With India exercising its option to become a nuclear weapon state, there is a need to work out a fresh policy approach in a radically changed environment.
LAST fortnight, India lifted its self-imposed restraint of 24 years to carry out not one but five nuclear tests. While the test in 1974 was a peaceful nuclear explosion, the current series must be seen as "explosions for peace". A simple fusion test would not have added in any way to the credibility of India's nuclear capability or proved the technological capability beyond the 1974 level. The quality of the potential nuclear deterrent demonstrated in the series of five tests represents a level far above that of the 1974 explosion. This provides the basis for a high level of credibility and flexibility for the future. It is a great achievement by India's nuclear scientific community.
Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee declared on May 15 that India was now a nuclear weapon state. This would indicate that having carried out the tests of a range of devices - from a thermonuclear device to the sub-kiloton range of devices - the Government proposes to take the matter to its logical conclusion. Over the years, it has become clear that India has little option but to exercise its nuclear option. Now that it is on the threshold, it is important not to be carried away by euphoria or falter from self-doubt. The government of the day will inevitably take the credit or discredit for decisions taken and implemented, but it is important to see the issues from the perspective of their implications for national interests. That requires that a satisfactory answer be found to the adverse nuclear asymmetry that has affected India's security calculus for decades; total elimination of nuclear weapons would be one way to resolve that asymmetry, but there are no signs of that happening.
Since India has been progressively left with no choice but to exercise the nuclear option, what should deserve attention is the process through which that option should be pursued in a restrained manner. (This has been examined by this writer earlier, most recently in his article "The challenges of strategic defence", Frontline, April 24, 1998.) While moving towards possessing a credible nuclear deterrent, it is important that the doctrine for such a deterrent should be articulated unambiguously. Some indications have already been given. India should pledge itself unequivocally to a 'No First Use' doctrine. The logic of going nuclear itself demands that it define the doctrine only in terms of self-defence. There can be no justification - moral, political or military - even to contemplate using nuclear weapons first, under any circumstances. The only purpose of India's nuclear deterrent should be to deter the possible use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against it. A natural corollary to this doctrine and posture is the need for India to pledge itself not to use nuclear weapons and capability against a non-nuclear weapon state, whether or not that state is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The Prime Minister has, in a statement, indicated a commitment to the 'No First Use' principle and that India's weapon will never be a weapon of aggression. This is to be welcomed: it will demonstrate that India's sole intention in carrying out the tests was to take steps essentially for its own security in a world where nuclear weapons are being retained apparently indefinitely in the future. The 'No First Use' commitment and an unqualified pledge that India will not use nuclear capability and weapons against a non-nuclear country should be made in Parliament and endorsed by Parliament when its meets on May 27.
IN recent weeks, there have been sharp and negative statements from China and India about each other. This should not be allowed to escalate. Far too much is at stake for both, and peace and cooperation is a continuing necessity. The negative impetus, therefore, must be controlled and reversed towards a greater cooperative framework at the earliest. A 'No First Use' pledge made in Parliament should be followed up by working towards a negotiated bilateral agreement with China on the principle of 'No First Use' of nuclear weapons against each other. This would be in keeping with the letter and spirit of the agreements between the two countries ranging from the 1954 Panch Sheel accord to the agreement of 1996.
China gave similar assurances when it acquired nuclear weapons more than three decades ago. Its criticism of India's nuclear tests, therefore, is difficult to explain, except as an expression of its own agenda. In recent times, there have been many uncertainties and ambiguities about China's commitment not to use its nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country. Now that India has declared itself a nuclear weapon state, that commitment by China is obviously not applicable to India any more. This should bring greater clarity to the nuclear equation between the two countries.
In 1993, China, which is an acknowledged nuclear weapon state, and India signed an agreement to bring about peace and tranquility on the border on the principle of "mutual and equal" security. The principle of equal security now assumes a more credible dimension. This should lead to greater understanding and mutual respect in accordance with the Panch Sheel accord that the two countries signed 44 years ago. Both countries should now seek to translate the five principles of peaceful co-existence and the existing agreements to start the process of concluding a bilateral agreement on 'No First Use' of nuclear weapons against each other. China has such an agreement with Russia, and such an agreement can be expanded to include other nuclear weapon states. Pakistan was offered an agreement more than four years ago, along with the offer of a bilateral agreement not to attack population centres and economic centres. This proposal should be revived even if Pakistan goes in for nuclear tests or continues to make hostile statements.
The international reaction, not unexpectedly, is sharply critical of India's tests. The United States has imposed sanctions and is likely to push for multilateral sanctions. France, Russia and the United Kingdom said that they did not favour sanctions. The manifestation of differences in the responses of the advanced countries should not, however, make India complacent because a long and bumpy road lies ahead.
First, there is the question of the repercussions of Pakistan following through with a test or two, either now or later. Pakistan has claimed that it has possessed nuclear weapons since 1987, a claim that the international community considers credible. The issue, therefore, is not an arms race, but the implications of possible Pakistani actions. If Pakistan conducts a test, but does not undertake tests of a broad range of devices of the type that India has done, Pakistan will only be demonstrating its technological inferiority. For Pakistan, which has sought parity for decades, that will be a serious blow.
On the other hand, Pakistan certainly will not be able to withstand the impact of even the minimal sanctions which will have to be imposed under U.S. laws. The U.S. will certainly not want to increase Pakistan's vulnerability or see it get more deeply dependent on China and/or shift towards radicalism, a prospect almost inevitable under such a scenario. While India should look for some accommodation to negate the adverse effects of sanctions on it, the U.S. also needs to resolve the tangle before it "loses" Pakistan. As the initial shock of the explosions dies down, India may expect more pragmatic approaches from the U.S. But if Pakistan does not go in for tests, the U.S. will feel encouraged to isolate India and pressure it to cap - or even roll back - its nuclear weapons capability.
THAT raises the issue of the U.S.' attitude and the sanctions. After 1974, U.S. attitudes and policy evolved with a snowballing effect to result finally in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1994. India must try and avoid such snowballing. Sanctions have been imposed under the U.S. domestic law which mandates them if a non-nuclear weapon state (as defined in the NPT) carries out a nuclear test. Under the law, the sanctions are of indefinite duration. It is in India's interest to see them lifted soon even though it can withstand their negative impact at an affordable cost. Only then can Indo-U.S. relations be strengthened, without the nuclear issue intruding excessively into it.
One suggestion in this direction is for India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Many of the objections that came in the way of India's acceding to the treaty in 1996 no longer exist, partly as a result of the series of five tests. On the face of it, there may be domestic objections to India signing the CTBT. But there is a need to weigh the costs and benefits of accession carefully. The CTBT is not the NPT and does not require a signatory to give up nuclear weapons or the nuclear option. The CTBT cannot come into force without India's signature.
On the other hand, if India does not sign up, pressures will keep mounting this year. U.S. Senate ratification is due before December 1998: if the CTBT does not come into effect by September 1999, a conference of the 149-plus members of the treaty will be called to discuss "measures" to be taken. India would, in any case, have come under greater pressure in the next 18 months to accede to the treaty. The U.S. administration has introduced the new Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1998 which states that "it shall be the policy of the Unites States" (among other objectives) to "press North Korea, India, and Pakistan" to sign the NPT.
The successful series of tests should provide confidence that a credible deterrent is feasible without further tests. Signing the CTBT will clearly lock Pakistan into an inferior capability. Acceding to the CTBT may not automatically mean that the sanctions will be lifted. But there is a provision in the law for a presidential waiver linked to a joint resolution of the U.S. Congress. The U.S. will no doubt expect India to accede to the CTBT unconditionally. The Indian Government has indicated that it is willing to adhere to portions of the treaty. This is obviously an indication of its willingness to negotiate. The CTBT has no provision for partial or conditional accession, but it does have a clause for withdrawal on grounds of supreme national interests. India should, therefore, start a dialogue with the U.S. at an early date to negotiate our accession to the CTBT subject to the U.S. lifting all sanctions. The opportunity should also be used to discuss the ways and means to ensure that India is treated as a "normal" country for purposes of export controls and application of non-proliferation concerns and measures.
India needs to gear up its diplomacy and try to change the parameters of the evolving situation. There is a need to talk to U.S. Congress leaders on a continuing basis and also hold extensive discussions with thinktanks and administration officials. Special efforts will have to be undertaken to explain the Indian position. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) would do well to recognise that diplomacy in the modern era is not limited to direct contact among diplomats. This is an information age and concerted efforts must be made to reach out to the public as well as to experts and opinion-makers across the world.
India must not make the mistake of assuming that since it has thought this through, and it feels its actions are justified, the rest of the world will also see it that way. Special focus will need to be placed on enhancing understanding not only in the U.S., but also in France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., Russia and China.
In all the excitement of acquiring a nuclear deterrent, India must not forget that in the ultimate analysis, its interests and principles will be furthered only through global disarmament. This assumes even greater importance now. A special task force of former diplomats should be formed to work on initiatives to pursue these goals on a continuing basis. The scientists have done their work. The time has come for the intelligentsia and the diplomats to take it forward, instead of getting bogged down in internal dissent.
Jasjit Singh, a regular Frontline contributor, is Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, and Convener of the National Security Council Task Force appointed by the Government of India to work out the role, constitution and functions of the proposed NSC.
COMMents
COMMents
SHARE