Given the experience with extraordinary powers vested in any institution, the wisdom of having a super-powerful body must be debated.
IT is axiomatic that it is the state that has the exclusive power to make law. As is true of many axioms, this too reflects reality only in part; various groups do, in fact, influence lawmaking. The Disabilities Act, 1995; the Right to Information Act, 2005; and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), 2005, are obvious examples. Yet, alongside this experience is the intransigence of the state, which the Lokpal debate has thrown into sharp focus.
The government's Lokpal Bill, 2011, was introduced in the Lok Sabha on August 4, following tough talking and hard bargaining by five members of a civil society team. Yet, this Bill manages to remain status quoist even while ceding some ground. Its Lokpal' will be a chairperson with a maximum of eight other members, half of whom are to be judicial members. The pool from which it will draw its candidates is populated with sitting and retired judges of the Supreme Court and Chief Justices of High Courts. The appointment process, too, is more of the same.
The government is, by instinct and practice, loath to dilute its control over what it creates, and the Lokpal Bill too is witness to this. The chairperson or any other member is to be removed from office on the grounds of misbehaviour on a report from the Supreme Court, on the basis of an inquiry made by it. The Supreme Court may, however, act only when the reference has been made to it by the President, on a petition signed by at least a hundred Members of Parliament or, again, by the President, on a petition from a citizen where the President is satisfied that such reference should be made.
Acceding to the demands of the team of five, the Bill has accepted the formula of a separate investigation wing and a prosecution wing to be constituted by and under the control of the Lokpal. There is relative fiscal autonomy where the Lokpal is to prepare its budget each year, which is to be sent to the Central government for information.
The sticky issue of whether the Prime Minister should be subject to the Lokpal's scrutiny has been answered by including him after he has demitted the office of the Prime Minister. Ministers, MPs and high-ranking officials are within this law, but not the lower bureaucracy.
The inclusion of any person belonging to any association of persons or trust (whether registered under any law for the time being in force or not) in receipt of any donation from the public is being read as a way of getting back at a public that has placed the government in this difficult spot. The notable absence of corporations from the ambit of this Bill has drawn adverse comments, especially given the role corporations are to have had in so many recent scams.
Prosecution or disciplinary proceedings, the power of search or seizure, provisional attachment of assets, and the power to recommend transfer or suspension of a public servant who is connected with allegations of corruption are all in the Bill, as are provisions providing for declaration of assets and adverse inference where assets not declared are found in the possession of or in use by a public servant.
Perhaps the most striking deviation from extant law is the change in the nature of the sanction' power. The power of the executive to withhold sanction for prosecution has been a huge hurdle to holding the corrupt guilty. The government Bill hands over to the Lokpal the power to give or withhold sanction. The Jan Lokpal Bill, too, adopts this approach. Neither, however, acknowledges the changes that have been introduced in the Torture Bill, which, carefully, does not leave the power in anybody's discretion. It, instead, requires that where the decision is not to allow prosecution, reasons have to be given, which may, then, be subject to judicial review. That places a check on arbitrary use of power by any agency. The formula in the two Bills relocates the discretion in the Lokpal but does not change the nature of that power to exercise discretion.
The presumption of good faith' that everything done by a public servant shall be presumed to be done in good faith or intended to be done in the discharge of official functions or in exercise of his powers has been retained.
Generally, then, the government Bill is more of the same with one significant change, some reluctant halfway measures, and much that has been left unconsidered.
The Jan Lokpal Bill has moved through many versions. In June, version 2.3 was made available on the website of India Against Corruption (IAC). Mildly put, this Bill is markedly at variance with the government Bill. This Bill envisages a Lokpal that would have administrative, financial and functional independence from the government. To achieve this, the Lokpal is to have its own investigating agency, which it will supervise, monitor and direct. It will appoint and dispense with the services of its investigators.
The arm of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) that investigates corruption is to be excised from it and subsumed in the Lokpal. Some years ago, in an effort to give functional autonomy to the CBI from its political masters, the Supreme Court shifted control of the CBI to place it in the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC). The Jan Lokpal Bill works on the unreasoned belief that the Lokpal will not succumb to the temptations of such extensive control over the investigating agency.Powers of the Lokpal
The powers of the Lokpal are elaborate and have been set out in two clauses in the Bill. They include the power to
Appoint judicial officers, prosecutors and senior counsel.
Initiate and monitor the progress of prosecution.
Attach property and assets acquired by corrupt means and to confiscate them in certain cases.
Recommend cancellation or modification of a lease, licence, permission, contract or agreement if it was obtained by corrupt means, and to recommend blacklisting of a firm, company, contract or any other person involved in an act of corruption. In this case, the public authority shall either comply with the recommendation or reject it within a month of receiving it. If rejected, the Lokpal may approach the appropriate High Court seeking appropriate directions to be given to the public authority.
Ensure due compliance of its orders by imposing penalties on persons failing to comply with its orders.
Initiate suo motu appropriate action... on receipt of any information from any source about any corruption.
Make recommendations to public authorities, in consultation with them, to make changes in their work practices to reduce the scope of corruption and whistle-blower victimisation, and the authority concerned is to send a compliance report within two months.
Prepare a sentencing policy under the Prevention of Corruption Act and revis(e) it from time to time. This is an extraordinary prescription by which parliamentary power to detail the policy of punishment is moved to the discretion of the Lokpal. The punishment for corruption can be set anywhere between six months and a life sentence.
Prepare an appropriate reward scheme to encourage complaints from within and outside the government to report acts and evidence of corruption.
Enquire into the statements of declaration of assets filed by all successful candidates after any election to any seat in any House of Parliament.
Punish a public servant with imprisonment up to six months or fine or both if he fails to comply with its orders for ensuring the compliance.
Assume competence to investigate any offence under any other law while investigating an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Interception and monitoring of various media of communication can be undertaken at the behest of the Lokpal and a member of the core committee claimed recently that this was non-negotiable.
The breadth of the Lokpal's interest includes within it complaints of corruption against the Prime Minister, Ministers and MPs, and the higher judiciary, and these shall be looked into by a bench of seven members if the Lokpal so decides. The Lokpal will, among its other functions, protect the whistle-blower and the Right to Information (RTI) activist; deal with grievances where there is a delay or non-performance in delivery of services; and ensure that its own staff does not practice corruption.
A complex appointment process and a complaints procedure by which anyone may complain to the Supreme Court, which will then inquire and decide whether a Lokpal is guilty as charged, are the bulwarks offered against excessive power corrupting the Lokpal.
The inadequacy of these protections has been raised and needs much discussion and reasoned debate.
A multiplicity of powers to legislate, judge, punish and protect are to be placed in this institution of the Lokpal. There are questions about constitutionality, separation of powers, checks and balances, and the consequence of absolute power waiting to be addressed in this Bill. It does, however, provide a useful counterpoint to the government Bill.
A postscript: although having the Lokayuktas in the Act is one of the demands, the Jan Lokpal Bill does not elaborate on this theme and stops with stating that similar provisions for Lokayuktas... will have to be incorporated in the Bill.
The National Campaign for People's Right to Information (NCPRI) has proposed a basket of measures in place of an omnibus law that vests all the power, and responsibility, in a Lokpal. These largely draw upon Bills pending in Parliament and work at improving and strengthening them. These are the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, the Whistleblowers' Bill, the Lokpal Bill and the toughening up of the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003. In addition, a National Grievance Redress Bill, 2011, has been drafted to cover the complaints that arise in the delivery of services.
The NCPRI position is that loading one institution with the work of dealing with corruption and inefficiency in the lower bureaucracy, protecting whistle-blowers and RTI activists, and confronting big-ticket corruption would make for an impossible agenda. As for the judiciary, the independence of the judiciary must be preserved, as must the separation of powers; and dealing with matters of standards and corruption in the judiciary would best be by a separate law. The NCPRI documents are offered as critiques and drafts meant to facilitate discussion.
Suggestions emanating from the Lok Satta and the Foundation for Democratic Reforms reflect on the proposals currently on the table and open the door for discussion. A Bahujan Lokpal Bill, 2011, sent to the Standing Committee brings into the debate the issue of representation in such a powerful body and the recognition of the diversion of funds and policy focus from the Scheduled Castes, for instance, to other purposes as happened during the Commonwealth Games.
Some of the changes that may be brought may need a constitutional amendment. Congress general secretary Rahul Gandhi made a suggestion in Parliament that the Lokpal may be made into a constitutional entity, a suggestion that has been seconded by former Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan.
Given the experience with extraordinary power when vested in any institution, the wisdom of having such a super-powerful, insulated body awaits serious deliberation.
Usha Ramanathan is an independent law researcher working on the jurisprudence of law, poverty and rights.