Question of ethics

A PREDATOR DRONE of the U.S. Air Force, an undated handout. - REUTERS/HO

The targeting of Al Qaeda's Anwar al-Awlaki raises questions about the legality of the U.S. killing its own citizens and the ethicality of using drones for that.

THE September 30 killing of Anwar al-Awlaki, a preacher-turned-operational commander of Al Qaeda, in a remote tribal village in the desert region of Yemen, following a United States drone attack, is yet another setback to the dreaded terrorist organisation. (The last time the U.S. used a drone in Yemen was in 2002. That was to kill Abu Ali al-Harithi, a Yemeni Al Qaeda operative accused of planning the 2000 attack on USS Cole, the U.S. Navy destroyer.) Coming within months of the death of Osama bin Laden in a daring U.S. operation at Abbottabad in Pakistan, the liquidation of Awlaki in Yemen is a remarkable success for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the White House. Incidentally, another U.S. citizen, Samir Khan, of Pakistani origin, was also killed in the raid, along with two others. Samir Khan was the co-editor of Inspire, an English online propaganda magazine that was principally aimed at prospective recruits to Al Qaeda.

Even the bitterest U.S. detractor would concede that superior technology and a ceaselessly penetrative intelligence outfit with enormous resources were indeed making a difference, even in as difficult a terrain as rural Yemen. Incidentally, this apparently seamless operation almost similar to the one that saw the elimination of bin Laden should strengthen the Obama campaign for next year's presidential election. This is, of course, only if the country's economic situation does not worsen further and Obama retains the zeal and edge in his offensive against Al Qaeda and other organisations that have dedicated themselves to striking at the U.S. and its citizens across the globe.

The Awlaki profile, like that of bin Laden, makes for interesting reading. It more than confirms that the breeding ground for terrorists is not Afghanistan or Pakistan. It could well be the American heartland itself. Awlaki was born in New Mexico in 1971, when his father (who was later to become a Minister for Agriculture in the Yemeni government) was a student there. Returning to Yemen with his father, he went to a prestigious private school. He went back to the U.S. to get an engineering degree at the Colorado State University and a Master's in Education from San Diego.

Possibly because of his exposure to strong Islamic instruction while he was an adolescent in Yemen, Awlaki took a drastic decision after he completed his postgraduate studies. Much to the chagrin of his father, he preferred religious preaching to a regular job that his U.S degrees could certainly have earned him. He became an imam, first at Fort Collins (Colorado) and later in San Diego, where he spent five years at the local mosque, the Arribat Al Islami. He had earlier married a cousin from his native Yemen and raised two children. Awlaki's life in San Diego was comfortable, marked by good relations within the community.

Ironically, alongside religious instruction there, he displayed temporal interests as well. These included exploring prospects of investment in private business, particularly in gold and minerals. It was this aspect of his personality that persuaded a visitor to the San Diego mosque to make Awlaki agree to recording his lectures and marketing them in CDs. This essentially commercial proposition (about 50 CDs were sold) was a success because of his powers of articulation, especially in English.

One report tells us that the lectures were free from radicalism, with not even a tinge of hatred or exhortation to violence, something that was to mark his later rhetoric. His desire to be in the spotlight influenced his decision to relocate to Virginia in 2000, where he became imam at the big Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, outside Washington, D.C. This proved very significant as it gave him exposure to a large segment of the Muslim community in the country.

Then came 9/11 and the subsequent government action against terror suspects. Awlaki took a leading part in the Muslim protests that followed. Information fed to official quarters had it that at least two of the hijackers involved in the 9/11 attack had attended Awlaki's sermons. He was quizzed several times by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during the 9/11 investigation, but it did not throw up material enough to justify his detention. Feeling the heat of scrutiny, he left the U.. abruptly and went to the United Kingdom, where he was a big draw at student gatherings.

Unable to make ends meet, he returned to Yemen in 2004. It was during this phase that Awlaki's outlook to life underwent a surprising transformation. He transited from being a mere ideologue to an operations man, and became pronouncedly militant in his exhortations online to Muslims, telling them that they should kill all those who did not subscribe to Islam. Under U.S. pressure, he was detained by the Yemeni government for a year.

Following his release, he found it safer to operate from the remote regions of the country so as to evade continual official monitoring of his activities. Keeping track of his doings as a leading light of the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the U.S. administration ordered his targeted killing in 2010. This move also took into account the strong evidence linking him with Nidal Malik Hasan, the U.S. Army Major who killed 13 persons in the Fort Hood camp in November 2009, and the arrest, one month later, of a Nigerian student with explosives fastened to his innerwear while on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit.

THREE ISSUES

In my view, the Awlaki killing raises at least three major issues. The first relates to Al Qaeda's morale. To be specific, how far has it further weakened Al Qaeda, which is yet to recover from bin Laden's removal from the scene? Without a doubt, one more virulent campaigner against the West in general and the U.S. in particular has been got rid of. If bin Laden stood out for his organising abilities, Awlaki was formidable with his widespread appeal on the Internet for violence against the non-Islamic world. The ease with which he spoke English carried an incredible appeal to the American Muslim youth, a phenomenon that caused panic within the U.S. administration. His successful elimination highlights the American prowess in the fight against terrorism, and to this extent, it will dampen Al Qaeda and its allies for at least some time.

Also, the impact of the U.S. operation should be long lasting, especially because of the use of a technology that Al Qaeda has not been able to match as yet. This is why the AQAP's threat of retaliation announced seems more symbolic than a real one backed by a capacity to inflict large-scale destruction on the U.S. and its allies. Notwithstanding this, a few spectacular actions that can damage relatively minor U.S. targets are very much on the cards.

The second feature of the Awlaki killing is the legality of the U.S. action. Awlaki was a U.S. citizen on whom the Constitution vested a few fundamental rights, including the Fifth Amendment right (No one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.) Interestingly, late last year, a U.S. court refused to intervene in a suit filed by Awlaki's father questioning the constitutional validity of the order against his son. The court's view was that this was an essentially political decision falling outside the judicial ambit. The question may have raised is whether by ordering his liquidation the Obama administration had violated a citizen's right enshrined in the Constitution.

One view that supports the administration refers to Awlaki's dual nationality and his choosing to operate from Yemen, a country over which the U.S. had no control. Even if this was so, there is the other test of imminent danger a condition prerequisite for a peremptory order of assassination against an individual that the U.S. government had to satisfy. It is difficult to say whether Awlaki's assassination satisfied this criterion, especially when the target was operating from a remote locale and had no means himself to strike at his enemy. One school of thought accuses the Obama administration of being extremely flexible while defining imminent danger. The debate will necessarily be inconclusive.

Finally, there is the ethical question of the use of drones, which have become a powerful weapon in the U.S. armoury. They are lethal beyond belief and are growing fast in sophistication. Otherwise known as Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), the remotely piloted aircraft have become an accepted mode of attacking the enemy. Until now they have passed muster with the Geneva-Convention-based Law of Armed Conflict despite the chorus of protest from human rights activists. The truth is, however much the U.S. may deny it, a drone attack takes more civilian lives than is admitted. In sum, the Awlaki episode deserves to be studied seriously by both defence experts and the political executive in India. The technology used and the legal issues raised here may not be relevant to us just now. At a distant point of time, however, it may not remain so.