for the consumption of the international community, the LTTE said even now it wanted 100 per cent implementation of the CFA and continuation of Norway as the official facilitator of peace talks. We are shocked and disappointed that the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) has unilaterally abrogated the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA).... The GoSL was forced to sign the CFA in 2002 after the LTTE brought about a military balance of power through a series of large-scale military victories, it said.

The statement maintained that the LTTE was forced to temporarily withdraw from the peace talks in April 2003 as a result of the failure of the government to implement the CFA 100 per cent. There was no explanation as to how the temporary withdrawal in early 2003 remained temporary for the next four years and on what basis the LTTE is seeking continuation of the CFA.

History is replete with examples of the GoSL abrogation of pacts that were made to bring permanent peace for the Tamil people. The abrogation by the GoSL of the unprecedented nearly six-year-long CFA has clearly demonstrated that the GoSL will never permit the Tamil people to live with freedom in their homeland, it said. Therefore, the international community must understand this, and immediately remove the bans it has placed on the LTTE believing the false propaganda of the GoSL, accept the just aspirations of the Tamil people, and recognise the right of the Tamil people to live with self-determination in their homeland, the Tigers pleaded.

With the government forces and the Tigers hell-bent on a fight to finish, there is no prospect of peace in the immediate future.