A step closer to peace

Published : Jan 08, 2000 00:00 IST

The second round of Israel-Syria talks, beginning in early January, could pave the way for durable peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours.

KESAVA MENON

HAFEZ AL ASSAD seems set to pull it off. The Syrian President had stuck to a tough negotiating position vis-a-vis Israel despite the desertion of regional allies and the collapse of a friendly superpower that had sustained his defiance for long. N ow it would appear that Syria is close to obtaining satisfaction on the Golan Heights and other issues and Assad appears prepared to be magnanimous in victory.

When Syrian and Israeli negotiators get down to their second round of talks from January 3, 2000 in or near about Washington, they are expected to tackle the issues at the root of a 32-year- old confrontation straightway. If they succeed in their task th ey could end the hostility that has existed for an even longer period. However, a settlement of the dispute between Israel on the one hand and Syria and Lebanon on the other will not close off the Arab-Israeli confrontation. That will only be achieved af ter Israel makes a settlement with the Palestinians. But a successful conclusion of the Syria-Israel talks would mark a giant stride towards a durable peace between Israel and the Arabs.

Israel's Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, and Syria's Foreign Minister, Farooq al Sharaa, first met in Washington between December 14 and 16. Official-level talks had been going on between Syria and Israel until February 1996 when they were abruptly suspended . Efforts to resume the talks had been stalled by a controversy, which might appear semantic in form but had deeper implications. In the Syrian version, the Israelis, especially former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, had agreed by February 1996 that they w ould hand over the Golan Heights. Israel maintained that Rabin had merely stated the theoretical possibility that Israel could return the Golan Heights if Syria was prepared to offer a comprehensive peace in exchange.

It was pointless for the two sides once again to go over the ground that they had covered until February 1996. But their publicly stated perceptions of what had been achieved in the negotiations made it difficult for them just to restart the process. Aft er having declared that Israel had agreed to return the Golan Heights, it would have been difficult for Assad to enter into open-ended negotiations in a context where Israel denied this claim. It would have been difficult for an Israeli Cabinet to sell t o the people of Israel the idea of reopening negotiations when Syria claimed that a deal on the Golan Heights had already been clinched.

The United States administration, which was fully involved in the talks, could have perhaps broken the stalemate if it had clarified what was contained in the minutes of the earlier negotiations or at least in a memorandum of understanding (MoU), which h ad supposedly been signed. It did not choose to do so, and this could have been either because the position was close to what the Syrians said or because it thought that secrecy was necessary for the success of the talks. Eventually, after a meeting betw een U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Assad the U.S. came out with a formula that finessed the difference in perception and allowed both sides to return to the negotiating table.

Although the breakthrough had been achieved in the talks that Albright held with Assad and Barak during her tour of West Asia, it was left to U.S. President Bill Clinton to make the announcement in Washington. Clinton declared that the talks would resume "from the point where they were left off in 1996". He did not elaborate on the "point at which the talks were left off in 1996" and this enabled both sides to return to the talks with their honour intact. A notable feature of the opening ceremonies in W ashington was the speech by Sharaa, in which he sought to clarify the historical record. While the West was well informed about the threats that Israel has had to face from the Arab world, it overlooked the sufferings of many Arabs because of Israel's oc cupation of their lands and displacement of peoples.

At the end of the first round of talks, both sides said that they were satisfied with each other's commitment and sincerity. While the Israelis appeared to be a touch more euphoric, Sharaa stuck to the traditional Syrian reserve, stating that he would no t say that he was optimistic until he saw how the second round went. There has been no clarification of the details of the first round, but from subsequent developments it would appear that the controversy over the "point at which the talks were left off in 1996" had been more or less settled. If nothing else, the Syrians could have left in a huff if the Israelis had been stubborn about their view on the true position.

There were several signs that Israel was preparing for a withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Israeli military had begun drawing up plans for the withdrawal and the likely costs were being bandied about. According to estimates in the Israel press, Israel w ould need about $10 billion to compensate its citizens who had settled in the Golan and to relocate industries. The dismantling of the military infrastructure in the Golan and its re-assembly on Israeli soil was expected to cost another $10 billion. It a ppeared that Israel would ask the U.S. to cover most of the bill on the grounds that a peace deal between Israel and Syria would advance the strategic interests of U.S. There were also reports that Israel was likely to approach the U.S. for an additional $10 billion to upgrade its satellite surveillance and air defence capabilities and to acquire advanced ground attack aircraft.

A surer sign of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights was that political campaigns for and against the withdrawal were initiated in Israel soon after Barak promised that he would hold a referendum on any deal that was signed with Syria. Soon after the Washington talks concluded, moves were initiated from both ends of the Israeli political spectrum to introduce legislation that would define the terms of the referendum. Barak and most of the parties in his coalition favour a referendum in which a s imple majority would be sufficient to endorse or reject the deal. The Opposition tried to press for referendum formats that would require that either a majority of all eligible Israeli voters or a special majority of all those who voted had to endorse th e deal for it to be valid. Opinion polls showed that the public was equally divided in the initial stages but that would change as there was further clarification on what Syria had to offer in exchange.

While an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan seems to be on the cards, it remains unclear as to how far the Israelis will withdraw. They have tried for a border line that runs along the edge of the Golan escarpment, and at best have been ready to contempla te a withdrawal to the border that existed prior to the 1948 armistice line, which ran through the Golan's forward slopes. But Syria wants Israel to return to the 1948 armistice line, which runs along the foot of the Golan Heights and which remained the border until June 4, 1967. Israel's main objections to a return to the 1967 border are that it would lose valuable water resources and such a step would bring the Syrians that much closer to the Galilee plain. Syria is not likely to compromise on this po int and the talks might collapse if Israel does not give way.

Sharaa and Assad have given strong hints that they are ready for a comprehensive peace with Israel if Syria's territory is returned. The very fact that they have begun talking directly to Israel shows that they have already met one of Israel's fundamenta l concerns - that its Arab neighbours should reconcile with its existence in the region. Through all these years of confrontation, the Syria-Israel border has remained one of the quietest in the region, with no violent attacks launched across it either b y Syrian forces or by militants. To that extent, any promise from Syria that it will prevent such attacks in the future should be considered solid. That would meet Israel's second major concern - that its citizens should be safe from the threat of violen ce.

Israel has been frustrated that none of the agreements it signed with its Arab neighbours has produced a flourishing relationship. Other than a spurt in Israeli tourists visiting Egypt and Jordan, gas deals with the former and some trade with the latter, there has been no great progress towards the building of relations with its neighbours. Syria has now held out the faint promise that it would promote a healthier relationship. In fact, Sharaa actually put the ball in the Israeli court when he said that it was for Israel and not the Arabs first to be clear whether it had made peace its strategic option.

The Syrians are also reportedly willing to accommodate Israeli concerns about water resources from the Golan and the Yarmouk river. In this context there is an intriguing report that Assad, when he makes his maiden visit to the U.S. sometime in the near future, will discuss with Clinton a plan for a separate deal with Turkey that will provide for enhanced water supplies from the Euphrates river. Syria could also be amenable to the Israeli request for forward observation posts on the Golan and demilitari sed zones on either side of the border, provided Israel reciprocates. But the most important benefit that Syria can confer on Israel is support for a deal between the latter and Lebanon.

Israel is desperate to withdraw from the enclave it occupies in southern Lebanon since it constantly loses soldiers in attacks by the Hezbollah, the Shiite militia. Barak had promised his people that he will withdraw troops from southern Lebanon by the m iddle of next year. While he has hinted that he would even order a unilateral withdrawal if necessary, Israel would obviously prefer to withdraw under the terms of a deal with the Lebanese government. Israel can be confident that the Hezbollah will not l aunch attacks into its (Israel's) territory in the future only if the revamped Lebanese army repossesses the enclave and takes responsibility for policing it. The Hezbollah has promised that it will suspend its military campaign against Israel (but not t he ideological one) once an agreement is reached with Syria and Lebanon. Israel can therefore anticipate a comprehensive peace if it settles its disputes with Syria and Lebanon.

With the contribution that Syria has made to establish peace and stability in Lebanon, not to speak of the 30,000 troops it is believed to have stationed on its western neighbour's territory, it has a powerful influence over Beirut's policy-makers. The r eality might be somewhere between the external perception that Syria controls Lebanon and the Syria/Lebanon declaration that they are true brothers who always act in concert. What matters is that Lebanon is not about to make a separate peace with Israel and that it will do so only when Israel accommodates it and Syria simultaneously. Lebanon is therefore not going to take over the policing of Israel's northern borders unless Israel has already agreed to settle the Golan Heights and other issues with Syr ia.

Lebanon did not take part in the first round of talks and was not invited to the second. Indications were that talks on the Israel-Lebanon track of the negotiations would get underway soon after the second round of the Israel-Syria talks. By the end of D ecember, Israel had appointed its negotiating team. Since the territorial issue is the main issue between them, a deal would not take long to reach if other conditions are right. The one other major issue remaining between Israel and Lebanon concerns the future of the Palestinian refugees who live in camps in Lebanon.

In all other respects, Syria and Lebanon can make their peace with Israel without concerning themselves with the plight of the Palestinians. Assad, for one, would feel that he was only paying back Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) Chairman Yasser A rafat in the same coin. However, apart from the emotive pull of the Palestinian issue, across the Arab world, the very practical problem of what can be done with the Palestinian refugees precludes a comprehensive deal involving Israel/Syria/Lebanon that leaves the Palestinian Authority dangling in the air.

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