Renewing ties

The rancour in the wake of Pokhran-II having disappeared, India and Australia move towards a new and more productive phase in the bilateral relationship.

IT is now just a matter of time before an Indian Navy officer once again takes up his assignment as defence adviser at the Indian High Commission in Australia. His Australian counterpart has already resumed his duties in New Delhi.

These two jobs have some symbolism attached to them since Australia took "steps" after the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 to downgrade the relationship between the two countries. Canberra withdrew its Defence Adviser stationed in New Delhi in the wake of Pokhran-II.

Today, however, all that is history. Australia and India have agreed to begin a "strategic dialogue" and are discussing an incremental improvement in the defence relationship. Interestingly, during talks in mid-June with his Australian interlocutors, the visiting External Affairs and Defence Minister, Jaswant Singh, even agreed to the participation of military officers in the "strategic dialogue". This is significant since India does not have such a component in its security dialogues with other countries. Notably, Jaswant Singh's visit was marked by cordiality and warmth - feelings that represent a far cry from the days following the nuclear tests. India and Australia found that they had similar views on the U.S. proposal for a nuclear missile defence (NMD) system.

A sample of the Australian views with regard to India's "outrageous acts" in May 1998 is, however, instructive. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer said in a statement on May 14, 1998: "Australia has and will continue with vigour to use regional and international forums to make clear Australia's opposition to Indian nuclear testing..." He also referred to the "wilful disregard" of world public opinion shown by India by going in for a second round of testing.

When this correspondent asked Downer at a joint press conference with Jaswant Singh in Adelaide what Canberra's response would be in case India, say, tested an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in the future, the Foreign Minister said: "That's a sort of beating-your-wife question." But Downer went on to answer the question thus:

"If India did something, if Rorutania did something outrageous, would we be unhappy about it... I have no reason to believe that India would do any such thing... back in 1998, when India conducted nuclear tests, we responded to that, the Indians felt we responded very strongly, but we responded to that in a way that was exactly commensurate to the way we responded to French nuclear testing back in 1995-96 and I think it was appropriate we did that.

"We have been one of the world's champions of nuclear non-proliferation and arms control for many, many years... we saw the advent of Indian nuclear testing and Pakistani nuclear testing as a setback for that agenda and we made our point. Since then, India has not only brought in a moratorium on testing, and we welcome that, but the Minister (Jaswant Singh) has already explained, the government is working to build a consensus for the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

"We don't want to play into the building of that consensus in any way at all or make the job of the Indian government more difficult by making inappropriate and negative contributions to that debate. And, we see India as one of the world's major nations... when India is supporting global peace and stability that obviously is a major contribution to the world and I think India is a country we can work with..."

Clearly, Downer's new views are a major departure from the past. India was a major nation even in 1998 and remains to be so in 2001. It is evident that India's we-are-still-building-a-consensus on the CTBT and declaration of a voluntary moratorium have provided Downer an "excuse" to re-engage with India.

It is also evident that the Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition government in New Delhi has shown no sustained desire to "build" such a consensus in Parliament, a fact that most New Delhi-based diplomats are possibly aware of.

Like many other countries, Australia has probably taken the cue from the improving India-America dynamic - marked by the visit of President Bill Clinton to India last year - as well as a series of meetings with Indian officials since George Bush succeeded Clinton. Australia would have also seen the growth rates in India and the possibilities of trade and commerce - an issue that can do much to soften the positions of governments on contentious issues. Over 11,000 students are studying in Australian universities today - earning Australia some (Australian) $300 million annually. This is certainly not a small number or figure and is likely to grow in the coming years.

There is little doubt that the Indian nuclear tests have been accepted by Australia at least as a fait accompli. As Jaswant Singh pointed out, the Australians do have concerns about the nuclear issue, but that is not something which has come in the way of enhancing cooperation in different fields. Not so long ago, Australian Prime Minister John Howard was said to have described Canberra as a deputy sheriff to the U.S. in the region. Whatever be the strength of the claim, it might sum up the current Australian government's strategic perspective.

A recent Defence White Paper released by the Howard government said: "At the global level, two interrelated trends seem likely to shape our strategic environment most strongly - globalisation and U.S. strategic primacy. These factors will help strengthen global security and promote economic, social and political developments that align with Australia's interests and values. Our strong alliance with the United States, in particular, is a key strategic asset that will support our bilateral, regional and global interests over the next decade and beyond."

"In the wider Asia-Pacific region, Australia will pursue its objective of supporting strategic stability by developing bilateral dialogues with key countries in the region and contributing to the development of multilateral security forums."

In this perspective, the Australian move to enter into a strategic dialogue with India makes sense for them. India perhaps does not have the same defined view. What direct benefit does a strategic dialogue have for India? One can only wonder.

On the issue of anti-missile defence, Jaswant Singh said in Adelaide: "We do believe that there is a need for a new security framework to emerge globally, marking the demise and the end of the Cold War. But that can emerge only through consultation and as a cooperative endeavour and that is why we feel that any changes, alterations in the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty... must only be through dialogue and discussion between United States... and Russia and for any regional missile initiative countries of the region must be taken into account."

In turn, Downer said: "We both agree that we would prefer to see negotiations between the United States and Russia over the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and would hope those negotiations could lead to successful outcomes to the satisfaction of both parties. I think it's fair to say that both of us very much agree that it's very important the United States undertakes extensive dialogue with its allies, its friends, importantly with China and Russia, on this issue so they fully understand the perspective from which the Americans are coming."

At the same press conference, Jaswant Singh was asked by an Australian reporter what he thought about giving the Americans access to Indian military bases. After referring to the impending visit of the senior U.S. military officer, Gen. Henry Shelton, the External Affairs Minister said: "Military-to-military cooperation is also one of the components of Indo-U.S. cooperation. Access to bases... you are moving too fast yet. Let these things evolve over time." Here, Jaswant Singh is not disputing the issue of access at all. What he is saying is that the reporter is moving too fast and American access to Indian military facilities could evolve "over time".

There is little doubt that the External Affairs Minister's statement represents a major departure on a key tenet of Indian foreign policy which was, so far, considered sacrosanct. However, in these days of a "pragmatic" Indian foreign policy, his statement should hardly come as a surprise. Jaswant Singh's statement does not portend well for the future, it is felt.

With the BJP government, it seems, everything in foreign policy is negotiable, including giving Americans access to Indian military bases. That is the message which Jaswant Singh effectively conveyed in Adelaide.

As far as India and Australia are concerned, it is a new, more productive phase in the bilateral relationship. The recent past, it seems, has now been buried.