Any fresh dialogue with the LTTE has to be preceded by a Sinhala consensus so that the issues of war and peace are not subjected to the vagaries of competitive Sinhala politics.
V. SURYANARAYANIN an emotion-charged address to the nation after assuming office for a second term, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga referred to the continuing trauma in her life. "I have suffered our nation's sorrow in every way humanly possible, in the vici ous way of losing a father. In the loving pain of motherhood. In the soul-destroying pain of losing a husband. And now, finally, I have stepped over the threshold of my life into the deep abyss of the unknown darkness, only to be miraculously saved by th e powers that be in order that I serve you further with even more passion and with even more dedication than I have before."
Wishing to forget the bitterness generated by electoral politics, she appealed to Ranil Wickremasinghe, the leader of the main Opposition United National Party (UNP), to join hands with the Government to find a permanent solution to the ethnic conflict a nd to end the "wretched and mindless bloodshed and destruction". After returning from London, where she had gone to seek medical advice, Kumaratunga expressed her readiness to enter into negotiations with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) if it s leader, V. Prabakaran, was willing to join the "democratic process" and accept a solution within a united Sri Lanka.
The result of the 1999 presidential election has momentous implications for the Island republic. The world heaved a sigh of relief when it was known that the LTTE's dastardly attempt on Kumaratunga had failed. The LTTE's objective was to create panic and confusion in the country and trigger a communal bloodbath. It is a signal tribute to the people of Sri Lanka that the electoral process, including the post-poll situation, passed off peacefully.
At the turn of the new millennium, Sri Lanka is at a crossroads. Will competitive Sinhale politics continue to plague the country? Or will Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe arrive at a consensus on holding negotiations with the LTTE and, if Prabakaran conti nues to be defiant, tackle the LTTE menace jointly?
The tragedy of Sri Lanka becomes apparent if one recalls the political situation in 1994 when Kumaratunga became President for the first time and contrast it with the situation in 1999. The parliamentary and presidential elections of 1994, which brought the People's Alliance (P.A.) to power, undoubtedly marked a progressive shift in the country's politics. The UNP, which had ruled for 17 years, had sounded the death knell for democracy. Parliament, the judiciary and the bureaucracy had been made subserv ient to the political executive. Electoral processes had been manipulated. The country was ruled by emergency regulations. Ethnic conflict got exacerbated. The hopes generated by the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 were shattered soon afterwards owing to the intransigence of Prabakaran and the Machiavellian machinations of President J.R. Jayewardene. The devolution proposals were not implemented sincerely. President R. Premadasa went a step further. He patronised the LTTE, gave it money and weapons, and allowed it to have control of the North and the East. Finally, Premadasa paid for the wages of sin; he was killed by an LTTE human bomb.
In 1994, Kumaratunga had the overwhelming support of the Tamils, Muslims and progressive sections of the Sinhalese. The Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) extended its support to the P.A. after Kumaratunga promised to abolish the executive presidency and res tore parliamentary democracy. What is more, she held forth the promise that her government would bring the war in the Northeast to an end and strive for a negotiated settlement. The Chandrika mystique spread like wild fire in Jaffna; shopkeepers made a p rofit selling 'Chandrika' bangles and 'Chandrika' pans.
The euphoria generated by the prospect of talks between the P.A. and the LTTE were soon dissipated. Prabakaran was unhappy with the peace process. The Tigers were only interested in the restoration of normalcy and the creation of a peaceful environment. Colombo, on the other hand, wanted simultaneous talks on a political solution to the ethnic conflict and the return to normalcy. Prabakaran accused the Kumaratunga Government of "bad faith" and started the Third Eelam War in April 1995. It should be poin ted out that during the election campaign in October 1994, the Tigers killed Gamini Dissanayake and some of his followers in a bomb attack. The immediate fallout was the postponement of a government delegation's visit to Jaffna. Kumaratunga, however, did not accuse the LTTE of bad faith, fearing that such statements would adversely affect the peace talks.
WHY did Chandrika Kumaratunga decide to conduct the election in 1999, ahead of schedule? Her decision was based on three assumptions. First, the overall war situation was favourable to her. The LTTE had lost its stronghold in Jaffna and, despite some rev erses, the Army was steadily extending its control in the east. Secondly, the negative approach of the UNP had resulted in the devolution proposals getting bogged down. Kumaratunga wanted to get a new mandate from the people in order to initiate fresh mo ves to break the political impasse. Thirdly, she believed that S. Thondaman, the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC) leader, would be able to mobilise the support of a substantial number of upcountry Tamils. The CWC had extended its support to the UNP in the 1994 elections. Kumaratunga believed that the crucial votes of the Tamils of Indian origin would offset the negative impact of the alienation of Sri Lankan Tamils. A number of Sri Lankan Tamils in Colombo, had either abstained or cast invalid votes in th e local bodies elections held in 1998.
Unfortunately for Kumaratunga, her calculations went awry. From early November, the Tigers began to inflict stunning blows on the Army in the Vanni region. They overran one military garrison after another. The military gains made since 1996 were wiped ou t in a few days. More hurting than the loss of territory, the death of hundreds of soldiers and the loss of considerable arms and equipment was the sagging morale of the armed forces. Panic spread; a few soldiers revolted and several others fled from the field. With the offensive coming a few weeks before the presidential election, Chandrika's popularity took a nosedive. The P.A. and the UNP resorted to mudslinging. The Tigers opened a new front in the Jaffna peninsula and tried to capture Elephant Pass in order to demonstrate their invincibility. Fortunately to Kumaratunga, the armed forces held their ground in the Jaffna peninsula.
The demise of the plantation patriarch, Thondaman, in November 1999 dealt another blow to Kumaratunga. The CWC had assured the P.A. its full support. But the situation began to change with Arumugam Thondaman succeeding his grandfather. The Perani, which Thondaman had formed on the eve of the local body elections, began to fall apart. The National Union of Workers switched sides and extended its support to the UNP. It was followed by the resignation of Chandrasekharan from the Ministry, who also expresse d his support to Wickremasinghe. There were rumblings within the CWC, and persons unhappy with Arumugam began to plead for inner-party democracy and collective leadership. It should also be borne in mind that over the years the UNP had also been building up its strength in the plantation areas.
The election results, however, do not indicate a complete swing in favour of the UNP. In Nuwara Eliya, the UNP won only 5,176 votes more than the P.A. in Badulla and its margin of victory was 5,884 votes. In Kande, Matale, Ratnapura, Kegalle, Kalutara an d Colombo, where there is a sizable presence of Indian Tamils, a number of them voted for Kumaratunga and contributed to the wide margin between the P.A. and the UNP.
On the eve of the election, the morale of the Tigers and their drummer-boys abroad was high. In his annual Heroes' Day address in November, Prabakaran claimed: "The speed of our strikes, the ability of rapid deployment, the unified command, the high disc ipline, the spectacular offensive tactics and the tremendous courage displayed by our fighting formations have astounded world military experts." The LTTE wanted Kumaratunga to be defeated in the election. This objective becomes evident if one understand s the message inherent in the two speeches - one made by Prabakaran and the other by Anton Balasingham, the LTTE ideologue, in London. Prabakaran described Kumaratunga as a "curse on the Tamil people". Balasingham was more forthright: "If Chandrika comes to power again, it can only mean that the problems and hardships will continue... We take no sides but the Tamil people know what to do." The LTTE propaganda was reflected in the Tamil vernacular press.
The UNP was in a bad shape when the election date was announced. Com-pounding its difficulties, a number of leading members of the party, including members of Parliament and members of the Provincial Councils, resigned and started to criticise Wickremasi nghe. However, the military debacles were a godsend for the UNP, and Wickremasinghe began to retrieve the situation. In a frontal attack on Kumaratunga, he said: "She has damaged the economy through her incompetence, demoralised our armed forces with her interference and tinkering in the war and enraged so many sections of our society through her selfish, uncaring attitude." What is more, in order to garner Tamil votes, he glossed over the earlier UNP policy on the ethnic issue and extended an olive br anch to Prabakaran. The UNP manifesto promised a "de-escalation" of war, the establishment of an interim council in the Northern and Eastern Provinces; the introduction of constitutional changes after a "working solution" acceptable to all sections of so ciety has been agreed upon; an immediate end to the "harassment of the people", and the establishment of an independent committee to develop an "action plan" which will address the problems of war victims and displaced persons of all communities.
WHEN the International Observer Group arrived in Colombo on December 16, the contest was very close, with Wickremasinghe having an edge in urban areas and Kumaratunga still the favourite in rural areas. Some commentators even felt that the second prefere nce votes may be taken into account. But the situation radically changed on the night of December 18 when the Tigers attacked the P.A. rally. Kumaratunga and two of her Cabinet colleagues were wounded and 13 persons were killed. A few hours earlier, the Tigers attacked a UNP rally at Ja Ela. Major General Lucky Alagama and seven UNP supporters were killed in the incident.
The cumulative effect was a strong sympathy wave and a sudden shift in favour for Kumaratunga. In a way, Prabakaran unwittingly enabled her to score a big lead over Wickremasinghe. The UNP was taken aback when the Tigers launched the savage attacks. Its electoral machinery was in a state of paralysis on the last two days of the campaign. It was not sure whether the election would be held as scheduled. Fearing violence, many UNP supporters did not exercise their franchise. Vasudeva Nanayakkara, the candi date fielded by the Left and Democratic Alliance, who was expected to win a significant number of votes, polled only 23,668 votes (0.28 per cent). Similarly, even in JVP strongholds, Nandana Gunathilaka did not fare well. The JVP received only 344,173 vo tes (4.03 per cent).
Why did the Tigers attack the UNP rally? Major General Alagama had put down the JVP revolt with a heavy hand. During the Second Eelam War, he was in charge of the eastern theatre, and owing to sustained military pressure the Tigers had to withdraw into J affna peninsula. By killing Alagama, Prabakaran sent across two messages simultaneously. One was that the LTTE would never forgive anyone who tried to tame it. The second was a warning to Wikremasinghe that he would meet the same fate if he tried to cros s swords with the LTTE.
In her statements after the election, Kumaratunga appealed to Prabakaran to eschew violence and join the peace process. She also appealed to the Tamils abroad to persuade Prabakaran to give up armed struggle and accept a solution within a united Sri Lank a. The difficult task of restoring peace can have a small beginning if the P.A. and the UNP sit together and evolve a common strategy. The two understandable concerns - that a solution has to be found within a united Sri Lanka and that Tamils should not be inundated in the North and the East - have to be addressed. The Tamils will also develop stakes in the unity and integrity of the country if arrangements are worked out to share power.
The Tigers, on their part, have maintained that they would not insist on Tamil Eelam if a "viable alternative" is offered. The LTTE had been in touch with a number of concerned persons and organisations, such as British parliamentarians, the Commonwealth Secretary-General and the Norwegian Government. According to media reports, Balasingham held talks with Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) leader Sambandhan in London. At the Heroes Day ceremony, Prabakaran spelt out the preconditions for peace talks: "Peace talks should be held in a cordial, peaceful atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill with the assistance of international third-party mediation." Understandably, Prabakaran was waiting for the outcome of the election and the likely response of the new government.
Indian observers of the Sri Lankan scene feel that in the new millennium, Sri Lanka desperately needs peace. Fresh initiatives should be undertaken to break the deadlock. But any dialogue with the LTTE should be preceded by a Sinhala consensus so that th e issues of war and peace are not subjected to the vagaries of competitive Sinhala politics. In the present context, consensus means the support of 94 per cent of the Sri Lankan population. Colombo should go farther than the present devolution proposals, and new ideas such as asymmetrical devolution should be explored. In the same way, the merits of having an international mediator should be seriously considered. It is certain that no government will extend support to the idea of a separate Eelam. Inter national isolation of the LTTE, except from the Tamils living abroad, is a reality today. The mediator can use his good offices in finalising an agreement; the mediator should also ensure that the agreement is implemented in right earnest.
A major impediment to peace continues to be the intransigence of Prabakaran. His record makes it clear that he will use the interval between negotiations to build up his strength. According to Sri Lankan Govrnment representatives at earlier negotiations, the LTTE "would drag on and on" and put forward new conditions for the return to normalcy. There were no serious talks about a political settlement. In order to pre-empt such a possibility, the LTTE should be persuaded to spell out the details of a "via ble alternative". Colombo can ill-afford to embark on another futile exercise.
The author, a former Director of the Centre for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Madras, was a member of the International Observer Group for the Sri Lankan presidential election. The article contains his views on the subject. They sho uld not be construed as the conclusions and recommendations of the IOG.
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