India cannot relax its vigil against terrorism; it lost 2,300 lives last year to terror and continues to rank among the worlds most terror-afflicted countries.
Defeating Al Qaeda will require analysis grounded in sound empirical judgment and not blinded by provocative theories, seductive methodologies or wishful thinking.
Bruce Hoffman, author of Inside Terrorism, in Foreign Affairs (May-June 2008).
DESPITE all the political rhetoric that I hear at home and abroad and the undeniable successes that law enforcement has achieved globally, I somehow get the feeling that the offensive against terrorism has lost its momentum.
Going mainly by widely publicised recent incidents and assessments, I believe it is not expedient for governments and police forces anywhere to rest on their oars. On the contrary, there is a definite need to remain on guard. A stock taking of the situation from time to time is always useful to disseminate education required for good citizenship and also to build all round caution. Here are some happenings and trends in India and its neighbourhood that confirm that the situation continues to be fragile.
First, at home. The infiltration into the Samba sector in Jammu and Kashmir by terrorists supported by Pakistan Rangers should make us sit up and take note of a situation that is far from stable. Six civilians and a jawan lost their lives in the fighting, in which the security forces managed to kill two infiltrators. The incident, coming as it does after a long lull and close to the annual Amarnath yatra, is an index of the terrorists determination to spread fear.
The foiled attempt on the life of Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai on April 27 cannot also be ignored. The happening has both positive and negative features. The reflexes shown by the security forces in preventing the killing is a matter of extreme gratification.
It seems all is not bad with the beleaguered country, and it can still boast of a loyal segment, however small, that retains sanity and dedication. It is around such incidents that professionalism, a definite requirement to keep terrorists on the run, can be built, especially in vital sectors of the government.
On the flip side is the continued resolve of the Taliban, a close ally of Al Qaeda, to wreck the peace in the area and frustrate all efforts to consolidate a constitutional government. The Talibans prosperity, flowing from a multidimensional, international drug trade, is one factor that will keep it a formidable force with an immense capacity to unleash violence at will. Karzai will remain its principal target, and his success or fall will decide the future of terrorism in this strategic geographic area, at least for a while.
The situation inside neighbouring Pakistan, which has a huge stake in Afghanistans stability, is not encouraging either. One expected at least a semblance of political stability after the elections. This, however, is not to be the case with Nawaz Sharifs announcement that he will not be part of the government but will support it from outside, a euphemism for readiness to pull down the government at will. This prospect of Pakistans return to political chaos, coupled with the governments own dalliance with fundamentalist, religious elements, is something that would actually encourage the terrorists.
A Pakistan government pact with militants such as Baitullah Mehsud of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which is a distinct possibility, would remove government troops from the area and encourage armed terrorists to cross over to Afghanistan, thereby swelling the Talibans ranks. The consequences could be disastrous and would only help buttress the Talibani (read Al Qaeda) cause.
What could be of greater concern is the continued violence in Iraq, which has been witness to the influx of Al Qaeda elements from a number of countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. While the lower formations are mainly from the local population, many leadership positions have been grabbed by foreigners, especially those from Egypt. The death of Al Qaeda leading light Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in a United States military raid in June 2006 was a major reverse for the organisation in Iraq.
Amidst fluctuating fortunes, including some heavy beating at the hands of the U.S Army, Al Qaeda has shown resilience during the post-Zarqawi period, which explains the huge U.S. casualties to date. A few days ago there were unconfirmed reports of the arrest of Abu-al-Masri, considered a successor to Zarqawi. If he is still at large, as some believe, there is cause for worry because of his dreaded organising abilities. His preference for attacks on infrastructure over human targets makes him a formidable enemy.
Interestingly, in the past few days, Iraq has been witness to women suicide bombers. One theory describes it as an index of Al Qaeda desperation, an assessment that is difficult to accept readily without knowledge of the compelling reasons for bringing in women to launch the attacks. Iraq is still very far from being normal; it provides a sanctuary for Al Qaeda and elements friendly to it.
A backdrop to all these trends is provided by Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, an annual production by the U.S. State Department and the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC). Released on April 30, it is an impressive global survey of a problem that should interest governments of all countries. A total of 14,499 attacks worldwide in 2007 no doubt represented a marginal decrease (571) over 2006.
These accounted for 9,400 police casualties. What is more galling is that about 2,400 children were also terror victims. As I write this comes news of the multiple blasts in Jaipur.
My first response is that this ghastly occurrence squares with the assessment that we can hardly relax our vigil, even if it may not help to prevent an outrage of the kind reported from the Pink City. The Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 cannot therefore be faulted as being alarmist when it says: India continued to rank among the worlds most terror-afflicted countries. Terrorists, separatists, and extremists took more than 2,300 lives this year. Although clearly committed to combating violent extremism, the Indian governments counterterrorism efforts were hampered by its outdated and overburdened law enforcement and legal systems.
In the final analysis, is it possible to summarise the current situation avoiding hyperbole and emotions and without simplifying a problem that has, unfortunately, acquired an annoying complexity at the hands of scholars and theoreticians? This is especially in the context of the confusion that still surrounds Al Qaeda, which remains a dominant player in the field. Is Al Qaeda as powerful and pervasive as it is made out to be by some intelligence experts? Or is it a spent force that is content with a modicum of central direction as some academics would want us to believe? Again, what is the truth behind assertions that the terrorist world comprises several directionless grass-roots jehadis about whom we needlessly make a lot of fuss?
All these questions receive some attention from Professor Bruce Hoffman, who teaches at George Town University and at the Combating Terrorism Centre in the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Reviewing a book, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century (Foreign Affairs, May-June, 2008) by Marc Sageman, a political sociologist and a practising psychiatrist, Hoffman disagrees totally with the writers assertion that Al Qaedas central command has been neutralised operationally and that the real danger to the world is from loose-knit cells floating around in the West.
According to Sageman, these cells comprise essentially Muslim immigrants and Muslim students. He is possibly correct if he is referring to 9/11 and to the terrorist action that one saw subsequently in London and Glasgow. In both the U.S. and the United Kingdom, students (a few of whom were pseudo) and immigrants have played a sizeable role in fomenting terrorism. Hoffmans view is that Sageman is wrong in articulating the theory that these alone constitute the current threat. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 2007, for instance, is unambiguous that Al Qaeda still has a central leadership that plans high-impact plots posing a serious threat to homeland security. The NIE assessment is endorsed by official circles in the U.K. as well, if one is to go by a public pronouncement (November 2006) of Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of MI5, and Hoffman cites this as one more reason why he will not go with Sageman.
From press accounts, I gather that Indian intelligence perceptions are not much at variance with those of the officialdom in the U.S and the U.K. Between Hoffman and Sagemans analyses, it seems the formers is more cautious, realistic and down-to-earth. In the game of intelligence, it is always practical not to be swayed too much by academic projections. The safe bet would be to exaggerate a threat rather than play it down. This is because the latter course could unwittingly influence us to lower our guard and thereby invite perdition.
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