Tension on the border

AS the attention of the world is focussed on the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan, a 'side show' is on in South Asia.

On the evening of October 15, the simmering tension between New Delhi and Islamabad over their role (perceived and real) in the U.S.' war against terrorism spilled on to the Line of Control (LoC) and the international border. Pakistan alleged that Indian troops resorted to 'unprovoked and indiscriminate' firing on civilian targets, but New Delhi explained that it was a 'punitive action' against attempts by Islamabad to sneak in militants into the Kashmir Valley. Islamabad rebutted India's stand, saying it reflected the latter's "growing frustration over the growing importance of Pakistan in the first war of the 21st century". Significantly, the firing took place hours after George Fernandes was re-appointed Defence Minister and hours before the special plane carrying U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell landed in Islamabad.

The guns were booming on the LoC after a gap of almost 15 months. The LoC and the international border were by and large incident-free after Islamabad enforced an undeclared ceasefire in July 2000. (The ceasefire coincided with the brief but dramatic ceasefire declared by the Hizbul Mujahideen in Jammu and Kashmir.) Although it was christened the 'policy of maximum restraint', Islamabad formalised the ceasefire when India declared a unilateral ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir in the month of Ramzan.

Despite the various ups and downs in India-Pakistan relations since November 2000, Pakistan has continued to observe the 'policy of maximum restraint'. It did not review its policy even when India called off the Ramzan initiative, known as Non-Initiation of Combat Operations (NICO), in May and invited General Pervez Musharraf to India for dialogue. New Delhi has acknowledged this fact on several occasions.

So why has New Delhi suddenly got into a proactive mode? At the heart of the matter is the role India and Pakistan see for themselves U.S.-led campaign against terrorism. New Delhi is convinced that Islamabad is the friend, philosopher and guide of the Taliban and practises jehad as an instrument of foreign policy. It believes that it is jehad that is at play in Kashmir and hence Pakistan cannot be part of the international coalition against terrorism. However, Islamabad contests this; it claims the 'struggle' in Kashmir is indigenous and could not be bracketed with terrorism.

New Delhi tried its best but apparently failed to sell its line to Washington. Since the U.S. needs Pakistan on board in its fight against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden, it has been conferred the status of a 'frontline state' in the war.

Was the firing by the Indian forces on the LoC and the international border an act of 'frustration and jealousy' meant to convey a message to Washington and Islamabad? The Pakistani establishment believes that the 'unprovoked and indiscriminate' firing was meant to take 'advantage of the delicate situation' faced by it. A senior official of the military establishment told Frontline that Pakistan had no doubt that the incidents were timed to coincide with the visit of Powell to Islamabad. "We were assured by Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh a few days ago, in response to a telephone call by Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar, that India did not intend to add to the complexities of the situation faced by Pakistan. We are convinced that this is precisely what the Indian forces have attempted to do. It does not augur well for the normalisation of ties between the two countries," the official said. Two days after the firing by the Indian troops, Pakistan charged New Delhi with amassing troops, including Air Force assets, on its border. The Press Secretary to the Pakistan President and Director-General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Major-General Rashid Quereshi, lost no time in warning India of dire consequences if it attempted any 'mischief or misadventure'.