The French example

The situation that has arisen following the parliamentary elections can work to Sri Lanka's advantage if the political adversaries are ready for administrative "cohabitation", after the French model.

THE Parliamentary election results in Sri Lanka make it clear that the country is going to witness the phenomenon of an executive President from one political party having to contend with the Parliamentary majority of a rival political party. The situation, however, is not unprecedented: the country has witnessed such a situation twice before. But, the current situation is more complicated and, if not handled with finesse, may lead to civil strife that can tear the polity apart.

The executive presidency was introduced by Junius Richard Jayewardene in 1978 . At that time the United National Party (UNP) held 141 of the 168 seats in Parliament. Ranasinghe Premadasa became Prime Minister and assumed a role that created the impression that the Premier too was a power centre in the new set-up. However, it was more of an image than the reality, and in actual constitutional terms the Prime Minister's office was no longer a powerful one. It was the irrepressible personality and political drive of Premadasa, combined with Jayewardene's acumen, that allowed his deputy such an assertive role, that led to such a perception. The real nature of the prime ministerial office was exposed when an authoritative and domineering Premadasa became executive President and a meek and submissive Dingiri Banda Wijetunga Premier in 1989. The latter held office in a lacklustre manner and the prime ministerial post seemed badly devalued. Later, when D.B. Wijetunga became President and Ranil Wickremasinghe Prime Minister, the situation changed to a limited extent. A working relationship in which the younger and more dynamic Wickremasinghe adopted an active role considerably enhanced the position of the occupant of 'Temple Trees'. The negative waves caused by Wijetunga's ill-conceived political utterances were somewhat contained by Wickremasinghe's moderate and pragmatic approach.

The situation reversed again when Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga became President and her mother Sirima Bandaranaike Prime Minister in November 1994. Kumaratunga, who was Premier earlier, continued to reside in Temple Trees while the grand old lady of Sri Lankan politics remained at her Rosemead Place residence. The sick and feeble Bandaranaike could not discharge her prime ministerial duties efficiently. Moreover, her being a Minister without portfolio rendered her completely " jobless", in practice. Such a state of affairs was unlikely to have been tolerated anywhere else in the world. However, the feudal and hierarchical tradition of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the respect shown by the Opposition leader the "Gentleman" Ranil to Bandaranaike, rendered any criticism mute. After Bandaranaike ceased to be Prime Minister, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake became Premier and took up residence at "Temple Trees". The People's Alliance (P.A.) lost its parliamentary majority during his tenure. A bitter struggle ensued between the government and the Opposition. It culminated in the premature dissolution of Parliament and fresh elections.

Sri Lanka's Presidents in the past, with two exceptions, enjoyed majority support in Parliament, which reduced the chances of friction between the chief executive and the largely ceremonial primus inter pares Prime Minister. The chances of a President-Parliament conflict arose first in 1994 and then in 2001. Both situations were resolved or managed in different ways. Now, with the latest round of elections, a conflict situation has arisen in a manner that far surpasses the previous experience.

In August 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga came to power and cobbled together a parliamentary majority with the help of the Muslim Congress and the Up Country People's Front. The President was D.B. Wijetunga of the UNP, who could have sought re-election in November 1994 if he so desired. Wijetunga could have exercised his executive powers and countered every move by Kumaratunga. However, Wijetunga bowed to the will of the people and offered little resistance. Kumaratunga became Prime Minister and for all practical purposes exercised power in a manner akin to the Premiers of the pre-1978 era. Although he retained executive powers in theory, Wijetunga reverted in practice to being a mere constitutional head. Thus a conflict situation was averted. In November 1994, Kumaratunga became President and once again the country had a President, a Prime Minister and a parliamentary majority of the same political persuasion.

The second conflict situation arose in 2001 after Rauff Hakeem and seven members of Parliament of the Muslim Congress crossed over to the Opposition. The events that followed are too well known to be recounted again. That phase was one of intense conflict. The prorogation of Parliament, the lapse of the state emergency, the announcement of a referendum, the pact with the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and so on characterised a conflictual chapter in the country's political history. Finally came the dissolution of Parliament and the elections.

AGAINST such a backdrop, what are the options available to both sides? Given the electoral rhetoric, a conflict situation may well be on the cards. Refusal to cooperate may lead to confrontation and chaos. It is to be hoped that saner counsel will prevail and that rhetoric of the political platform will be forgotten. For both sides, the practical option would be to accept the inevitable and explore the possibilities of achieving a working relationship. The President could voluntarily not exercise her executive powers and instead opt to be guided by Parliament on most counts. Through practice, usage and adoption of a new set of conventions, the President could metamorphose into a titular or constitutional head of state. On the other hand, the Prime Minister could develop into the de facto head of State. Two positive features could evolve as a result. The need to abolish the executive Presidency may be negated and a progressive era of bipartisan cooperation could begin. This could mark a golden period in the country's constitutional evolution.

For the realisation of such an Utopian vision, a period of politico-administrative "cohabitation" between the President and the Prime Minister is required. Cohabitation, which has the same spelling and meaning in both French and English, entered the political lexicon after the French experience. Since the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka is a mixture of the French Gaullist and Westminster models, the temptation to hope for the repetition of a French experience in the Island is great. However, It may be fallacious to draw analogies between the French and Sri Lankan situations. A brief examination of the origin and evolution of the cohabitation concept is relevant to understanding the issues involved.

The long-festering Algerian revolt against French colonialism imposed tremendous strains on the existing political system in France. The Army wanted guarantees that Algeria would be under permanent French domination and it was in a state of armed rebellion against the civilian government. Public opinion favoured a negotiated peace. The Fourth Republic could neither govern authoritatively nor retain credible respect at that stage. A crisis was averted when the Second World War hero, General Charles de Gaulle, was appointed Premier in 1958. His appointment was based on the understanding that he would present a new Constitution to the country for approval.

The Constitution of the Fifth Republic provided for a strong President who had to share power with a Prime Minister who in turn was answerable to a majority in the National Assembly. In keeping with De Gaulle's political opinion, the Assembly's role was confined to a legislative capacity and its sovereignty was eroded heavily. The new Constitution was ambivalent about the exact role of the President and somewhat vague about his or her relationship with the Prime Minister and the government. The President could appoint and therefore presumably remove the Prime Minister. De Gaulle, like J.R. Jayewardene, was an imposing personality and soon stamped his authority on the new system. Defence and colonial affairs, including Algeria, as well as foreign affairs became his exclusive domain.

The end of the Algerian war in 1962 saw a definite shift of power to the presidency. The President was no longer chosen by an electoral college but elected directly by popular vote. De Gaulle's reluctance to enmesh himself in routine administration and his disdain for domestic policy-making allowed Prime Ministers under him to wield great responsibility and authority.However, subsequent Presidents intervened in governance very often and asserted their authority. The 1981-1986 period under Francois Mitterrand is a case in point. However, there were limits to absolute presidential authority in a country with liberal traditions and values as well as powerful autonomous institutions. Even before "cohabitation" proper occurred in 1985 Mitterrand had begun to delegate responsibility to the Prime Minister and the Government.

In 1986 the "leftist" Mitterrand was confronted with a "rightist" government under Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. It was a major test for the Fifth Republic. Hence, in political terms cohabitation came to mean cooperation between parties for specific purposes without actually forming a coalition. Although cohabitation was essentially a constitutional relationship, it also involved a temporary collaboration where responsibilities overlapped. The Mitterrand-Chirac cohabitation evolved into a state where the government under the Premier legislated on domestic issues while the President confined himself strictly to "advice" and "arbitration". While the portfolios of foreign and European policies were shared, defence and nuclear policies remained the exclusive preserve of the President. The presidency also retained its privileged status.

Interestingly, although cohabitation initially seemed to circumscribe the presidency in theory, actual practice saw it reaping political benefits for the incumbent President. Through adroit political manoeuvring, Mitterrand began to capitalise on the domestic problems of the government. Moreover, by intervening only in issues where the government was at an obvious disadvantage, Mitterrand laid the groundwork for a comfortable victory in the Presidential re-election of 1988 against the badly divided rightist forces. To avert the threat of further cohabitation, Mitterrand promised to reduce the presidential term of office from seven to five years so as to coincide with the life of the legislature. However he failed to apply the pledge to himself, and cohabitation returned in 1993 and went on until Mitterrand bid adieu in 1995. The two periods of cohabitation, during 1986-88 and 1993-95, helped France tide over severe political strains. Moreover, the distinction between the Social Democratic Left and the Right blurred over the years.

It is a moot point as to whether cohabitation in the French example can be relevant in the Sri Lankan context. The political cultures are vastly different and the liberal values of tolerance, cooperation and notions of respecting democratic principles are regrettably absent or insignificant in the case of Sri Lanka. Moreover, there has been a marked reluctance to devolve power and de-centralise authority at multiple levels.