Container insecurity

The U.S. leads nations that are paranoid about the possibility of terrorists using containers to smuggle explosives and equipment.

Even on the most exciting of subjects, government handouts can be bone-dry and singularly uninteresting. On this score, The Country Report on Terrorism 2005 released recently by the United States State Department does not come as a surprise. Mind you, terrorism is not exactly the least exciting topic of the day, especially when talking about Osama bin Laden, one of the most hated yet colourful subjects. The CROT (as I would like to abbreviate the title of the State Department production for the sake of convenience) is just prim and proper. Perhaps I am at fault for expecting too much from a document that merely chronicles events of the past year. This is an annual Washington ritual, analogous to the law and order report placed in Parliament each year by our own Ministry of Home Affairs. Our Mandarins possibly do a better job than their State Department counterparts do.

The CROT may not rate high on readability, but it definitely is the delight of columnists like me who are constantly looking for a single window to get all data. After outlining the legislative requirements and key terms, it straightaway plunges into a strategic assessment that is of great value to the layperson. The burden of the song is, while Al Qaeda is no longer the organisation it was at the time of 9/11, it cannot be written off as yet. It has been denied the safe haven it once had in Afghanistan and has been on the run after losing several of its prominent leaders. Notwithstanding these reverses, it has proved itself resilient and has managed to retain its hard core of followers, who have adapted to the new operational demands of the field created by U.S belligerence and the formidable international cooperation that has been forged since 9/11. The State Department's overall assessment is: "We are still in the first phase of a potentially long war.... It is likely that we will face a resilient enemy for years to come."

This is definitely not a sensational statement or something that we do not already know. It does, however, serve notice on all those in government in any part of the world that there is no room for complacency just because Al Qaeda has not done anything spectacular since 9/11. There are reports from time to time of a formidable number of sleepers secreted in various parts of the world who can energise themselves for a strike.

Indonesia is a supreme example of a country that nurses hardcore militants who are sufficiently ruthless to cause major damage. The CROT devotes nearly three pages to trends in that country, highlighting the importance of this region in the fight against terrorism. As if to follow up the 2002 bombings of the historic tourist resort of Bali, which resulted in massive casualties, terrorists struck again on October 1 last year. Three suicide bombers were involved this time. More than 20 people were killed and 120, including six Americans, were injured. Law enforcement tasted huge success during the November raid in Malang, a town in East Java, in which Azahari bin Husin, a Malaysian bomb maker who had been evading arrest for nearly three years, was killed. A close collaborator and fellow Malaysian, Noordin Mohammed Top (also known as "Moneyman") remains at large, having escaped a police raid in central Java earlier this year. According to the State Department, Husin and Top are suspected for every major incident that has occurred in Indonesia after 2001, including the 2003 Marriott Hotel and 2004 Australian Embassy bombings. The Jemaah Islamya (JI) is a well-knit Indonesian militant outfit that is a thorn in the flesh of the Indonesian government. It calls for continuous monitoring.

The Philippines is another country that is a source of great concern because there are at least three Islamist terrorist outfits - Jemaah Islamya, the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Rajah Sulaiman Movement, the majority of whose members are Christian converts to Islam. February 2005 saw near-simultaneous explosions in three cities - Manila, Davao and General Santos City - in which eight people died and 150 were injured. What is significant is the terrorist access to sophisticated explosives. On the positive side, the authorities have had success in pursuing criminal cases in courts and obtaining substantial terms of imprisonment against some terrorists. Coupled with the killing of some key operatives, the police seem to be fairly in control of the situation.

The CROT devotes a whole chapter to the nagging problem of state sponsorship of terrorism. It puts Cuba, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Libya and Sudan in this league, although the latter two countries have had a slight change of mind and have been lending a semblance of support to the international action against terrorism. Not surprisingly, Iran is identified as the greatest threat in the context of its ambitious and unconcealed nuclear ambitions and preparations. Two features in Iran's stance are of concern to the U.S. One is the sustained support - funds, training and weapons - to the anti-Israeli activities of Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Next is the uninhibited interference in what is happening on Iraqi territory. The CROT claims that there is reason to believe that insurgent elements in Iraq receive material support from the Iranian government, including funding and safe passage. Apart from possible support to WMD-based terrorism, what is worrying to the U.S. is Iran's ability to produce chemical and biological agents or weapons.

Syria is another "bad boy" in the eyes of the State Department. While there has been no direct attack against American targets in Syria for nearly seven years, the country's active promotion of hostilities against Israel invites U.S. ire. Syria makes no bones about its antipathy to Israel. While it disclaims any support to global terrorism, it is clear that it will not hesitate to lend support to all those who pose problems to Israel. The CROT also takes note of the wide suspicion of a Syrian hand in the assassination last year of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

An entire chapter on the initiatives to forge global cooperation to combat terrorism is the most significant feature of the CROT. It is easy to be cynical of these efforts to halt terrorism. However, without these efforts we would undoubtedly have had a repeat of 9/11 in some form or the other.

The attempts by a wide spectrum of government agencies to stem the flow of funds across countries has helped a great deal. The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), formed at the 1989 Paris Summit of G8 nations is an example of what international consensus can achieve in tracking down and neutralising those who command proceeds of crime and use them to spread terrorism. What started as a measure to contain the evil of money laundering has expanded purposefully. It has produced an action plan to deny to the terrorist the financial help he looks for from a variety of sources, including organisations that pass off as business houses or charities. The first set of 40 FATF recommendations issued in 1990 were followed up in the days after 9/11 with nine more that address terrorist financing, which mainly involves the use of cash couriers and the smuggling of cash across borders.

The success that governments can achieve will certainly make a difference. Training is no doubt a key element. What is more crucial is the level of integrity in law enforcement agencies, especially at airports and check posts. I am not comfortable discussing this, knowing as I do how little transparency there is at critical points in our country. Recall how a senior Customs official helped in the smuggling of arms on the West coast, which ultimately facilitated the serial blasts of 1993 in Mumbai. I am not for a moment suggesting that we hold the monopoly for dishonesty. However, the mere fact that this evil is present elsewhere in the globe also should not lead to a state of helplessness. How we are going to address this evil is of interest to the average Indian who is harassed by corruption at all levels.

A matter of great worry for us all should be how to prevent terrorists from sending huge quantities of contraband, such as explosives and firearms, in containers that arrive at our ports. Introducing explosives and other lethal equipment into the containers is easy and checking them is extremely difficult. This hard reality has triggered serious thinking among experts in various countries to evolve a viable and effective plan of action. The U.S. leads the nations that are paranoid about this.

The CROT estimates that 90 per cent of world trade takes the form of dispatches through containers. Seaports in the U.S. receive more than nine million cargo containers each year. These figures convey the enormity of the problem and the vehicle available to terrorists to engage in wanton mischief.

The Container Security Initiatives (CSI) now in place comprise four elements: intelligence, pre-screening of containers, detection technology and use of smarter/tamper-evident containers. This is possibly the best combination of preventive measures one can visualise at this moment if one reckons the dimensions of international cargo traffic. There are, however, stark vulnerabilities in the domain of container security. Containers can be broadly classified as "high risk" and "low risk", and it is the former that will receive priority from inspecting units such as the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection of the U.S. This covers only about 4 per cent of all cargo, leaving the rest open to speculation.

That the problem is real and not imaginary might be understood if one recalls how the Chennai airport cargo terminal staff stumbled on a package containing a powerful grenade on November 19. 2005. Also relevant is the explosion in Meenambakkam Airport on August 2, 1984, in which nearly 30 people were killed. The bombs were in a bag that was to be put on a flight to Colombo.

More than 40 ports worldwide participate in a CSI programme that contemplates pre-loading screening. Incidentally, 75 per cent of all containers arriving in the U.S. originate in or are transshipped from these ports. Significantly, no Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi port is in the CSI list , although Singapore and Colombo are. Will it be too much to expect a Home Ministry's response on this subject, if only in the interest of transparency and educating the public?

The CROT may be routine, but it provokes many thoughts. For instance, what more can the international community do to plug loopholes in the transfer of funds that go to the benefit of the terrorist? How can we make immigration controls tighter, without making international travel more miserable than it is now? How do we enhance the security features of travel documents so that no terrorist is able to enter a country on a stolen or forged passport? Finally, how much technology is available to prevent a container from being used for the transshipment of terrorist contraband?

All these questions illustrate that counter-terrorism is a full-time exercise that is best left to a group of experts who should be able to zealously guard their province from meddling by uninformed politicians. Only then can we make the world safer from the onslaught of those who want to wreck the already fragile peace in the world in the name of religion.