India has so far pursued a policy of keeping the nuclear option open, which essentially is a policy of restraint. And it is important that restraint remains the central element of India's nuclear policy.
THE debate on India's strategic policy, especially the nuclear option, has been going on for decades. So far India has pursued a policy of keeping the option "open". This essentially is a policy of restraint. And it is important that restraint remains the central element of its nuclear policy.
The option could be closed by shifting to either end of the spectrum, that is, either becoming formally a non-nuclear weapons state (which could be done by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)), or going in for weaponisation. In the 1990s, there has been increased pressure to move towards the second choice in spite of the deep-rooted abhorrence of most Indians for nuclear weapons. During the past three years there have also been demands for carrying out a nuclear test. The BJP, which has been advocating a hard line on nuclear weapons for long, is now in power at the Centre with a declared intention to re-evaluate India's nuclear policy and exercise the option. Statements made by the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister soon after assuming power indicate that any change of policy would be based on a fresh evaluation and a strategic review. This makes it all the more necessary to examine the issues once again.
To start with, it is necessary to answer the question: does India need nuclear weapons (or an option to make them)? If so, why?
INDIA does not require to possess nuclear weapons for status or prestige. In the ultimate analysis, its status will be determined by how its problems - ranging from poverty eradication to socio-economic change and human development - are solved. Nuclear weapons are relevant only in relation to nuclear weapons and should not be expected to solve other problems, such as militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. The nuclear dilemma is only one part of the challenges and problems that the country must address, although it is a crucial one.
The nuclearisation of India's security environment took place in the early 1960s and intensified in the late 1980s when Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons. The Cold War and much of the articulated doctrines of the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, during the Cold War period, were focussed on nuclear warfighting and blindly building up tens of thousands of weapons in their stockpiles. Much of this was merely to prove "superiority". This approach must be rejected. An objective analysis of the history of nuclear weapons indicates that:
1. There is no credible defence against nuclear weapons. The maximum that can be achieved is defence through deterrence. Nuclear weapons have a horrendously high level of destructive capability. Deterrence, therefore, does not require the creation of arsenals and weapons stocks equal or superior to that of the potential adversary; it is sufficient that they deter the other side from initiating a threat of use or actual use. The prospect of a retaliation that would cause grievous damage would provide the necessary deterrence. This is why the U.S., in spite of its overwhelming superiority of nuclear weapons at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, reconciled itself to a negotiated settlement: even though the U.S. could have annihilated the Soviet Union, some nuclear weapons would have got through to American cities, and that was deterrent enough.
2. As against only one incident of actual use (of two bombs) since 1945, there have been over 46 identifiable incidents of nuclear weapons threat being held out in ways that were more explicit than the threat implicit in mere possession of such weapons. All these cases occurred when the threatening power enjoyed a favourable asymmetry in nuclear weapons capability. Thus, nuclear asymmetry is the core of the problem that affects the conduct of states, their relations, foreign policy choices and military equations.
3. Asymmetry has allowed nuclear weapons states to indulge in political coercion in pursuit of their own interests. China had acquired nuclear weapons and is modernising them to safeguard itself against nuclear "blackmail". But nuclear coercion is not the prerogative of any one nuclear power. It may be recalled that during the Bangladesh liberation war in December 1971, the U.S. despatched a nuclear-armed task force led by USS Enterprise in order to coerce New Delhi. The then President Richard Nixon stated 14 years later that he had considered using nuclear weapons during that war. India's willingness to include the security clause in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty was no doubt motivated by the need to build insurance against possible actions by other nuclear weapons states. And while the 1974 Pokhran test was driven by other goals, it also provided a signal to Moscow that India would not need to depend on the security clause in that treaty any more.
NUCLEAR weapons thus represent a powerful political tool that has been used in the pursuit of foreign policy rather than in military operations. In India's case, nuclear asymmetry that is adverse to its interests and security exists and impacts on its security environment. There is a long-standing territorial (not merely border) dispute with China, and no solution to it seems to be in sight. Bilateral agreements commit both sides to peace and tranquillity along the borders. Relations are improving across the board. But so did they in the 1950s. Eight years after the Panch Sheel agreement was signed, the two countries were at war, and the consequences of that war still remain. China still claims parts of India, including Arunachal Pradesh. China talks of "re-unification" as a sacred duty, and it is not clear whether Arunachal Pradesh is included in the concept of reunification. At the same time, Tibet continues to be a sensitive issue for China. It was a revolt in Tibet in 1959 that triggered a significant deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, which led to the war about two years later. Such contingencies have to be planned for well in time even if they are unpleasant to contemplate during a period of improving relationship.
China is the biggest military power in Asia, and its power is growing. There are many strategic uncertainties that India will have to contend with in the coming years and decades. But it is clear that China does not pose a threat in a way that India cannot adequately deal with. The issue thus is not a question of a threat from China, but the fact that if India has to maintain its independence of policy and action, it must have adequate means of self-defence, whether conventional or nuclear. The challenge is in ensuring the autonomy and strength to deal with future coercion or military pressure. It is in this context that India will require a nuclear deterrent. China and India have signed agreements in recent years to maintain peace and tranquillity based on the principle of mutual and equal security. The concept of equal security could become meaningless, or worse, a mirage, if nuclear asymmetry is perpetuated.
A similar, though lesser, problem exists vis-a-vis Pakistan, although it entered into the nuclear equation only recently. A Pakistani nexus in the matter of nuclear-missile proliferation continues to pose its own challenges, and Pakistani civilian and military leaders of the past are now substantively on record as having said that all the wars against India were initiated by that country. Its present leaders frequently brandish their nuclear deterrent. Even pro-Pakistan U.S. thinktanks are of the view that the gap between India and Pakistan is widening and this strategic divergence could lead to some desperate adventure by the Pakistani leadership, especially if its internal ethno-sectarian conflict and economic crisis continue. This leaves little confidence in the Pakistani leaders' intentions. At the same time, there is no guarantee that a nuclear weapons state will not again seek to apply political coercion on the strength of its nuclear capability, especially if India remains a state of adverse nuclear asymmetry.
THERE are only three possible ways in which the challenges of this asymmetry can be resolved: 1. India gets security through extended deterrence linked to an alliance with a nuclear weapons state; 2. global nuclear disarmament, or 3. India acquires an independent nuclear deterrent.
The first choice is not really a choice since it goes against the very principles of independent India. In any case, no security guarantee by a nuclear weapons state would be credible in the post-Cold War period. Any security assurance by the United Nations Security Council is meaningless since the chances are that the threatening power will be a nuclear weapons state with a veto power in the Council.
Obviously, the second option is the most desirable one since it protects India's interests and security while being in consonance with its values and principles. This is the reason why India sought disarmament from the very beginning. Unfortunately, while the accumulation of nuclear weapons stockpiles were being justified during the Cold War as being necessary for peace between the two blocs, after the Cold War ended everything points to the unwillingness of nuclear weapons states to give up nuclear weapons. The focus, on the other hand, has shifted from disarmament to non-proliferation. Indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT has legitimised the nuclear weapons status of five states for an indefinite period.
India has made disarmament a more urgent (and time-bound) goal, but concern is growing that actual progress will take decades. It was hoped that at least after the Cold War was over, progress on nuclear disarmament would be more visible. But arms control agreements such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-2 (START-2) have not been ratified and schedules for the implementation of earlier agreements have slipped. Everything points to the fact that nuclear weapons states will retain their nuclear weapons well into the next century. Russia has reversed its earlier position of supporting disarmament and now seeks to retain nuclear weapons against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. But notwithstanding the task of progress, disarmament is the real durable solution to the security dilemma.
But nothing short of global disarmament can provide tangible results in resolving the adverse asymmetry that India faces. This leaves hardly any choice but to look seriously at acquiring a nuclear deterrent at least until nuclear disarmament becomes an established reality. The issue is how (and when) to exercise the option to create the necessary deterrent capability. India's relations with China have been improving for quite some time now. There is a window of opportunity for further improvement. Yet it would be prudent to keep an insurance policy for unforeseen reversals.
The question then shifts from whether India should exercise the option, to how and when it should do so. This is where serious consideration needs to be given to the isues involves on a non-partisan basis.
THERE are many ways of looking at how to "exercise" the nuclear option. But three points need attention. While India does need an independent nuclear deterrent, there is no hurry to get it. Nuclear threats do not arise overnight, and some advance indication of the likely situation which could demand such capability in self-defence would normally be available. While it can be argued that Pakistan's behaviour has been quite hostile even in recent times, this is not what should drive urgent action. That this has been the underlying assumption is reflected in the fact that India has not allowed the situation to get out of hand in spite of severe provocation and transnational terrorism and militancy in India for over 15 years which have resulted in nearly 40,000 deaths. This was the period when Pakistan acquired its nuclear weapons and rattled that capability often in aggressive ways.
The second issue is that the progress toward acquiring a nuclear deterrent must not be guided by emotions but by a carefully calculated process that weighs the costs and benefits of a policy. For example, should India test a nuclear bomb to demonstrate that it is going nuclear? The answer is, obviously, no. The test in 1974, though carried out for different reasons, provided sufficient demonstration of India's scientific ability to design and fabricate a fission bomb. A test would inevitably invite sanctions from the U.S. because its national laws decree it. And many other countries may be expected follow suit. Therefore, the issue really is that of the balance of cost and benefit of carrying out a test. A thermonuclear bomb may require a test. But does India need a thermonuclear device at this stage for deterrence for self-defence? The answer is: not at the cost it carries.
THE third point is that India needs to be clear about the doctrine (and hence the strategy and posture) to be followed if it acquires nuclear weapons. It needs to learn from the actions of the five nuclear weapons states, but there is no need to follow them blindly. It has to evolve its own solutions. The foregoing discussion makes it clear that the only reason for acquiring nuclear weapons would be to deter nuclear weapons threat and use at a future date. Thus, the maximum posture that India would ever require is that of minimum deterrence. This obviously is a worst-case scenario. The Chinese posture with necessary modifications (since India's requirements will be of a significantly lower order) becomes a relevant example. But the more reasonable and optimum posture would be based on what may be termed as "recessed deterrence". This posture would not require weaponisation as such; however, all elements of the deterrent (warheads, delivery systems and infrastructure) are kept at a level of preparedness which allows for their rapid shift to a deployed status. This is not a doctrine of ambiguity, but one that seeks to define capabilities that can be rapidly transformed into an operational arsenal of a certain minimum level. This would provide an additional level of deterrence against escalation of tensions into a conflict since the adversary would know, and should be told, that India will move towards an operational arsenal if the security environment deteriorates.
WHAT does a recessed deterrence posture require? To start with, it needs an adequate amount of fissile material for weapons purposes. International experts believe that India will have upwards of 250 kg of weapons-grade plutonium (enough to make 50-odd bombs) by A.D. 2000. There is no doubt that India has the wherewithal to make plutonium-based 15 to 30 kiloton-yield nuclear warheads. A thermonuclear bomb would be desirable but will require testing. India has the sovereign right to test, but the costs of the likely international response outweigh the benefits, at least at this stage. The 1974 peaceful explosion provided India with enough basis for a credible capability. It also needs to be remembered that the Hiroshima bomb was not tested; yet it was not any less effective because of that. A nuclear test, therefore, remains a desirable measure but not a necessity. A test will define the quality of the deterrent, but not its credibility.
It is in the area of delivery system that work is required. Such a system will need to be missile-based if it has to cover ranges of up to 5,000 km (which is perhaps the maximum limit of India's requirement). Aircraft will remain subject to risks of interception. This is why the weapons states maintain a triad. Reliable operational deployment of ballistic missiles will take time. If India goes by the experience of other countries, two dozen or more tests may be needed before adequate operational reliability can be ensured. The last test of the intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) was carried out more than four years ago. While the three Agni tests successfully demonstrated the technology, they are not adequate for a deployable option. An operational IRBM system in requisite numbers, therefore, could be as much as 10 years away at this stage, especially when the restrictive technology denial regimes instituted by the West are taken into account. But it is clear that the priority, and the path to "exercising the option", lies in expediting the development of intermediate range ballistic missiles.
Although all the 16,000 ballistic missiles used in wars since 1944 were armed with conventional warheads, the missile programme is the key to credible nuclear capability. The advantage of investments in missiles is that they can be used with conventional warheads also. The Indian Government stated in 1996 that a decision on further development of the IRBM would be taken depending on the security environment obtaining at that time. But that would be too late. India must get out of the Panipat syndrome of national defence. It is necessary to take steps to carry out four to six IRBM tests a year on a priority basis. Then the process of keeping the option open will be more credible and progress will be made toward exercising the option when necessary. Meanwhile India should be willing to forgo ballistic missiles if all countries are willing to abolish them since this will be a major step toward nuclear disarmament.
WHAT will be the costs of a recessed deterrence strategy? One is that this may prove to be too late at a crucial time. But planning on the basis of worst-case scenarios should be avoided. Usually, nuclear threats emerge linked to a conventional war, and the utility of nuclear weapons will continue to come down rather than increase, in the coming decades. Fewer weapons are required for deterrence as states and societies become more industrialised and integrated. Even a small arsenal would provide adequate deterrence capability and function as a political tool on a par with large arsenals.
The other cost is financial, which must be looked at seriously, especially since precious resources will be invested. Here India has some advantage in that the peaceful nuclear programme for civilian purposes has already absorbed most of the costs involved in creating a deterrent. The nuclear programmes of South Africa and Pakistan did not grow out of any civilian programmes and the costs, therefore, were high. South Africa spent a total of $250 million for its six bombs, and Pakistani leaders claim that their programme cost a similar amount by 1996. What India will have to cater for is the missile development cost and the incremental costs of weaponisation if and when India needs to resort to it.
In terms of international political and economic costs, no violation of international commitment would be involved. The international community has already been sensitised to what many of them term as the "quasi-nuclear" weapons capability of India. As long as India moves incrementally and with due restraint, international reaction is not likely to harm its interests in any significant way.
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh is Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
